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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to investigate the determinants of capital structure in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia and their effect on firms’ performance. The study 
addresses the following primary question: What are the factors that influence the capital 
structure of SMEs in Malaysia? The sample of this research is SMEs in the east coast 
region of Malaysia. Adopting a positivist paradigm, the research design includes a 
preliminary study comprising 25 interviews with the owner-managers of SMEs, which is 
analysed using thematic analysis. The results are used to finalise the conceptual 
framework for the main study, which takes the form of a self-completion questionnaire 
survey. Usable responses were received from 384 firms, giving a response rate of 75.3%. 
The survey data is analysed using a series of binomial logistic regression models.  
 
Results reveal that there was no indication for the impact of owner’s education and 
experience on capital structure decisions. Other owner-related factors, firm characteristics, 
management performance and environment were found to relate to all types of capital 
structure. Both complete and partial mediating effects are also discovered in this study. 
The results provide evidence to support the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and culture model of 
Schwartz (1994). It appeared that owner-managers in Malaysia do not strive to adjust their 
capital structure towards some optimal debt ratio, which is contrary to the static trade-off 
theory (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) of capital structure.  
 
This study makes several important contributions to the existing studies of capital 
structure. This research led to the development of a model of capital structure 
determinants by integrating factors related to owner-managers, firms, culture, and 
environment. This study incorporates methodological triangulation that may mitigate the 
problem of the difficulties in accessing financial data of SMEs in Malaysia. This study 
also provides meaningful insight into the financing preferences of the owner-managers 
with relevant implementations to academics, business practitioners, financial providers 
and policymakers. The research findings should assist owner-managers in making optimal 
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capital structure decisions as well as help the policymaker in making an appropriate policy 
on the financing. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
  
This study investigates the determinants of capital structure in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs)
1
 in Malaysia and their effect on firms’ performance. SMEs play an 
important role in the global economy (Danis, Chiaburu, and Lyles, 2006; Johan, 2007) 
and are considered to be the engines for growth and employment in both developed and 
developing countries (Storey, 1994; Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Boocock and Shariff, 
2005; Watson, 2006; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Mbonyane and Ladzani, 2011). In 
Malaysia, 99% of businesses are SMEs, and they account for 32% of GDP and 64% of 
total employment (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2011). The contribution of SMEs 
to Malaysia’s GDP is expected to increase to around MYR120 billion by 2020 (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2013).  
 
SMEs are valued for their potential to grow into larger, more productive units, their 
ability to invest in and adopt new technologies, and their ability to adapt to new 
economic circumstances (Berry, Rodriguez, and Sandee, 2001). Financial constraints 
can ruin a good business idea (Gould and Parzen, 1990), contribute to business failure 
(Baumback and Lawyer, 1979), or hinder growth and development (Hall, 2002; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). One of the most widely cited challenges they 
face in many countries is access to finance (Hughes and Storey, 1994; Hood, 2000; 
APEC, 2000; Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; SMIDEC, 2002; Salleh and Ndubisi, 
2006; Reynolds and Lancaster, 2006; Hussain and Matlay, 2007; Robb and Fairlie, 
2007; UNDP, 2007). A number of studies have focused on financial challenges faced by 
SMEs in Malaysia (Chee, 1986; APEC, 1994; Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2005; 
Saleh and Ndubisi, 2006; Hooi, 2006; Aris, 2007; Saleh, Caputi, and Harvie, 2008; Isa, 
2008; Wahab and Buyong, 2008; Abdullah and Manan, 2010). Not surprisingly, the 
                                                          
1
 SMEs comprise unincorporated businesses and companies. SMEs are defined as firms employing up to 
50 full-time employees for service sectors and 150 full-time employees for manufacturing sectors, or 
those with an annual sales turnover not exceeding MYR5 million for service sectors and MYR25 million 
for manufacturing sectors (http://www.smecorp.gov.my/vn2/). 
2 
 
problem of access to finance for SMEs has also attracted interest from policymakers 
such as the SME Corporation of Malaysia and Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
 
Previous research shows that the capital structure of SMEs differs from that of large 
companies (Rivaud-Danset, Dubocage, and Salais, 1998) and suggests this is due to the 
limited amount of information small firms disclose (Newman, Gunessee, and Hilton, 
2011) and their asset structure (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997). Compared to small firms, 
larger firms tend to provide more information to lenders (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Peel 
and Wilson, 1996; Abor and Biekpe, 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007) because larger 
firms have a higher fixed to total asset ratio, lower current liabilities relative to total 
assets, and lower financial risks. Smaller, younger firms are more likely to face higher 
finance costs and demand for collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995). Consequently, owner-
managers of smaller firms tend to rely on internal sources of finance such as personal 
savings and funds from family and friends. The Census of Establishment and Enterprises 
(2005) by the Department of Statistics Malaysia also revealed the similar results. 
 
1.2 Research problem and rationale for the study 
 
The literature confirms a significant association between the availability of finance and 
SME growth (Cook, 2001), leading to the notion of a finance gap. The finance gap 
refers to ‘a situation where a firm has profitable opportunities but there are no, or 
insufficient, funds (either from internal or external sources) to exploit those 
opportunities’ (Jarvis and Schizas, 2012, p.362). According to Abdullah and Manan 
(2010), accessibility and sufficiency of funds is the major barrier to the growth of SMEs. 
Zabri (2013) suggests that financial accessibility of SMEs could be achieved through 
improving understanding of their financial practices. Hence, it is important to investigate 
the determinants of capital structure of SMEs to understand their financial practices 
further. 
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Although there are a number of studies covering capital structure in the developed 
nations during the last five decades (e.g. Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris, 1999; 
Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios, 2000; Hall, Hutchinson, and Michaelas, 2000; 
Riportella and Martinez, 2003; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Johnsen 
and McMahon, 2005; Vos et al., 2007; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010), very few 
studies have focused on the developing countries like ASEAN, as argued by 
Deesomsak, Krishna, and Pescetto (2004). Predictably, studies in developing countries 
(e.g. Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Wu, Song, and Zeng, 2008; Newman et 
al., 2011; Abdullah, Manan, and Khadijah, 2011) produce results that conflict with those 
from Western studies. Klapper, Sarria-Allende, and Zaidi (2006) assert that financial 
theories of capital structure, initially developed to illuminate the financing behaviour of 
firms in developed countries, might not be applicable in developing countries due to 
cultural and institutional differences. There are considerable debates over the use of the 
terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing country’. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
classifies developed countries as those with advanced economies, which comprise 
65.8% of the global nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and 52.1% of global GDP 
(PPP
2
) in 2010. Alternatively, the World Bank (2013) defines developing countries as 
countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) of USD 11,905 and under, per capita, per 
year. Based on the list taken from the International Statistical Institution (http://www.isi-
web.org), Malaysia is included in the latter category. By focusing on SMEs in Malaysia, 
this study also fills the gap highlighted by Harris and Raviv (1991) to test capital 
structure theory in firms of different sizes as well as various contexts. 
 
A number of factors have been identified to have an influence on a firm’s capital 
structure of the SMEs. Existing theoretical frameworks from finance and strategic 
management set out to explain the determinants of the capital structure of SMEs. These 
include pecking order theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf; 1984), 
trade-off theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), and financial growth cycle theory (Berger and Udell, 
                                                          
2
 PPP- Purchasing Power Parity 
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1998) from the finance paradigm, and theoretical frameworks developed by several 
authors in the strategic management paradigm (see Barton and Matthews, 1989; 
Matthews et al., 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998; Romano et al., 2000). Although 
numerous empirical studies have been undertaken to examine the determinants of capital 
structure on the basis of these theories, there is still no agreement among economists as 
to which of the existing theories present the best description of the actual behaviour of 
firms. 
 
In addition, while there is a broad and growing body of empirical studies investigating 
the influence of these factors on firms’ capital structure, the findings are not always 
consistent in terms of direction of the association between capital structure and its 
determinants. Graham and Leary (2011) established that, although a lot of studies had 
been done in investigating capital structure of the firms, the results obtained are still 
unclear. They asserted that it might be due to wrong measurement of key variables, 
investigation on the wrong models or issues, misspecification of managerial decision 
process, or unresponsive of owner-managers.  
 
The existing theoretical and field studies also show that the capital structure decision has 
a considerable influence on the performance of the firm (Ramadan, 2009). Practicing 
managers and behavioural scientists have looked more carefully at the effects of capital 
structure decisions on organisational performance (Forbes, 2002; Assaf, 2005; 
Hutchinson and Gul, 2006; Ludvigson and Ng, 2007), however, these types of studies 
are still few within the SME context. There is little evidence of the association between 
capital structure and a firm’s performance. Theoretically, the optimal mix of capital 
structure minimises the weighted average cost of capital of a firm and maximises 
performance in terms of shareholders’ wealth (Ramadan, 2009).  
 
In Malaysia, previous studies concerning the financial practices of SMEs have focused 
especially on financing issues and the sources and uses of funds employed for the 
business (see Rozali et al, 2006; Saleh and Ndubisi, 2006; Hassan, 2008). Studies on 
capital structure were mostly on listed companies (see Booth et al., 2001; Zain, 2003; 
5 
 
Pandey, 2004; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Wan Mahmood and Mat Kila, 2008; Yau, Lau, 
and Liwan, 2008; Ahmed and Hisham, 2009; Gurcharan, 2010) and there was less 
investigation on the capital structure of SMEs (see Ismail and Razak, 2003; Rozali et al., 
2008; Wahab and Buyong, 2008; Abdullah and Manan, 2010; Zabri, 2013). Moreover, 
comparative studies among ethnic groups in relation to SMEs’ capital structure 
determinants are still rare in international research (e.g. Smallbone et al., 2003; Fairlie 
and Robb, 2007). Despite the importance of equality issues in Malaysia, there is no such 
research (i.e. focusing on ethnicity issue and financing) being conducted in Malaysia.  
 
There are relatively few empirical studies exploring the perception of owner-managers 
in finance even though they actually play a vital role in SMEs’ financing decisions. 
Alternatively, most of the prior studies in capital structure determinants obtained 
information from secondary sources of panel data such as Affärsdata, Datastream, Osiris 
database, Global Vantage database, Compustat, Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database, public databases, Worldscope financial data, Social and Behavioural 
Instruments (SABI) database, annual reports, and others. This study, therefore, 
investigates empirically the financing patterns of SMEs using data gathered from SME 
owners. With reference to the existing studies on capital structure of SMEs in Malaysia, 
there does not appear to be any empirical work investigating the impact of environment, 
managerial attitudes, culture, and network ties on SMEs’ financing in Malaysia, which 
has led to this current research, with the aim to fill the gap. 
 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
 
In this thesis, the researcher will enhance understanding in the area of capital structure 
as this research is based on a combination of various models (e.g. Romano et al., 2000; 
Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). This study adapts 
those models with a view to improve prediction and explanation of the components of 
capital structure determinants in SMEs in Malaysia. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the determinants of capital structure in SMEs in Malaysia and their effects on 
firm’s performance. The scope of the study is limited to the registered SMEs (i.e. 
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mixture of incorporated and unincorporated firms) in the east coast region of Malaysia 
which comply with the definition (i.e. definition of SMEs) given by the SME 
Corporation of Malaysia (http://www.smecorp.gov.my/). Malaysia is chosen as the 
institutional context for this study in order to test the external validity of western-
developed theories. The specific objectives of the study are:  
1. To develop a theoretical framework for the determinants of capital structure. 
2. To investigate the influence of owner-manager characteristics, firm 
characteristics, management performance and external factors on capital 
structure. 
3. To investigate the impact of capital structure and its determinants on 
organisational performance. 
4. To investigate the direct and indirect effects of ethnicity3 on capital structure. 
5. To examine any differences in the financing patterns of Malay owner-managers 
and ethnic minority owner-managers (Chinese and Indian)
4
.  
 
1.4 Overview of the methodology 
  
This research design incorporates methodological triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). The preliminary study comprised 25 semi-structured interviews with owner-
managers of SMEs to gain initial understanding of the constructs and to generate their 
domains and measurement items. This prepared the way for a pilot survey to test the 
draft questionnaire. The main study took the form of a questionnaire survey to collect 
data from the owner-managers of 384 SMEs, the results of which were analysed 
statistically. In addition, 20 follow-up interviews were conducted to provide contextual 
and historical information and aid the interpretation of the results. 
  
                                                          
3
 There are three major ethnic groups in Malaysia, namely Malay, Chinese, and Indian. They have equal 
rights in every aspects of life, for example in political (e.g. voting rights or right in representing the state), 
economic, or social activities. 
4
 This objective is pertinent with the introduction of the ECER (East Coast Economic Region) and equality 
issue (i.e. 1Malaysia). The East Coast Economic Region (ECER) is one of Malaysia’s Development Plans. 
The ECER was introduced by Malaysia’s fifth Prime Minister, Y.A.B. Dato’ Seri Abdullah Bin Hj. Ahmad 
Badawi. The region consists of four states which cover 51% of Peninsular Malaysia. On the other hand, 
1Malaysia was introduced by the current Prime Minister, Dato’ Seri Najib Bin Tun Razak. 
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1.5 Overview of the contribution of the research 
 
This study makes several important contributions to the existing studies of capital 
structure. The main contributions of the study are: 
i. Unlike previous studies which mainly focus on the firm characteristics, this 
study develops a model of capital structure determinants by integrating 
factors related to owner-managers, firms, culture, and environment. 
ii. This research is the first study in Malaysia that investigates the issue of 
capital structure among different ethnic groups.  
iii. This study incorporates methodological triangulation that may mitigate the 
problem of the difficulties in accessing financial data of SMEs in Malaysia. 
iv. Unlike previous studies which generally employed debt (short or long-term) 
as a dependent variable, this study employs sources of internal and external 
debt and equity as dependent variables in multivariate models.  
v. This study is the first study that investigates the direct association between 
determinants of capital structure and firm performance and the mediating 
role of the capital structure for the aforementioned associations. 
vi. This study provides meaningful insight into the financing preferences of the 
entrepreneurs with relevant implementations to academics and business 
practitioners and advisors (e.g. financial providers or policymakers).  
  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews the 
literature while Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework, hypotheses and research 
questions. Chapter 4 describes and justifies the research design and methods for the 
preliminary study and the main study. Chapter 5 provides a description of the data and 
variables analysed in the preliminary study and the main study; it also presents 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 reports the findings of the preliminary study (semi-
structured interviews). Chapter 7 presents and discusses the results of the main study 
(survey). The final chapter draws conclusions by discussing the results in the context of 
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the research questions and highlighting the contribution of the study. It also points out 
the limitations of the study, which leads to recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is a review of the literature on the capital structure, its determinants and the 
theoretical relationship between the capital structure and its determinants. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of theoretical perspectives that support in explaining the SMEs’ 
financing decisions. This chapter also examines other theoretical perspectives which 
may aid in the understanding of SMEs’ capital structure. The next section identifies each 
determinant of capital structure by highlighting the definitions of each determinant and 
theories that explained each determinant. The chapter then reviews few available studies 
that have investigated some of the factors in the direct or indirect relationship between 
determinants of capital structure and capital structure with the firms’ performance. The 
final section articulates the identified gaps in the literature and the possible directions of 
this research and also summarises the whole chapter. 
 
2.2 Capital structure 
 
Capital structure refers to ‘the mix of debt and equity maintained by the firm’ (Gitman 
and Zutter, 2012, p. 508). It could be defined as a mix of sources of financing that 
appears in the balance sheet (Keown et al., 1985). Romano et al. (2000) categorise 
capital structure into four main parts: capital and retained profits, family loans, debt, and 
equity. Alternatively, Gibson (2002) suggests five types of source of finance, namely 
owner equity, related person debt, trade credit, bank loan, and other debt or equity such 
as credit cards, venture capital, and government loans. On the other hand, Burns (2001) 
classifies sources of finance into two categories: long-term finance such as equity from 
private investment and other people’s money, bank loans, leasing, and hire purchase, 
and short-term finance, for instance, bank overdrafts, short-term loans, and factoring. 
Marlow et al. (2003) categorise it into three types: private investment (e.g. personal 
monies and funds from friends and families), public investment (e.g. government loans, 
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grants, and public equity finance) and private external finance (e.g. bank loans and 
overdrafts, asset finance and asset-based finance).  
 
Frank and Goyal (2005) suggest three sources of finance accessible to firms: retained 
earnings, debt, and equity. In addition, Rozali et al. (2006) categorise it into self-
financing, the government scheme, short-term loans from banks, medium term loans 
from banks, long-term loans, venture capital, and financing from non-bank financial 
institutions. Irwin and Scott (2010) classifies sources of finance into personal savings, 
personal and business bank loans, private and business credit cards, redundancy, re-
mortgage family and friends, leasing, hire purchases, microfinance, grants and others.  
 
Deakins, Whittam, and Wyper (2010) recommend two main categories of sources of 
finance: internal and external. An internal source of finance comprises of internal debt 
and internal equity. The main internal sources of finance for sole proprietors are as 
follows: retained earnings
5
, personal finance (e.g. savings, credit cards, internal equity, 
sale of assets or inventories, working capital, and funds from family and friends) 
(Titman, Keown, and Martin, 2011). Ou and Haynes (2006) assert that retained earnings 
are the main source of finance for SMEs. It was also considered to be the most preferred 
source of finance in most of the countries. Other than retained earnings, personal savings 
were also found to be the primary source of finance for SMEs (Fraser, 2004; Scott, 
2010; UNDP, 2007). Personal savings means the owner’s financial sources, whether in 
terms of cash, personal credit cards, personal loans, winnings, inheritance, or investment 
income (Scott, 2010). 
 
In addition, funds from family and friends mean savings or assets of the family members 
or friends. These types of sources of finance are very important for SMEs, especially in 
supporting ethnic minority businesses (Smallbone et al., 2003; Robb and Fairley, 2007; 
Fairley and Robb, 2007) or family businesses (Romano et al., 2000). Sale of asset is a 
sale which generates profit or loss (Woods, 2009). This usually happens in a situation 
                                                          
5
 Retained earnings mean a ‘net profit available for distribution, less any distributions made, i.e. the 
amount kept within the company’ (Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 2008, p. 382). 
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where firms are unable to get finance from any other sources. Sometimes, firms may 
decide to stop offering certain goods or services in order to sell the fixed assets. 
Moreover, working capital is ‘the capital that is used to finance the day-to-day 
operations of a company’ (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 2010, p. 437). It is also 
defined as current assets minus current liabilities. According to McCosker (2000), SMEs 
should ensure that they have adequate working capital to avoid any problem related to 
working capital, especially during an expansion period. This is because, if the working 
capital is small, it will cause a cash flow problem. The firms may fail to pay suppliers on 
time or be unable to claim discounts for on-time payment (Basu and Altinay, 2002).  
 
On the other hand, external sources of finance means funds obtained from an 
organisation from an outside source (Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 2008). 
It comprises of debt and equity. Debt consists of bank loans, bank overdrafts, foreign 
loans, leasing
6
 and hire purchases
7
, trade credits, factoring
8
, and loans from non-bank 
financial institutions. Financing with external equity is relatively expensive and may 
create problems of control and decision making. Most small firms were found to be 
averse to using this type of finance (Berger and Udell, 1998; Binks et al., 1991; Hughes, 
1997). When seeking external finance, bank loans appear to represent most of the 
businesses’ primary choices (for example Boocock and Wahab, 1997; Romano et al., 
2000; SBS, 2004; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Abdullah et al., 2011; Ibrahim and 
Masron, 2011). According to EOS Gallup Europe (2005), about 79% of SMEs used 
bank financing, followed by leasing companies. The lowest source used by these EU-
based SMEs was a source from venture capital companies (2%).   
 
                                                          
6
 Lease is a ‘contract between the owner of a specific asset (the lessor) and another party (the lessee), 
allowing the latter to hire the assets’ (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 2010, p.259). 
7
 Hire purchase is ‘a method of buying goods in which the purchaser takes possession of them as soon as 
a deposit has been paid and obtains ownership of the goods when all the agreed number of subsequent 
instalments have been paid’ (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 2010, p.221). 
8
 Factoring is based on ‘the buying of trade debts of a manufacturer, assuming the task of debt collection 
and accepting the credit risk, thus providing the manufacturer with working capital’ (Oxford Dictionary of 
Accounting, 2010). 
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2.3 Financial theories of capital structure 
 
Capital structure theory was initiated by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who hypothesised 
that when there are no taxes, the market will be more efficient. They indicated that the 
firm’s value does not depend on the amount of debts taken by the firm. According to 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the model depends on two keys: arbitrage and borrowing 
on personal account. The former is a process ensuring that two firms varying only in 
their capital structure must have the same performance. The latter means that an investor 
raises a personal loan through a share that he/she held in a levered firm. He/she can sell 
the share, spend the proceeds in the unlevered firm, or increase his/her income without 
additional costs.  
 
In a further study, Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduced corporate taxes into the 
existing model and found that once this underlying assumption was relaxed, capital 
structure can become relevant because the value of firms increases. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) affirmed that the firm’s value does depend on the amount of debts 
employed by the firm. They considered the tax shield benefits associated with the debt 
used. 
 
In addition to the tax model of Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977) introduced 
personal taxes into the model (i.e. previously only corporate taxes). According to Miller 
(1977), firms may continue to utilise debt until the marginal investor’s personal tax 
equals the corporate tax rate. This is because additional supply of debts may increase 
interest rates until the tax advantages of interest deduction are equalised by higher rates. 
 
Subsequently, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduced accounting depreciation and 
investment tax credits by referring to Miller’s (1977) personal tax theory. They stressed 
that non-debt tax shields may lead to the market equilibrium as firms without profit 
would be unable to be benefited through tax advantage.  
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Modigliani and Miller’s theory has been expanded by Myers and Majluf (1984). They 
proposed that firms rely on internal funds at the beginning of the business. For those 
firms with less information to provide, they may use less debt capital as they encounter a 
problem of asymmetric information and possess high earnings, respectively. Durand et 
al. (1989) criticised the theory of efficient market (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). They 
stressed the effect of imperfectness in the market, a preference for present income over 
future returns, transaction costs and institutional restriction; on capital structure and the 
value of the firm. More recently, Ebrahim and Mathur (2007) addressed the limitations 
of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) model and rejected the optimal pricing parameters of 
debts. They stressed the same negotiating ability of individuals (who are resorting to 
Modigliani and Miller’s arbitrages) with lenders as that available to the organisation.  
 
2.3.1 Pecking order theory 
 
Pecking order theory was initially proposed by Donaldson (1961), who found that 
owner-managers prefer to finance investment using retained earnings instead of external 
funds, regardless of the size of the firm. Debt would be repaid if retained earnings 
exceeded investment needs. Alternatively, if external funds were required, external 
equity would be the last option chosen by the firms after the safest security and debt.  
 
Myers (1977, 1984) then developed a hierarchical pecking order of preferred sources of 
firm’s finance. Accordingly, retained earnings are used whenever possible. Debt 
financing will be used if there are insufficient retained earnings. Alternatively, equity 
will be used in exceptional circumstances since it involves relatively high constraints in 
the management of the business. The debt tax shields encourage the use of debt as 
opposed to equity financing (Kemsley and Nissim, 2002) as a tax shield may reduce the 
income tax payments. 
 
The theory also affirms that following particular financing hierarchy will maximise the 
value of the firms (Myers, 1977, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory assumes 
there is no optimal debt-to-equity ratio. Firms will utilise all available internal funds 
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before choosing an external finance, especially external equities, in order to avoid 
dilution of control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991). However, in reality, some 
companies issue equity even when other sources are not fully exhausted (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002).   
 
In terms of debt finance, banks were thought to be the most favourable external sources 
of finance. The main reason was because bank finance results in no loss of equity and 
little dilution of ownership control and, obviously, managers are concerned with 
independence (Read, 1998) and financial freedom (Bolton, 1971; Cressy, 1995). They 
do not want to lose control of their business and properties (Hamilton and Fox, 1998). 
This situation mostly happens in small firms as external equity is considered as being a 
relatively uncommon source of financing in small firms. The main reason is that few 
owners have the means to absolutely own their firms, and small firms are less likely to 
share markets; thus, debt financing is a requirement for most SMEs (Batten and 
Hettihewa, 1999). 
 
Another critical issue in this theory is that of how capital structure is affected by the 
relationship between the capabilities to generate internal funds (i.e. retained profits) and 
the viewpoint of getting new investment projects. According to the theory, only 
companies that are expecting to generate profitable growth options will need external 
financing if internally generated funds are not large enough. The aforementioned 
arguments confirmed the findings of Hutchinson (2003) who asserted that those with a 
lower level of earnings will make use of external funds. According to Hutchinson 
(2003), it is more likely that smaller firms will need to borrow than larger firms when 
faced with investment opportunities. Alternatively, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
stated that the debt would only be issued when there was a shortage of internal funds. 
This is because, logically, if there is readily available internal financing, firms will 
prefer to settle up the debt instead of borrowing it. However, Cowling, Liu, and Ledger, 
(2012) maintained that owners who are reluctant to consider external equity under any 
conditions will not move down the pecking order to that point.  
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The problem of ‘information asymmetry’9 is quite inter-related with the hierarchical 
system of pecking order theory (Newman et al., 2011). In fact, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
had considered the issue of information asymmetry when developing the pecking order 
model. They assumed that asymmetric information problems drive the capital structure 
of firms. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), common stocks would be undervalued 
by the market since owner-managers possess more information about the firm than the 
investors. Leverage would increase concurrently with the level of information 
asymmetry when greater risk is attached to a firm. Moreover, according to Lopez-Gracia 
and Sanchez-Andujar (2007), businesses will start financing their project using the 
internal source of financing as there was no information cost. The second choice was 
debt or borrowing, and the final choice was external equity, which has the highest 
information costs.  
 
This theory is relevant to SMEs as they are opaque and carry high information costs 
(Psillaki, 1995), especially those with a relatively short historical performance (Cressy 
and Olofsson, 1997; Cressy, 2006; Reid, 1996; Paul, Whittam, and Wyper, 2007; Mac 
an Bhaird and Lucey, 2011). SMEs are averse towards losing control over their firms 
(Berggren, Olofsson, and Silver, 2000) which leads them to prefer financing options that 
minimise imposition into their business activities. According to Jordan, Lowe, and 
Taylor (1998), the primary explanatory factor for SMEs to stick to the pecking order 
theory of financing is the desire of the owner-manager to maintain independence and 
retain control of the firm.  Additionally, Cosh and Hughes (1994) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) found that SMEs are likely to be affected by adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), moral hazard and 
adverse selection can be overcome only by providing collateral to the banks.  
 
  
                                                          
9
 This refers to the disparity between the information available to firms and lenders (Abor and Biekpe, 
2007). It refers to the situation where all relevant information is not known by the interested parties 
(Peirson et al., 1999) due to the concept of confidentiality of owner-managers towards outside investors. 
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2.3.2 Trade-off theory 
 
In contrast to pecking order theory, where there is no target debt ratio, trade-off theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), assumes the existence of optimal capital structure. According 
to Myers (1984), an optimal capital structure is determined by substituting equity for 
debt and vice versa until the value of the firm is maximised (e.g. trade-off the cost and 
benefits of debt).  It means firms trade-off between the financial distress derived from 
debt (i.e. when firms are unable to meet the interest and principal payments) and tax 
savings (Seifert and Gonenc, 2008). Thus, most of the firms would use a fair deal of 
debt to take advantage of tax deductibles (Myers, 1984). However, the firms would not 
utilise debt excessively to avoid the problem of bankruptcy (Myers, 1984).  
 
According to Myers (1984), firms set the target debt ratio and move towards achieving 
it. In contrast to pecking order theory, this theory suggests that more profitable firms 
have a higher target debt ratio. This is because higher profitability firms ensure lower 
probability of bankruptcy, higher tax savings from debt, and higher overinvestment. 
Scott (1976) stressed that a trade-off between bankruptcy cost and the tax advantage of 
borrowing determines the optimal debt ratio of a firm. However, this effect can be 
insignificant due to the existence of non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) 
and personal taxes (Miller, 1977). Further, Eriotis, Vasiliou, and Ventoura-Neokosmidi 
(2007) who examine the target debt ratio based on the one-year lag of the debt ratio, 
found a positive association between target debt ratio and leverage. 
 
In addition, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) popularise a dynamic trade-off theory. 
This theory stresses the deviating debt ratio from the target, in a situation where the 
costs of adjusting the debt ratio are higher than the costs of maintaining sub-optimal 
capital structure. According to this theory, there is a negative association between 
profitability and leverage, since firms reflexively accumulate profits and losses and let 
the debt ratios deviate from the target.  Similarly, according to Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman (2001), firms that were highly profitable in the past are likely to have low 
gearing. Although there are quite a number of studies (e.g. Bhaduri, 2002; Bancel and 
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Mittoo, 2004; Gaud et al., 2005; Beattie, Goodarce, and Thomson, 2006) that verified 
that the firms manage leverage towards a target ratio, nevertheless, the evidence is 
indecisive.   
 
Empirical investigations in the SMEs’ literature did not find strong evidence to support 
trade-off theory (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). This is because SMEs face difficulties in 
accessing adequate debt financing in order to get tax shields in view of the fact that they 
are less likely to generate a tremendous amount of profit incomparison with the larger 
firms (Pettit and Singer, 1985). This complements the findings of Michaelas et al. 
(1999). A similar finding was derived by Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2010), who 
affirmed that debt level was not affected by tax considerations. Indeed, previous work 
indicates that SME owner-managers tend to operate without targeting an optimal debt to 
equity ratio (e.g. Holmes and Kent, 1991). 
 
2.3.3 Agency theory 
 
Fama and Miller (1972) initiate the work by examining the possibility of different utility 
functions between managers and shareholders. Building on the work of Fama and Miller 
and expanding from Modigliani and Miller’stheory (1958), Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
developed an agency theory; agency theory concentrates on agency costs. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) assert that agency costs rise due to a conflict of interest between 
shareholders or equity-holders and managers (i.e. agency cost of equity) and a conflict 
of interest between debt-holders and shareholders (i.e. agency costs of debt). 
 
The problem of agency cost of equity happens since managers are motivated to invest 
funds in a risky business for shareholders’ interest (Harris and Raviv, 1991) as they are 
not the single beneficiary to receive any profits from the firm. Lenders are most likely to 
bear the cost in a situation of investment failure since members of limited liability 
entities have limited liability for the debts of the business. Debt can play an important 
role in monitoring or reducing the conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 
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1986).  The free cash flow of the owner-managers may reduce due to issuing additional 
debt since the firm is now committed to servicing the debt rendered.  
 
Meanwhile, the problem of agency cost of debt happens when the funds obtained 
through debt could elicit equity-holders to invest sub-optimally. Leverage increases the 
incentive of equity-holders to shift wealth from bondholders to equity-holders (Fama 
and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Equity-holders anticipate capturing gains 
from the high-returned investment while debt-holders only collect the fixed payment 
from the interest and principal. Having too much leverage financing may increase the 
likelihood of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The loss can be damaging 
if the debt-holders can correctly predict the equity-holders’ intentions, as debt-holders 
prefer less risky projects, while equity-holders prefer the opposite. 
 
The problem of agency cost of debt is particularly severe for SMEs due to their 
opaqueness that may lead to increased moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
(Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992, 2000). This is in line with the argument of Hand, 
Lloyd, and Rogow (1982) who argued that the main problem of agency in SMEs is 
between the internal and external contributors, not between owners and managers. 
Michaelas et al. (1999) considered that agency costs are greater in smaller firms, leading 
their owner to run higher risks and in isolation, especially in the first years when the 
firm’s survival is at stake.  
 
Solutions to agency problems are relatively expensive for SMEs. It may increase the 
transaction costs between SMEs and their creditors or shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Monitoring could also be more difficult and costly in the case of 
SMEs since they are not obliged to fully disclose information to the market as usually 
occurs with large firms, which allow a reduction of agency costs (Vasilescu, 2010). In 
addition, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) highlight the credit rationing issue. They state that 
the availability of capital structure of SMEs depends on the agency problems caused by 
asymmetric information and moral hazards. Conversely, different circumstances happen 
in growing industry firms, by which firms will experience higher agency costs (Titman 
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and Wessels, 1988). In addition, equity-controlled firms tend to invest below an optimal 
level to take wealth from debt-holders (Jordan et al., 1998). The above problems could 
be reduced or monitored using a secured debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
 
2.3.4 Life cycle theory 
 
Life cycle theory originates from economics literature (Penrose, 1952). The theory is 
generally used to describe the development of the firm through growth phases or on 
consumption and savings behaviour. In addition, Timmons (2004) asserts that the life 
cycle model has been advanced in explaining the development of financing needs and 
capital structure of the firm. The model assumes the firm in its early stage of 
development relies significantly on internal finance.  As the firm develops, it is able to 
obtain more external finance due to less information asymmetries (resulting from the 
ability of outsiders to scrutinise its creditworthiness). However, firms will use less debt 
in the later stages of development since they use retained profits to finance investment.  
 
This theory is relevant to SMEs as they are opaque and carry high information costs 
(Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009), especially those with a relatively short historical 
performance. There are quite a number of previous studies supporting the applicability 
of the life-cycle model in explaining the financing decisions of SMEs (e.g. Petersen and 
Schuman, 1987; Fluck, Holtz-Eakin, and Rosen, 1998; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 
2006).  
 
Berger and Udell (1998) use data from several US datasets to explain how firm 
financing changes over time. They demonstrate that financing choices and needs change 
as a firm grows in size, gains more experience and becomes more transparent. However, 
Gregory et al. (2005) maintain that it is not possible to contain the life-cycle of SMEs in 
one model, as implied by Berger and Udell (1998). The model is unable to present a full 
scenario with reference to the relationship between firm characteristics and capital 
structure. 
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2.3.5 Signalling theory 
 
Signalling theory (Ross, 1977) is developed based on the view that capital structure of 
the firm may signal information of the firm to outside investors. The theory assumes 
that, unlike outsiders, insiders such as the owner-managers know the exact state of the 
firm. The owner-managers would prefer equity over debt since an excessive usage of 
debt may cause managers to lose their job if the firm goes into liquidation or becomes 
insolvent.  In contrast, outsiders view outstanding debt levels in firms favourably since 
high-debt levels signal to outsiders that firms are of high quality.  
 
In general, signalling theory is of little benefit to small firm sectors since SMEs are not 
public companies listed on a stock exchange and cannot signal information to potential 
investors in the capital markets. However, signalling theory still has to be considered in 
the case of asymmetric information, where SMEs might want to send a signal to lenders 
or creditors. Ross (1977) asserts that when there are information asymmetries between 
the firm’s management and outside investors, debt will be represented as a signalling 
means. Asymmetric information between owner-managers and investors is a driver to 
signalling games where the amount of debt and the timing of new issues are viewed as a 
sign of the performance of the firm. This problem will also lead to moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems (Akerlof, 1970). 
 
Despite comprehensive discussion on the significant impact of signalling problem on the 
capital structure of the firm, some studies highlighted different findings. For example, 
Bhaduri (2002) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that signalling appeared to be 
insignificant in determining the leverage.  
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2.3.6 Free cash flow problem 
 
According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), free cash flow is the excess of cash required 
that could be used for maintaining asset base, or funding and expanding projects. Jensen 
(1986) states that managers with large amounts of free cash flow prefer to undertake 
non-optimal activities. When the operating cash flow of the organisation is more than its 
profitable investment opportunities, high-debt levels will increase the value of the firm. 
Moreover, when the organisation generates substantial free cash flow, conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are severe. Too much 
cash may encourage managers to take it easy, and expand their benefits with cash that 
should be paid back to shareholders. Another problem is to motivate managers to utilise 
the cash instead of investing it below the cost of capital. 
 
Managers tend to allocate the firm’s resources to their private benefit, especially when 
the firm is mainly equity financed (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Debt, therefore, is 
important to limit management spending the excess cash flow in non-profitable 
investments. The excess cash flow will be used to repay debts where indirectly 
diminishing the management’s control over the cash flows. According to Jensen (1986), 
debt can also be an effective substitute for dividend since it would tie up the owner-
managers to pay out the debts for future cash flow.  
 
2.3.7 Alternative theoretical perspectives on capital structure 
 
Although there is general agreement that financial theories have contributed to the 
understanding of capital structure decision-making, they conveniently ignore the role 
played by the firm management in determining capital structure. A whole host of factors 
has been shown to impact on financing decisions in SMEs other than those posited by 
financial theories of capital structure. Management researchers have begun to develop 
alternative theoretical frameworks based on paradigms as diverse as strategic 
management, psychology and sociology to explain how financing decisions in SMEs are 
made (Barton and Matthews, 1989; Matthews et al., 1994; Romano et al., 2000). 
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Barton and Matthews (1989) asserted that a corporate strategy perspective might be 
superior to a traditional finance perspective when seeking to explain the financing 
decisions of SMEs. They argued that the managerial choice, constrained by the 
availability and costs of funds, might go a long way in explaining the capital structures 
that firms adopt. On the basis of previous work, they developed a theoretical framework 
which covers a series of factors that influence the capital structure decisions of 
individual firms. These factors include managerial goals, risk aversion (Jensen, 1986) 
and internal constraints.  
 
Matthews et al. (1994) brought together divergent perspectives in the study to develop a 
model for understanding financial structure in private SMEs. They moved beyond 
financial theories of capital structure by combining elements from the literature on 
decision making and strategic management. They proposed that financing decisions are 
determined by the owner-manager’s attitudes towards debt financing as moderated by 
external environmental conditions. Consequently, owner-managers’ attitudes towards 
debt financing are influenced by the characteristics of the entrepreneur, which include 
the need of the entrepreneur to maintain control over the business, their experience, their 
risk propensity, their net wealth and their social norms. 
 
Uzzi (1999) developed and tested a theoretical model which sets out to explain how a 
firm’s network ties enable them to gain better access to financing at a lower cost than 
their competitors. Using a national dataset of small firms in the US, he found that the 
social relationship between firms and bank officials might aid firms in accessing a more 
competitive price of bank financing. Moreover, Romano et al. (2000) identified 
numerous factors that affect the financing decisions of SMEs. They tested a model of 
capital structure combining insights from financial theories of capital structure with 
those from a broader strategic management perspective. They examined how firm level 
characteristics, managerial strategy, psychology and human capital influence the capital 
structure of family-owned SMEs. Their findings reveal that leverage is positively 
associated with firm size, family-ownership, business planning and business objectives, 
and negatively associated with profitability. Their analysis suggests that firm-level 
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factors as hypothesised by financial theories of capital structure do not explain 
comprehensively how the financing decisions of SMEs are made. Newman et al. (2011) 
reported almost similar findings through testing a model of capital structure combining 
insights from financial theories of capital structure with those from a broader strategic 
management perspective.  
 
2.4 Determinants of capital structure 
 
A review of previous studies on the determinants of capital structure helped the 
researcher to identify some key issues. Most of the previous studies reveal that the firm 
characteristics are the most influenced determinants of capital structure, while relatively 
few studies examine the effect of managers’ behaviours. In a qualitative study, 
Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris (1998) ascertain that owners’ behaviours also 
determine the financial structure of the firm. The recent study by Borgia and Newman 
(2012) also established that the financial structure is not only influenced by firm level 
characteristics such as firm age, size, asset structure and profitability; rather it is also 
influenced by the managerial strategy, psychology and human capital.  
 
The purpose of this section is to present empirical studies related to the capital structure; 
the discussion involves the viewpoints of the capital structure theories about the effect of 
these attributes on capital structure. The determinants of capital structure selected in this 
study are based on the consensus in most of the previous studies. This study examines 
such determinants as characteristics of the owner-manager, characteristics of the firm, 
management performance and external factors on four measures of capital structure (i.e. 
retained earnings, internal funds, debt finance and external equity). 
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the owner-manager 
 
Characteristics of the owner-manager were found to influence the capital structure of the 
firm (Cassar, 2004; Low and Mazzarol, 2006). Previous studies, by Irwin and Scott 
(2010) for instance, suggest that the personal characteristics of the SME owner-
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managers (education, gender and ethnicity) influence their capability in raising business 
finance. Likewise, Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010) classifies it into owner’s age, race, 
gender, education and experience, preferences, goals and motivations. Newman (2010) 
suggests four categories of determinants related with the owner-managers, namely 
managerial strategy, managerial psychology, managerial human capital and network 
ties. In addition, a recent study by Borgia and Newman (2012) categorises it into 
managerial characteristics (i.e. education, experience, and network ties) and managerial 
attitudes (i.e. risk-taking propensity, control aversion and growth intentions). 
 
The following sub-sections discuss reports of earlier studies on the owner-manager’s 
characteristics (e.g. age of the owner, human capital, ethnicity, relationship, networking, 
goals, perceptions and attitudes to debt, and culture), which were selected for this 
particular study of owner-managers’ characteristics, for different sources of financing. 
 
i. Age of the owner-manager 
 
Age of the owner-manager appears to be an important factor determining the capital 
structure choice. Previous studies found that older owner-managers would be less likely 
to be concerned with gaining wealth. They are reluctant to invest additional finances 
into their firms (Vos et al., 2007; Bell and Vos, 2009). Instead, they focus more on 
financial independence and control (Cassar, 2004; Vos et al., 2007). 
 
Van der Wijst (1989) established that older owner-managers are more averse than 
younger owner-managers in accepting outside participation (i.e. use of debt or external 
equity). Exceptions are older owner-managers who have a lack of successors from the 
family (Ward, 1987). Researchers like Scherr, Sugrue, and Ward (1993) also report a 
negative association between leverage and owners’ age. Scherr et al. (1993) suggest that 
the older owner-managers are more risk averse than younger ones since they are most 
likely to be more educated, more experienced and wealthier than the younger owner-
managers. They prefer to use more of their personal finance to finance their business 
operations than younger, less experienced and less educated managers.  
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In contrast, Carter and Rosa (1998), Wu et al. (2008) and Song et al. (2008), who found 
conflicting evidence, reported that the age of the owner was positively associated with 
the leverage of the firms. On the other hand, Romano et al. (2000), Cassar (2004) and 
Buferna (2005) found no significant relationship between leverage and age of the 
owner-manager.  
 
ii. Human capital 
 
Hatch and Dyer (2004) define human capital as a combination of knowledge and skills 
possessed by the owner-managers. Knowledge and skills can be obtained through formal 
education or managerial experience (Scherr et al., 1993; Romano et al., 2000; Cassar, 
2004). Educational attainment and managerial experience would increase the 
creditworthiness of the firm to the potential financiers, which indirectly reduces the 
adverse selection costs (Storey, 1994; Bates, 1997; Cassar, 2004; Zhang, 2008). They 
are expected to persuade the banks that they have a practical proposition (Scott and 
Irwin, 2006, 2009; Othman, Ghazali, and Sung, 2006; Wu et al., 2008). High-educated 
owner-managers were found to prefer using debt since they have better access to 
external financing (Bates, 1997; Coleman and Cohn, 2000; Cassar, 2004; Delmar and 
Sjoberg, 2004; Hettihewa, 2008; Bell and Vos, 2009; Irwin and Scott, 2010; Robb and 
Robinson, 2012). Similarly, experienced owner-managers prefer debt over equity. This 
is confirmed by the study of Borgia and Newman (2012) who found positive association 
between experience of the owner-manager and leverage.  
 
From the lenders’ perspective, they may consider the human capital of owner-managers 
when deciding whether or not to lend to SMEs. A better human capital may signal a 
better quality of firm, and thus increase accessibility to external financing (Storey, 1994; 
Bates, 1997; Cassar, 2004). Osei-Assibey, Bokpin, and Twerefou (2010) affirm a 
significant association between owner’s educational achievement and firm’s financing 
preferences. Loan repayment ability of the firm might be collateralised by education 
achievement, especially during business start-up. A study by Scott and Irwin (2009) also 
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found that educational level of the owner-managers would help the firm in raising 
external finance.  
 
In addition, Cassar (2004) and Romano et al. (2000) found limited evidence of the 
association between human capital of the owner-manager and leverage. The human 
capital of the owner-manager might also influence their preferences for risk and control, 
and therefore affect their borrowing needs. Cassar (2004) finds that although it is easier 
for high educated owner-managers to access debt, they might not do so because of their 
tendency to be more control and risk averse.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Vos et al., 2007) 
assert that highly educated individuals may show more signs of financial contentment as 
they are wiser and better able to recognise what is valuable to them in the long term. 
They would be benefited through financial freedom, relationship building, and 
exercising caution in decision-making and consequently would make less use of debt. 
Other researchers such as Buferna (2005), Watson (2006), Roper and Scott (2009), Irwin 
and Scott (2010) and Borgia and Newman (2012) found no significant association 
between leverage and human capital.  
 
Trade-off theory predicts a positive association between human capital and the use of 
debt. This is because more experienced and educated SME managers are more likely to 
recognise the tax advantages to debt better than less educated managers (Zhang, 2008; 
Bell and Vos, 2009). In contrast, pecking order theory postulates a negative association 
between leverage and human capital. 
 
iii. Ethnicity of the owner-manager 
 
Ethnicity of the owner-manager also appears to be an important factor determining the 
capital structure choice. ‘Ethnic minorities’ is used to represent a minority population of 
ethnic groups in a location, region or country (Berthoud et al., 1997, cited by Hussain 
and Matlay, 2007). Malaysians are divided into four categories: Malays (67.4% with 
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other ‘indigenous’ groups), Chinese (24.6%), Indians (7.3%), and Others (0.7%) 
(Population and Housing Census, 2010). Chinese and Indians are considered to be 
ethnic-minorities for the Malaysian population. The ethnicity of the owner-managers has 
been shown to influence the financing of their business activities in several studies 
outside of Malaysia (McEvoy et al., 1978; Aldrich, 1980; Aldrich et al., 1981; Brooks, 
1983; Jenkins, 1984; Rafiq et al., 1992; Ram and Holliday, 1993; Curran and Blackburn, 
1993; Ram and Deakins, 1996; Ram, 1997; Basu and Altinay, 2002; Levent, Masurel, 
and Nijkamp, 2003; Deakins, Ram, and Smallbone, 2003; Smallbone et al., 2003; 
Hussain and Matlay, 2007; Deakin et al., 2007; Robb and Fairley, 2007; Fairley and 
Robb, 2007; Ram and Jones, 2008; Robb, Fairlie, and Robinson, 2009; Scott and Irwin, 
2009). 
 
Previous studies discovered that ethnic minority businesses encounter difficulty in 
accessing finance. For example, Curran and Blackburn (1993) establish that ethnic 
minority business owners experience additional barriers, compared with other business 
owners, particularly at start-up. Jones, McEvoy, and Barrett (1994) claim that, if 
compared with white business owners, ethnic minority business owners in the UK were 
found to encounter problems accessing bank finance at start-up. Correspondingly, Ram 
and Deakins (1996) report that African Caribbean business owners also face difficulties 
in obtaining loans from the bank. Scott and Irwin (2009) also discovers a similar pattern 
and concludes that the reasons for the difficulties are lack of business planning, high-
failure rate, sectoral concentration of ethnic businesses and risk aversion behaviour by 
lenders. 
 
Smallbone et al. (2003) find that approximately one-third of the ethnic minority 
businesses relied on self-financing at start-up stage; while one-third of them obtained 
external finance and the remaining utilised bank finance. Likewise, Hussain and Matlay 
(2007) report in their study that two-thirds of the ethnic minority owner-managers prefer 
to finance internally during the start-up stage. Significantly, the importance of trade 
credit, bank finance and venture capital increased over time. Moreover, Robb and Fairlie 
(2007), who had conducted a study in the US, reported the same pattern. Black and 
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white entrepreneurs were found to differ in their financing usage because of lending 
discrimination and differences in personal wealth. For the start-up capital, black 
entrepreneurs were evidenced to rely more on credit cards. They are less likely to use 
other external financing. 
 
Other researchers (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002; Blanchflower, Levine, 
and Zimmerman, 2003; Coleman, 2003; Blanchard, Yinger and Zhao, 2004; Mitchell 
and Pearce, 2004; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; Coleman, 2005) discovered that 
ethnic-minority business owners have to pay higher interest rates and face a higher 
probability of loan denial than white-owned business. This situation leads the ethnic 
minority entrepreneurs to prefer using internal sources of funds even if they had credit 
needs (Blanchflower et al., 2003). Deakins et al. (2003) report that ethnic-minority 
business owners do not engage with mainstream support agencies; alternatively, they 
rely upon their social and trusted community networks for business advice. 
 
iv. Relationship with banks and networking 
 
The ‘relationship and networking’ that SMEs form have been evidenced to influence the 
financing decisions of the firms in previous studies (Uzzi, 1999; Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006; Le and Nguyen, 2009; Newman, 2010; Borgia and Newman, 
2012). This factor is related to people who are involved in the business such as business 
owners, lenders, suppliers, and workers, as well as customers. However, when dealing 
with financial sources, it is more focused on the business owner and the lender/supplier 
(Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006).  
 
The wider the networking or the closer the relationship between the lender/supplier with 
the firm, the lower the difficulties firms will experience in raising external finances 
(Scott, 2006; Saleh and Ndubisi, 2006). Firms will utilise more debt if they have easy 
access to that particular finance, and vice versa (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). As 
a result ofa lack of publicly-available data on SMEs to outsiders, SMEs often experience 
a problem of agency cost and information asymmetry (Le and Nguyen, 2009). However, 
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this problem can be reduced through a strong relationship and network ties between 
SMEs and financiers (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). When the relationship 
between firms and financiers is strong, it can indirectly reduce the agency cost problems 
since there will be less conflict of interest (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole, 1998; Cole 
et al., 2004). Problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may also decrease since 
the financier knows the firm (Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992).  
 
Financiers often rely on informal contacts with executives at other firms to review the 
creditworthiness of loan applicants or the practicality of the business proposals (Nguyen 
et al., 2006). Financiers could gather information through continuous contact with the 
firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). According to Krishnan and 
Moyer, (1996), local banks’ personal relationships with clients was sometimes more 
important than an objective appraisal of the financial merits of the borrower. In fact, 
banks will use qualitative as well as quantitative information in structuring the loan 
contract to SMEs (Scott and Irwin, 2006). Some authors (Baas and Schrooten, 2006; 
Abor and Biekpe, 2007) consider that SMEs are more dependent on the relationship that 
they maintain with banks in comparison with large firms. The reason is that the 
accounting information that they produce is not of such high quality, which indirectly 
may be difficult for small firms to obtain bank financing. 
 
A close relationship can also avoid the discrimination in lending (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994) whereit may limit the firms’ access to loans or expansion (Robb and Fairlie, 
2007). Irwin and Scott (2010) also concludes the same point by stating that a good 
relationship between business and lender is tremendously important to avoid SMEs from 
facing difficulties in raising external finance. Additionally, close and long-term 
relationships coupled with good rapport with lenders (Berger and Udell, 1998) may 
enhance the borrowing relationships (Han, Fraser, and Storey, 2009). A strong 
relationship between lenders and the firm may reduce the asymmetric information 
problem since it may provide a potential lender with greater information on the 
operating and financial situation of the firm (Le and Nguyen, 2009).  
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It is crucial for firms to develop active social and business networks to improve access 
to finance (Newman et al., 2011). A close relationship with the financier could assist 
firms in relaxing the liquidity constraints (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), getting greater 
assurance of fund availability (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006), and obtaining 
favourable rates and terms (Donnelly, Berry, and Thompson, 1985). 
 
In addition to business relations, social relations also become a fundamental issue in 
business. Social relations with suppliers and customers are vital for SMEs in increasing 
the accessible sources of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 
2006). Network ties with suppliers and customers help spread information about the firm 
and its reliability and creditworthiness to other suppliers and providers of credit. This 
will indirectly reduce asymmetric information between the two parties (Le and Nguyen, 
2009), lighten strict rules and regulations (Greif, 1993), and improve its reputation 
within business circles (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988). Nguyen and Ramachandran 
(2006) reveal that SMEs with stronger network ties with suppliers have greater debts in 
their capital structure than those with weaker ties (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). 
Moreover, support from other firms assists in creating a positive image of the firm 
which indirectly increases the chances of obtaining credit (Uzzi, 1999). 
 
As aforementioned, networking provides information about reliability (Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006). Firms can learn about the reliability of their counterparts through 
dealing with them directly or through their network, such as family members (McMillan 
and Woodruff, 1999). Owner-managers’ involvement in a network could lead to a 
positive indication to the business community (Holmlund and Tornroos, 1997). Firm can 
obtain funds through trade creditor short-term debts as long as they maintain strong 
relationships with suppliers and financiers (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Newman 
et al., 2011). Network ties with other firms are especially important when firms apply 
for bank loans.  
 
In another perspective, this factor (relationship and networking) can be described in the 
form of either transaction lending or relationship lending. Brighi and Torluccio (2007) 
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refer transaction lending and relationship lending to transparent borrowers and opaque 
borrowers, respectively. Brighi and Torluccio (2007) further explain that, under 
transaction lending, the financial institutions relied primarily on hard information. In 
contrast, they relied primarily on soft information, i.e. a relationship that is built over 
time to tackle the problem of opacity.  
 
v. Owner’s preference, perceptions and attitude to debt 
 
According to Farrelly (1980, p.15), ‘since perceptions are important determinants of 
how individuals and firms allocate resources, perceptions are worthy of study’. Other 
scholars argue that people’s views are more important, especially in the context of 
SMEs as people’s views or perceptions influence the way they act (Sawyer, 1993; 
Sawyerr, McGee, and Peterson, 2003).  
 
Michaelas et al. (1998) highlights that capital structure decisions will be governed by 
managers’ preferences, perceptions and attitude towards external finance as businesses 
grow and need more funds. This may influence the SMEs’ capital structure in a number 
of ways. Owner-managers may have their concerns in deciding on financial capital. 
Their preferences may be based on the risk perceptions and preferences (Norton, 1990), 
culture norm, financing attitude, or managerial motivations (Friend and Lang, 1988). 
Norton (1990) asserts that firms (regardless of the size) believe that management is most 
influential in formulating capital structure. He found in his study that small firms are 
averse to taking on debt due to owner-managers’ preferences. Some of the SMEs 
develop ‘safety nets’ to minimise possible costs (Michaelas et al., 1998).  
 
Weston and Brigham (1979) assert that capital structure of the firm represents the 
financial risk that the firm could face. The risk propensity and control aversion of the 
owner-managers is found to be positively associated with the amount of debt used by the 
firms (Barton and Matthews, 1989; Matthews et al., 1994). Analysis of interview data on 
small firms in the US by Barton (1989) confirms such assertions. According to 
Matthews et al. (1994), the risk propensity of management will become more important 
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if the owner-managers used personal assets as collateral for the loan (Barton and 
Gordon, 1987; Barton and Matthews, 1989; Matthews et al., 1994).  
 
Berggren et al. (2000) stress that most owner-managers tend not to be interested in 
seeking external sources of finance, especially those that would demand a change in 
ownership or greater examination of financial information. Barton and Matthews (1989) 
establish that owner-managers of private firms typically prefer to finance from internal 
sources through a fear that they may lose control and flexibility in decision-making to 
external stakeholders such as banks and venture capitalists. Cressy (1995, p. 292) 
suggests that the control aversion of SMEs’ owner-managers influences their financing 
decisions, arguing ‘the desire of entrepreneurs to maintain independence is manifested 
in their behaviour towards banks and borrowing generally’. In this case, even if firms 
can access external financing, they might be reluctant to consider it through the fear of 
losing control over their business as it may limit the autonomous power of the owner-
manager in making decisions for the firm (Harvey and Evans, 1995; Hutchinson, 1995; 
Berger and Udell, 1998; Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007; Newman, 2010). The limited 
use of external financing is not due to the refusal of lending from banks to SMEs 
(Cressy, 1995). 
 
Concerning the impact of religion in affecting the capital structure decisions of firms, 
Hamoudi (2007) states that Islam forbids transactions that involve the payment of 
interest on debt; this indirectly discourages Muslim entrepreneurs from borrowing from 
the bank (except when seeking short-term loan financing). However, El-Gamal (2003) 
maintains that there are some permissible alternatives to bank loans that carry the same 
function as interest-bearing loans; and investing funds in banks that pre-specify profits is 
allowable under Islamic law.  
  
33 
 
vi. Objectives and goals 
 
The individual goal of the SME owner-managers is playing a greater role in the firms’ 
capital structure decisions in comparison with the individual goal of the larger firms’ 
owner-managers (Barton and Matthews, 1989; Romano et al., 2000). The objective(s) 
might be single or multiple (McMahon and Stanger, 1995). According to McMahon and 
Stanger (1995), objectives mean the intentions of the owner-manager in operating or 
running the business. These should be clear, concise, and coherent (Kaisler et al., 2005) 
to help the owner-manager in making any important decisions for the firm. Barton and 
Gordon (1987) assert that most textbooks presume that the goal of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation is the only goal for top management. However, studies by Grabowski and 
Mueller (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (2007) state that managers might have other 
goals than profitability such as growth and maintaining control. 
 
Dewhurst and Horobin (1998) proposed that small firms’ owners have commercial and 
lifestyle goals at some stages of the firm’s life cycle. The lifestyle goals are also 
suggested by Morrison et al. (1999, p. 13) as being that the ‘owners are likely to be 
concerned with survival, and maintaining sufficient income to ensure that the business 
provides them, and their family, with a satisfactory level of funds to enable enjoyment 
of their chosen lifestyle’. The example of lifestyle goals can be to earn sufficient money 
from the business to support family (Getz and Carlsen, 2000), or to enjoy being a host, 
i.e. to receive some earnings from home-stay guests (Lynch, 2005). In another study, Ou 
and Haynes (2006) assert that the owner’s objective such as career independence or 
wealth accumulation could also influence their way of exploring finance options.  
 
The SME is treated as a small version of a large firm, and most SMEs are family 
businesses (Romano et al., 2000) and home-based (Hakim, 1989). They mostly employ 
a few employees (Hakim, 1989). SMEs are most likely to use internal financing since 
they aim to maintain control (Boyer and Roth, 1978; Curran, 1986; Holmes and Kent, 
1991; Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson, 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Jarvis, 2000; Nguyen 
and Ramachandran, 2006; Vos et al., 2007; Whittam et al., 2007; Lopez-Garcia and 
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Sanchez-Adujar, 2007; Moro et al., 2010) instead of seeking growth beyond their ability 
to maintain independence and control.  
 
An old study by Boyer and Roth (1978) notes that many owner-managers emphasise 
non-financial concerns such as control, lifestyle, and job security, rather than focusing 
on return on investments (see also Ray and Hutchinson, 1983; Petty and Bygrave, 1993; 
Romano et al., 2000). Boyer and Roth (1978) found that entrepreneurs who do business 
as their steady employment prefer to finance using debt. On the other hand, some 
researchers (see Van Der Wijst, 1989; Cressy, 1995; Chaganti, DeCarolis, and Deeds, 
1995; Berger and Udell, 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999) emphasise that SMEs desire 
growth.  For example, Chaganti et al. (1995) assert that entrepreneurs who are ‘bullish’ 
about their business prefer equity over debt financing. Alternatively, those who aim for 
growth or business expansion would prefer debt finance (Van Der Wijst, 1989). 
Berggren et al. (2000) also found a similar pattern where those decision makers whose 
aim for business growth tends to be less control averse and more active in seeking 
external sources of finance when internally generated funds are inadequate. In contrast, 
profitable small firms, particularly those that aim to maximise the long-term value of 
their business, prefer to rely on internal funds.  Other studies such as Van der Wijst 
(1989), Cressy (1995), Michaelas et al. (1999), and Cassar (2004) found a significant 
association between growth intentions and debt finance, and Storey (1994) found a 
significant relationship between growth intentions and external equities. 
 
vii. Culture 
 
Culture has been evidenced to influence the financing decisions of the firms in previous 
studies (e.g. Sekely and Collins, 1988; Stonehill and Stitzel, 1993; Schwartz, 1994; 
Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao, Chuck, and 
Guedhami, 2010; Li et al., 2011; Evans, 2013; Lucey and Dowling; 2013). Schwartz 
(1994) categorises culture into two dimensions: conservatism and mastery. According to 
Schwartz (1994), conservatism is related to employees and the owners who aim towards 
a harmonious relationship, preservation of public image, or uncertainty avoidance. The 
35 
 
items in this factor have also been recognised as a major cultural factor in other studies 
(see Sekely and Collin, 1988; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Chui et al., 2002; Licht, 
Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2007; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; Li et 
al., 2011). Chui et al. (2002) found that firms in conservative societies use a relatively 
less debt in their capital structures. The main reasons were because they place emphasis 
on preserving public image, social harmony, harmonious working relationship, as well 
as security, conformity, and tradition. Individuals would act in line with the group’s 
interests regardless of their interest. For instance, according to Titman (1984), the 
liquidation costs of a firm comprise of costs on its workers, customers and suppliers. 
High liquidation costs on the stakeholders will lead to lower financial leverage of the 
firms. 
 
As regards to public image, it is lost when a firm fails to meet any expectations of the 
individual (Chui et al., 2002). According to Chui et al. (2002), firms in conservative 
societies prefer to use less debt financing in order to minimise the probability of 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy may indicate a bad signal as it is a sign of losing public image. 
Conservatism also cultivates security’s values. Conservative societies emphasise 
uncertainty avoidance where they prefer certainty rather than ambiguity in business 
financing (Offerman and Hellman, 1997). According to Riddle (1992), societies with 
high uncertainty avoidance tend to be more risk averse. Enormous utilisation of debt 
may leave firms with financial instability, which may lead to bankruptcy. Consequently, 
firms would prefer to utilise equity over debt financing.   
 
Conservative societies also emphasise conformity and tradition. Firms with high 
concerns over conformity and tradition prefer paternalistic management. The owner-
manager would ensure their decisions would not give any harm to the employees. They 
would place emphasis on strengthening the firm’s financial stability. Therefore, they 
prefer to utilise equity over debt.  
 
On the other hand, Schwartz (1994) defines ‘Mastery’ as a culture value, which is 
related to individual success, individual actions or decisions, which aim towards 
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individual satisfaction. These items have been considered to represent the mastery factor 
in numerous studies (see Chui et al., 2002; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 
2010). Schwartz (1994) affirms that mastery is related to internal locus control. Chui et 
al. (2002) found that firms in a country with high scores on ‘mastery’ opt to use 
aggressive policies. They focus on independence and individual success and avoid any 
investment strategies which may lead to bankruptcy. The owner-manager would prefer 
safer projects with less debt in order to maintain their performance (Hirshleifer and 
Thakor, 1992). 
 
2.4.2 Characteristics of the firm 
 
In this study, selecting characteristics of the firm were executed through reviews of past 
studies. The following sub-sections discuss factors related to firms’ characteristics. 
 
i. Age of the firm 
 
Firm’s age refers to the age of the firm at the time of the survey (in years). This variable 
has been found to follow the life cycle approach in which different capital structures are 
optimised at different points in the cycle (Dollinger, 1995; Gersick et al., 1997; Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Timmons, 2004; Wu, 2007). At start-up, SMEs mainly raise funds 
internally (Helwege and Liang, 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998; Avery, Bostic, and 
Samolyk, 1998; Fluck et al., 1998; Ampenberger et al., 2013). The main reason is that 
external sources are limited during that stage (Kimki, 1997). Collins and Moore (1964) 
assert that first-generation owners did not favour external borrowings because of 
discrimination and difficulties in accessing intermediate external finance (Huyghebaert, 
2001). When the business grows, they then look for external capital such as debt or 
external equity, as the amount of capital needed becomes higher. 
 
Another crucial issue related to firm’s age is related to the problems of information 
asymmetries and agency. Older firms usually have longer financial records, which 
indirectly reduce the agency problem and problem of information asymmetries, and, 
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therefore, enjoy better access to debt financing (Gregory et al., 2005; Vos et al., 2007; 
Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Saarani and Shahadan, 2013). The above findings complement 
other studies such as Ozer and Yamak (2000), Romano et al. (2000), Hutchinson (2003), 
and Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010). On the other hand, younger, smaller firms may 
face difficulties in accessing external financing due to high-information cost (Cassar, 
2004) which indirectly discourages the use of external financing. These effects are 
relatively more common during start-up as new firms are more informationally opaque 
than existing firms (Li, Yue, and Zhao, 2009). The results are consistent with the life 
cycle model. 
 
In addition, Berger and Udell (1998) also comment concerning the same issue. They 
state that firms tend to finance internally due to information asymmetries between the 
firm and potential lenders, especially in the early stage of development. In contrast, 
firms are most likely to utilise debt as they reach the maturity stage (Berger and Udell, 
1998). Berger and Udell (1998) establish that, as firms mature, they are able to resolve 
the information opacity problem through improvements in the firm’s private and public 
reputation and may secure debt using assets. This positive association supports trade-off 
theory since financial distress costs are lower for older firms (see Cole, 1998; Upneja 
and Dalbor, 2001; Cole, Lawrence, and Lawrence, 2004; Li et al., 2009; Newman, 
2010). Usman (2014) who had conducted a study on 37 listed companies in Ethiopia, 
also reports the same association. 
 
In contrast, some studies found a different result to the aforesaid. Some studies found 
inverse relationships between debt ratio and firm age as older firms have more retained 
profits and consequently less debt (Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Ripotella and Martinez, 2003; Esperança, Gama, and Gulamhussen, 2003; Hall, 
Hutchinson, and Nicos, 2004; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; 
Vos et al., 2007; Lopez-Gracia and Sznchez-Andujar, 2007; Vos et al., 2007; Garcia and 
Mira, 2008; Rocca, Rocca, and Cariola, 2009; Ramalho and Da Silva, 2009; Barros, 
Nakamura, and Forte, 2013). This pattern is consistent with pecking order theory (Myres 
and Majluf, 1984). Timmons (2004) asserts that younger firms favour internal funds 
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over external funds. Cole and Wolken (1995) conclude that as firms grow and mature, 
they may reinvest retained earnings in current projects. The fast growth firms were 
evidenced to use equity rather than debts (Stanworth and Curran, 1976). Similar patterns 
were found in mature firms (Cole and Wolken, 1995) whereby mature firms opt to 
utilise all available internal sources of finance. Berger and Udell (1998) assert that 
although the accessibility of young firms to external financing is quite limited, the 
proportion of external debt financing was relatively high due to the willingness of the 
firm’s owners to secure debt using their personal assets.  
 
Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997) also found an inverse association between firm age and 
leverage. New firms were seen engaging in leverage more than older firms. They 
pointed out two main points. Firstly, the bank is unwilling to give a loan to older firms 
that had severe bank loans earlier, and, therefore, is more willing to give to new firms 
that had no such miserable experience before. Secondly, the older firms prefer to seek 
more equity finance rather than debt financing since they have a reputation in the stock 
market. Johnson and McMahon (2005) also maintain that younger firms tend to use 
external financing in the early stages of development before becoming more self-
sufficient through reinvestment of profits. Robb (2002), Vos et al. (2007) and 
Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2010) also point out the same view. They claim that the older 
the firm is, the more it can accumulate funds (internally) and the less it will need to 
borrow. Alternatively, young or new firms may not have time to retain funds and may be 
forced to borrow. On the other hand, Romano et al. (2000) do not find any association 
between the firm age and leverage. 
 
ii. Size of the firm 
 
Firm size can be measured based on (i) the natural logarithm of total asset, (ii) the 
natural logarithm of sales (Deesomsak et al., 2004), (iii) the logarithm of total turnover 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995), (iv) the natural logarithm of employees (Ampenberger et 
al., 2013), and (v) a multi-criteria measure which is the result of applying factor analysis 
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using the principal-components factor method on the last three proxies (Arogan-Correa, 
1998).  
 
Size of the firm has been evidenced to influence the capital structure of the firm in 
previous studies (see Pettit and Singer, 1985; Chittenden et al., 1996; Cressy and 
Olofsson, 1997; Jordan et al., 1998; Romano et al., 2000; Cassar, 2004; Klapper et al., 
2006; Jegers and Verschueren, 2006; Beck et al., 2008; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Mateev, 
Poutziouris, and Ivanov, 2013). Rajan and Zingales (1995) affirm that large firms are 
more diversified than small firms since they tend to incur lower expected bankruptcy 
costs which enable them to take on more debts as they have easier access to the market. 
Gregory et al. (2005) assert that the financial options of firms will become more 
attractive when they become larger, older and more informationally transparent as they 
can access public equity financing and public long-term debt. 
 
There is a disagreement between theories about the association of size and capital 
structure. Trade-off theory assumes that firms trade off the benefits of leverage (e.g. tax 
savings) against the costs of leverages (e.g. the costs of bankruptcy). Trade-off theory 
predicts a positive association between a firm’s size and leverage as larger firms should 
accordingly employ more debt than smaller firms (e.g. Cassar, 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 
2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006). Large firms are more diversified 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995), less volatile (Fama and French, 2002) and fail less often 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Nagano, 2003). They possess better reputation, more stable 
cash flows and fewer hazards to be liquidated, which give them relatively high chances 
of accessing external finance (see Marsh, 1982; Ang, 1992; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal, 2008; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Riportella and 
Martínez, 2003). In contrast, small firms borrow less since they are riskier (Cosh and 
Hughes, 1994; Booth et al., 2001; Joeveer, 2005) and they sometimes were 
discriminated against during the loan application (Abor and Biekpe, 2009).  Romano et 
al. (2000) also found a positive association between firm size and external equity or 
debt, and found a negative association with funds from friends and families. Similarly, 
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Al-Ajmi, Hussain, and Al-Saleh (2009) who assessed the leverage of Saudi companies 
evidenced the same association.  
 
Alternatively, pecking order theory predicts a negative association between a firm’s size 
and leverage. The large-sized firms tend to disclose more information to the outsiders as 
compared to the smaller-sized firms which are close in nature (Watson and Wilson, 
2002). Small firms may face an informational asymmetries problem (Binks and Ennew, 
1997), which may hinder the accessibility to external finance (Peterson and Schulman, 
1987; Ang, 1992; Berger and Udell, 1998; Gregory et al., 2005; Rozali et al., 2006). The 
information asymmetries are smaller in large firms (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Large 
firms prefer to issue equity instead of debt because of the undervaluation of equity 
(Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001). In addition, Titman and Wessels (1988) conclude 
that due to a high issue cost per unit, small firms become less likely to rely on external 
equity. Similarly, Mazur (2007), Vos et al. (2007), Ezeoha (2008) and Chakraborty 
(2010) validate empirically negative association between leverage and firm size.  
 
Further, it is arguable that, due to increased complexity of the operations of larger firms, 
lenders incur higher assessment costs when considering the financing of large firms. 
Any relative gains from financing large firms over small, for a given creditworthiness, 
would then have to come from economies of scale. Larger firms may issue long-term 
debts in order to take advantage of economies of scale. However, it is unclear if the 
gains from economies of scale do, in fact, offset the higher assessment costs.  
 
Agency theory expects a dual role for the relationship between a firm’s size and debt 
level. Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) assert SMEs are prone to face agency conflicts 
between owners and financiers. They discover a positive association between size and 
debt ratio. This parallel relationship is consistent with the idea that large firms can 
overcome financing constraints by trading on their reputations. In addition, Ortiz-Molina 
and Penas (2008) concluded that size has a positive impact on maturity. The lender 
restricts the length of maturity offered to small firms in order to control the risk of 
lending. Larger firms may be expected to have more long-term debt while smaller firms 
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may be expected to have more short-term debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Stohs and 
Mauer, 1996; Esperanca et al., 2003; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Abor and Biekpe, 
2009). Esparanca et al. (2003) assert that small firms prefer to seek short-term financing 
due to their risk premium, lower diversification and lower liquidity of their securities. 
 
For those reasons, most of the previous studies showed a positive association between a 
firm’s size and leverage (Gupta, 1969; Warner, 1977; Ferri and Jones, 1979; Pettit and 
Singer, 1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Krishnan and 
Moyer, 1996; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Muhammad, 1999; Romano et al., 2000; Upneja and Dalbor, 2001; Al-Sakran, 2001; 
Pandey, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Bhaduri, 2002; Hutchinson, 2003; Chen and 
Hammes, 2003; Nagano, 2003; Barbosa and Moraes, 2003; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; 
Boateng, 2004; Hall et al., 2004; Cassar, 2004; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 
2005; Gaud et al., 2005; Chen and Strange, 2005; Bhabra, Liu, and Tirtiroglu, 2008; 
Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Huang and Song, 2006; Sayılgan, Karabacak, and 
Küçükkocaoğlu, 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Lopez-Gracia and Sanchen-Andujar, 2007; 
Qian et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2008; Rocca et al., 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; 
Ramalho and da Silva, 2009; Degryse, De Goeij, and Kappert, 2009; Newman, 2010; 
Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler, 2011; Barros et al., 2013). On the contrary, Chen (2004) 
evidenced that a negative association exists between a firm’s size and long-term debt. 
On the other hand, Barton and Gordon (1988), Upneja and Dalbor (2001), and Tang and 
Jang (2007) did not find any association between those variables. 
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2.4.3 Management performance 
 
In this study, selecting management performance was executed through reviews of past 
studies. The following sub-sections review factors related to management performance 
(e.g. profitability, asset structure, and business planning). 
 
i. Profitability 
 
Profitability refers to the ratio of profit before tax and interest over sales turnover
10
 
(Örtqvist et al., 2006). There is considerable evidence that the profitability of a firm 
plays a significant role in capital structure decisions.A higher profitability firm tends to 
use internal financing and will raise the debt only when additional funds are necessary 
(Chakraborty, 2010). They are less likely to borrow since they can generate sufficient 
funding internally (Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian, 2004). A profitable firm 
could use less debt than unprofitable firms. This is because, according to Kemsley and 
Nissim (2002), the financial distress cost of debt may diminish the operation value. 
Although in reality, if the more profitable firms ask for bank finance, they can easily 
access it and get a longer duration than less profitable firms (Riportella and Martinez, 
2003).  
 
Profitability has been found mainly to have an inverse impact on the debt ratio in 
support of pecking order theory (Zarebski and Dimovski, 2012; Usman, 2014). More 
profitable firms are more likely to choose external finance, and vice versa. This is in line 
with Esparanca et al. (2003) who discovered a negative association between profitability 
and debt to equity ratio. Rationally, since the owners and managers of the small firms 
are the same individuals, they prefer to maintain their control over their firms (Hamilton 
and Fox, 1998). Thus, overinvestment is unlikely to happen. They will avoid debt (Vos 
et al., 2007) and prefer internal financing such as retained earnings as opposed to 
external resources to finance firms’ activity. Previous studies on both large and small 
                                                          
10
 Interest is not included to avoid miscalculation of the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Almost 
96% of firms in the main study did not clearly understand and know about the interest and its 
percentage. Thus, this study follows the definition which was suggested by Örtqvist et al. (2006). 
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firms confirm this negative relationship (see Titman and Wessel, 1988; Harris and 
Raviv, 1990; Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Michaelas et al., 1999; Booth et 
al., 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Pandy, 2001; Cassar, 2001; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou, 
Guney, and Paudyal, 2002; Fama and French, 2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Swinnen 
et al., 2002; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Chen, 2004; Joeveer, 2005; Chen and Strange, 
2005; Gaud et al., 2005; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Klapper et al., 
2006; Vos et al., 2007; Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar, 2007; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Degryse et al., 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Rocca et 
al., 2009; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Chikolwa, 2009; Smith, 2010; Chakraboraty, 2010; 
Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Harrison et al., 2011; Newman et al., 2011; Zarebski and 
Dimovski, 2012; Barros et al., 2013; Saarani and Shahadan, 2013; Ayed and Zouari, 
2014). 
 
In contrast, trade-off theory expects a positive association between profitability and 
leverage by considering the effect of debt tax deductibility of interest payment and low-
bankruptcy risk (Ooi, 1999). Rajan and Zingales (1995) assert that debt suppliers would 
be reluctant to lend to less profitable firms than profitable firms. Bhaduri (2002) also 
indicates a positive association between long-term debt and profitability, but a negative 
association with short-term borrowing. The findings of Bhaduri (2002) are relatively 
similar to Ozkan (2001) who shows a negative effect that is consistent with pecking-
order theory. However, he finds that the lagged profits have a positive and significant 
effect with leverage, which supports the trade-off model. Meanwhile, Panno (2003) 
reports a negative effect, and his study also reveals some evidence of positive effects 
consistent with the trade-off model. Hadlock and James (2002), Tong and Green (2005), 
Abor and Biekpe (2007), Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) and Ibrahim and Masron (2011) also 
discover a significantly positive relationship. Further, previous studies (see Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Um, 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Klapper et al., 2006; Abor, 
2007; Qian et al., 2009; Degryse et al., 2009) also affirm that profitable firms face low 
cost of distress(i.e. bankruptcy) and place more value on tax deduction of interest 
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payments than less profitable firms. This situation provides incentives for profitable 
firms to utilise extra debt to benefit from the tax shield.  
 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) discuss a different view by contending that consistent with the 
dynamic trade-off theory, an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage is 
not because of the influence of profitability on the target leverage; rather, it is because it 
affects the deviation from the target. They conclude that the negative relationship of 
profitability should not hold for firms that offset the deviation from the target by 
resetting their capital structure. 
 
On the other hand, free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) expects a positive association 
between profitability and leverage. Debt could be a discipline device for a profitable 
firm (Williamson, 1988). Relatively high profitability should result in higher debt 
because high debt can control management discretion; this approach was used by 
Frydenberg (2001). Noticeably, the above rationales are expected to hold for relatively 
large firms. Nevertheless, this agency problem of free cash flow is non-existent in SMEs 
since they do not have public equity.  
 
In addition, profitability is inversely associated with short-term debts such as trade credit 
(Hall et al., 2000). This is because debt introduces an agency cost argument. 
Management will avoid consuming excessive perquisites and building their empires 
since large sums of money must be paid to creditors each year. In the case of bank 
financing, even though small firms can obtain loans from a commercial bank, the loan 
rate may be higher. Small firms may have to provide a higher premium to commercial 
banks in comparison with larger firms (Fu, Ke, and Huang, 2002). This will lower the 
profitability a small firm can earn from an investment. Reliance on debt finance might 
also reduce the investment opportunities available for small firms. However, if less 
profit has been retained in the past because of lower profitability, small firms must rely 
more on debt financing. When a small firm relies heavily on debt as a financing source, 
the profitability could be lower since the debt is costly.  
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In relation to external equity, profitable small firms would avoid using it in order to 
maintain control over their firms and avoid dilution of ownership (Deesomsak et al., 
2004), which leads to a negative relationship between profitability and external equities. 
Nevertheless, despite a broad discussion on the positive and negative association of debt 
and profitability, Krishnan and Moyer (1997), Fattouh, Harris, and Scaramozzino (2005) 
and Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) could not confirm that profitability is a 
significant factor in the leverage decision.  
 
ii. Asset structure 
 
Access to tangible assets is asymmetrical across sectors. For example, manufacturing 
sectors are primarily composed of tangible assets, while services sectors are mostly 
composed of intangible assets. More tangible assets would increase the accessibility of 
the firm to the external financing; tangible assets have less asset specificity. 
Accordingly, this feature maximises its benefit as collateralisation for debt which also 
increases the lenders’ guarantee. On the other hand, assets’ specificity for intangible 
assets creates difficulties in finding credit because they are non-collateralisable. As a 
result, this will also suggest a positive relationship between collateral of assets and debt 
level. Collateral is also needed to overcome information asymmetry with respect to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem (Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). The 
lending is mainly granted depending on the value of underlying assets, which can be 
determined by outsiders (Berger and Udell, 2006), not based on the creditworthiness of 
the firm.  
 
Collateral of assets is essentially necessary for SMEs to enable them to borrow (Han et 
al., 2009) as small firms are not as informationally transparent as large firms as they do 
not have to disclose audited financial statements or do not issue traded securities 
(Myers, 1984). Collateral may also block any gaps that exist between lender and 
borrower (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Batten and Hettihewa, 1999; Hanley and Crook, 
2005). The collaterised assets would be seized upon failing to pay the debt. Firms that 
have fixed assets can borrow at lower rates because of their ability to provide assets as 
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collateral (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, a positive relationship is expected to exist 
between leverage and fixed assets (see Scott, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Van der 
Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chittenden et al., 1996; Krishnan and 
Moyer, 1997; Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Wald, 1999; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Romano et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2000; Nuri, 2000; Um, 2001; 
Booth et al., 2001; Colombo, 2001; Devic and Krstic, 2001; Chui et al., 2002; Howorth, 
2001; Gibson, 2001; Hutchinson, 2003; Chen, 2004; Gaud et al., 2005; Sogorb-Mira, 
2005; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Ortqvist et al., 2006; Huang and Song, 2006; 
Shah and Khan, 2007; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2008; Rocca et al., 2009; Degryse et al., 
2009; Zekohini and Ventura, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Bany-
Ariffin, Mat Nor, and McGowan Jr, 2010; Newman et al., 2011; Ayed and Zouari, 
2014).  
 
In addition, the financial distress cost would depend on the type of assets that a firm 
possesses. A firm that relies more on investment in tangible assets rather than intangible 
assets would have a smaller cost of financial distress. SMEs are more likely to incur a 
higher cost of financing as banks and other financing institutions feel hesitant to provide 
the capital to SMEs. SMEs may have a higher probability of insolvency in comparison 
with larger firms (Berryman, 1993). SMEs with lesser collateral prefer to use internal 
funds instead of debt finance (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Michaelas, 1999; Hall et 
al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). SMEs may use their personal assets instead of business 
assets for collateral purposes (Cosh and Hughes, 1994).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, especially when considering the maturity, pecking order 
theory suggests that tangibility is negatively related to short-term debt financing and 
positively related to long-term debt financing (Feidakis and Rovolis, 2007; Qian et al., 
2009; Barros et al., 2013).  The pecking-order hypothesis assumes that firms prefer debt 
over equity because debt is considered more secure and has fewer agency costs. The 
demand of debt will be covered with collateral assets. The more the tangibility of assets, 
the more the secured debt, and a positive relationship is expected. In contrast, DeAngelo 
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and Masulis (1980) state that firms with high levels of depreciation will be anticipated to 
have low levels of debt. 
 
Agency theory suggests that collateralised assets can be used as a monitoring instrument 
to control managers and prevent threats of transferring wealth from debt-holders to 
shareholders. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between assets structure 
(tangibility) and debt level. Transaction cost economics by Williamson (1988) 
demonstrated that when assets become more re-deployable, firms prefer debt over equity 
in financing decisions.  
 
Trade-off theory assumes that firms with tangible assets are stronger when facing 
financial distress, and these assets make debt more secure. Tangibility of assets 
increases the liquidation value of the firm and decreases the hazards of mispricing and 
the difficulties of financial loss in the case of bankruptcy. Firms with mostly intangible 
assets should borrow less as they are unable to provide collateral in comparison with 
those possessing relatively high tangible assets (Jordan et al., 1998). Trade-off theory 
also predicts that firms with greater collateral value favour to choose higher debt since 
they recognise a lower potential cost of financial distress (Myers, 1977; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Thornhill, Gellatly, and Riding, 2004). 
Nonetheless, Booth et al. (2001) who had conducted a study in ten developing countries, 
Huang and Song (2002) in China, and Karadeniz et al. (2009) in Turkey, did not support 
trade-off theory and found tangibility to be negatively related with leverage. 
 
Ferri and Jones (1979) and Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) strongly confirm a negative 
relationship with a debt level due to the use of intangible assets (e.g. R&D 
expenditures). This pattern supports the fact that intangible assets are not re-deployable, 
and this limits the borrowing capacity of the firm. Similarly, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
affirm that firms with specialised or unique products face more costs in terms of 
liquidation and are more likely to be less levered. These results have been supported by 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Ghosh and Cai (2000), Bhaduri (2002), and Delcoure (2007) 
and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009).  
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On the other hand, Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) report 
contradicting results (i.e. positive) depending on the debt measures used. Panno (2003) 
also had a contradictory result justifying that if a company has more fixed assets, this 
can be an indication of less current assets or liquid assets, and that might lead to a 
negative relationship with extra debt. In contrast to the above findings, Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) found an insignificant relationship for Asian countries (except Australia) due to 
two reasons: the concentrated ownership structure and a close relationship between 
firms and lenders which minimises the need for collateral. In contrast, a recent study by 
Newman et al. (2011) reports that there is no evidence of a significant relationship 
between assets structures with total or short-term leverage. The findings are against the 
expectations of both static trade-off and pecking-order theories. 
 
iii. Business planning 
 
Romano et al. (2000) defined business planning as a combination of three variables, 
which are a business plan, a formal strategic long-term plan, and formal management 
structure. Management structure can be shown in a chart showing the position and task 
schedule of each person who is involved in the business (Romano et al., 2000). Business 
planning is highly related to the problem of information asymmetry. It involves the 
secrecy concept of the firm and outsiders such as bankers or investors (Romano et al., 
2000). For instance, in the case of business start-up capital, especially when firms want 
to apply for external funding, they are encouraged to prepare a business plan (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Low-business planning will indirectly increase the level of 
information opacity, which may hinder the accessibility to external finance (Petersen 
and Schulman, 1987; Ang, 1992; Harvey and Evans, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Orser, Hogarth-Scott, and Riding, 2000; Romano et al., 2000; Gregory et al., 2005; 
Rozali et al., 2006; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; Bell and 
Vos, 2009; Rocca et al., 2009). 
 
SMEs face tremendous difficulties in accessing external financing as they do not 
provide track records and their information is not transparent. Empirical work on data 
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from 628 enterprises in the late 1990s by Gregory, Tenev, and Wagle (2000) indicates 
that the life cycle model might provide an adequate explanation for the capital structure 
of private enterprises in China. The findings reveal that as firms grow and age, they 
become less opaque with an established track record, which indirectly gives them better 
access to external financing. 
 
SMEs also face the problem of informational asymmetries in their dealings with lenders 
or creditors (Ennew and Binks, 1994). The information asymmetry problem is quite high 
in SMEs since they do not have to disclose firms’ information to outsiders (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Hall et al., 2000). Thus, this makes outsiders such as investors, venture 
capital institutions and banks become reluctant to lend to SMEs since it is difficult for 
the outsiders to identify the best-returned firms, i.e. potential profitable firms (Beck et 
al., 2008). The opacity
11
 of information can be reduced if the firm provides regular and 
accurate financial reports and statements regardless of formal or informal statements, 
documents the performance of the business, and prepares good financial forecasts 
(Coleman and Carsky, 1999). SMEs will have higher failure rates due to a lack of credit 
history or no track record, which indirectly make them more risky than large firms (see 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Al-Kharusi, 2003). A firm without a 
proper financial track record will have higher information opacity than those with a 
proper record, which may prevent the firm from obtaining external finance (Batten and 
Hettihewa, 1999).  
 
Certainly, business planning is necessary for the firms in obtaining external financing, 
especially during the start-up stage. According to Berger and Udell (1998), firms at the 
start-up stage prefer to finance internally because it is difficult for them to obtain 
external financing as they could not provide a proper business plan, strategic plan, or 
management structure. Similar findings were found by Haron and Shanmugam (1994). 
They found that the loan application process in Malaysia is extremely tedious and 
lengthy, which includes a preliminary interview, a second interview, a pre-decision visit, 
                                                          
11
 Opacity means that information is asymmetric between small firms and their (potential) lenders.  
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a loan decision, loan documentation, and loan disbursement. They affirmed that the 
reasons for the rejection of a loan application are because of no sound business plan and 
a lack of knowledge of capital management and business management. 
 
2.4.4 External factor 
 
Environment 
 
Environment can be categorised into stable, benign (Naman and Slevin, 1993; Covin, 
Green, and Slevin, 2006), and external environment. A country’s macroeconomic data 
such as GDP growth, the inflation rate and interest rate have implications for the debt 
available to SMEs (e.g. Lee et al., 2010). Michaelas et al. (1999) briefly mentioned the 
effect of environmental factor on capital structure in their study. This factor is mostly 
studied in the developed countries. Although this factor has been examined recently, 
there is no conclusive evidence on the effect of macroeconomic variables on capital 
structure choice. Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer (1997), Booth et al. (2001), and 
Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and Noulas (2002) strongly confirm an inverse association 
between inflation rates and leverage. On the other hand, Sener (1989), Taggart (1995) 
and Bas et al.’s (2009) reports contradict results depending on the debt measures used. 
Klapper et al. (2006) report inverse association between environments with greater 
asymmetric information and debt. A study by Mutenheri and Green (2002) reports no 
association.  
 
As regards to the effect of economic situation, Michaelas et al. (1999) find that during 
an economic recession in the UK, firms rely more on short-term debt in response to 
liquidity problems. This problem needs to be re-addressed in the ASEAN context. 
According to Deesomsak et al. (2004), the 1997 economic crisis affected the financing 
preferences of the owner-managers. Similar finding is also being found by the European 
Commission (2011) regarding the effect of severe economic crises on the financing 
preference and practices in Europe.  
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Instead of economic factors, Rajan and Zingales (1995) assert that the institutional 
characteristics such as ownership pattern, tax code and law of bankruptcy also affect 
capital structure choice. Further, La Porta et al. (1998) emphasise that the law 
enforcement of the countries appeared to be among the determinants of capital structure. 
They emphasise that countries with common law systems offer investors (outsiders) 
better protection than those with civil law. Another important issue is concerned with 
corruption (La Porta et al., 1998). Firms will use more debt when the legal system has 
less integrity (high levels of corruption). The arguments are in conformity with the study 
of Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000). They reported that the capital structure of a 
firm may be influenced by the economic system, the legal environment, the tax 
environment, and the technological capabilities. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) establish 
that both firm-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions influence the capital 
structure of the firm. Further, De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) confirm the influence 
of institutional and legal environment as well as economic development on firm’s 
capital structure.  
 
2.5 Effect of capital structure on performance 
 
A study of a firm’s capital structure and a firm’s performance is widely discussed in 
most of the capital structure theories. The agency theory for free cash flows by Jensen 
(1986) assumes that the free cash flow available to managers can be reduced through the 
utilisation of debt (Ramadan et al., 2012) and consequently will act in the interest of 
shareholders. However, this theory is not applicable in the case of SMEs as the owner 
and manager of the firm is the same individual.  
  
The asymmetric information model (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) assumes 
that owner-managers usually have better information about their firms than outside 
investors. Due to limited information received by the outsiders, they tend to look at the 
debt level of the firms. High level of debt indicates that owner-managers are certain 
about the future of the firm. On the other hand, high level of equity indicates the poor 
performance of the firms as the earnings will fall in the future (Ramadan et al., 2012). 
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Ramadan et al. (2012) also stress that debt mediates the association between 
determinants of capital structure and firm’s performance. 
 
In addition, Miller (1977) asserts that the firms will trade-off between benefit and cost of 
debt until it reaches the optimal level of debt. An appropriate capital structure mix may 
minimise the cost of capital of the firm. This situation will maximise the net returns for 
the firm that indirectly improve the firm’s performance. 
 
Based on the literature search, it was found that there are three different situations for 
the associations between capital structure and firm’s performance: no significant 
association, positive association and negative association.  Those who found no 
significant association support Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory and the argument 
of Miller’s (1977) model about the optimal capital structure. Alternatively, those who 
found a negative association between debt level and performance support Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) argument which stated that highly levered firms may forego positive net 
present value (NPV) projects which may affect performance adversely. 
 
Among studies that found no significant association between capital structure and 
performance are Krishnan and Moyer (1996) who conducted a study for hotels in Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea, and Phillips and Sipahioglu (2004) on hotels in 
the UK. Similar findings were found by Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006). They used profit 
efficiency as the performance measure.  
 
In contrast, Abor (2008) reports a significant and negative association between capital 
structure and firm performance (ROA) in the case of Ghana. Singh and Faircloth 
(2005)
12
 report that more debt leads to lower long-term capital investments and that in 
turn leads to lower corporate performance. Forbes (2002) also finds an inverse 
relationship between debt ratios and net income growth. Similarly, Gleason et al. (2000) 
indicate a significant and negative association between capital structure and 
                                                          
12
 They measured performance based on the growth rate of earnings per share, net profit margin, 
operating cash flow and future growth opportunities. 
53 
 
performance (i.e. ROA, profit margin and sales growth). The inverse relationship 
suggests that lower performance may be due to the agency issues which lead to high 
utilisation of debt. Interestingly, research evidence by Kinsman and Newman (1998) 
recommends three measures of debts: current short-term debt, long-term debt, and total 
debts. They find that earnings are negatively and positively associated with current 
short-term debt and long-term debt, respectively. However, overall results demonstrate 
an inverse relationship between debt and firm performances.  
 
Chang Aik Leng (2004) studied the effect of corporate governance practices on a firm’s 
performance and found that borrowing ratio has a negative effect on earnings 
performance using return on equity (ROE). Dessi and Robertson (2003), who used 
Tobin’s Q as a performance measure for UK firms for the period 1967 to 1989 
unbalanced panel data, found that the debt has a significant positive effect on an 
expected performance. Thompson, Wright, and Robbie (1992) found a positive and 
significant effect in explaining the excess returns to equity investors. The finding is also 
consistent with Ebaid (2009) when short-term and total debts had impacted negatively 
on a firm’s performance measured by Return on Assets (ROA). Interestingly, Campello 
(2006) discovered mixed effects; he found that debt increases sales performance up to a 
certain point and then additional debt leads to sales underperformance, as well as 
affecting the product market performance negatively. Kamran, Khan, and Sharif (2014) 
who investigate on the sugar industry in Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan found a weak 
positive association between capital structure and financial performance.  
 
In summary, SMEs are most like to finance internally, which sometimes may restrict 
them to survive and grow (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, rigorous 
competition in globalisation trends, shorter product cycles, innovation requirements, and 
rapid technological development has demanded SMEs to accelerate their performance. 
Therefore, SMEs need capital from both internal and external sources (Pretorius and 
Shaw, 2004) in order to increase the performance.  
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2.6 Other influences on the firm’s performance 
 
Shergill and Sarkaria (1999) investigated the influence of firm characteristics and 
industry on the firm’s financial performance, finding that capital intensity is positively 
related to the financial performance. They use two sets of measures to reflect the 
financial performance: ROE and ROA to measure profitability; and growth in sales, 
dividends, and net total assets as indicators for growth. Chen (2004) discovered that debt 
ratio is negatively related to ROA.  
 
In fact, many studies investigate the relationship between size and performance. 
Goodman, Peavy, and Cox (1986), using Standard and Poor’s 400 firms and stock 
returns to reflect financial performance, discover an inverse association between size 
and performance. Similarly, Forbes (2002) and Jermias (2008) find a similar association. 
Alternatively, studies such as Shergill and Sarkaria (1999) for Indian firms and Orser et 
al. (2000) for Canadian firms, found a positive association between size and 
performance. They measure performance in terms of diversification, new technology, 
and economies of scale production. Gleason et al. (2000) and Zeitun and Tian (2007) 
affirm this parallel relationship. However, Moen (1999), who studied Norwegian 
companies, finds that export performance is not subject to the size of the firm 
(employment). He asserts that the primary competitive advantages are the products and 
technology of the firm, not the size of the firm.  
 
In the light of the free cash flows hypothesis, Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx, (2000) 
ascertain a strong positive relationship between sales growth and a firm’s performance 
in terms of stockholders’ returns and return on assets. Hutchinson and Gul (2006), who 
studied the top 500 Australian companies, found that high-investment opportunities are 
positively associated with ROE and negatively associated with agency costs. Further, 
Amidu (2007), by using ROE and ROA for Ghana, found support for the fact that 
growing firms have the potential of generating more returns for the firms. 
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Moreover, numerous studies investigate the relationship between risk and performance. 
There are others who confirm the positive relationship between a firm’s risk and 
financial performance, for example, Wing and Yiu (1997), Shergill and Sarkaria (1999), 
Orser et al. (2000), and Tsai and Wang (2005), Loudon (2006) and Dewan, Shi, and 
Gurbaxani (2007). Other studies that use excess stock market returns also found a 
positive relationship. The studies include Girard, Rahman, and Zaher (2001), using nine 
Asian capital markets and the US, Tang and Shum (2004) for the Singapore stock 
market, Assaf (2005) for the Canadian stock exchange, Bali and Peng (2006) for the 
S&P 500 index, Tang and Wai (2006) for the Hong Kong stock market, and Ludvigson 
and Ng (2007) using large data sets in different US markets. 
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The following figure shows the preliminary framework for the study which was based on the gaps the literature.  
 
Figure 2.1 Preliminary framework 
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The following tables summarise some studies on the determinants of capital structure in SMEs and large firms. 
Table 2.1 Explanatory variables used in previous studies of the determinants of capital structure in SMEs 
Authors  Explanatory variables used* Other variables used  
 
 P S AT G A NDTS L  
 
Michaelas et al. 
(1998) 
    - - -  Owner characteristics: need for control, 
knowledge, experience, risk propensity, 
perception and beliefs about external finance 
 Cash flow 
 Ownership 
 External factors: state of economy, market 
condition, availability of funds, industry, 
government policy 
Romano et al. 
(2000)  
-  - -  - -  Business planning  
 Owner‘s attitude for family control  
 Objectives of family business  
 Industry type  
Esparanca et al. 
(2003)  
      - Economic risk=Sales variation coefficient 
(Pearson)  
Riportella and 
Martinez (2003)  
     - -  Business sector  
 Financial distress  
 Return on assets as a proxy of economic 
performance.  
 The temporal structure of interest rates.  
 Volatility of the interest rate.  
Hall et al. (2004)      - - - 
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Cassar (2004) -    - - -  Legal organisation 
 Owner’s education 
 Owner’s experience 
 Gender 
Mac an Bhaird and 
Lucey (2006)  
-     - -  Ownership  
 Internal collateral  
 Owner‘s collateral  
Ortqvist et al. 
(2006)  
     - - -  
Nguyen and 
Ramachandran 
(2006)  
    - - -  Business risk  
 Relationships with banks  
 Networking 
Abor and Biekpe 
(2007)  
     - - Macroeconomic variables (inflation and interest 
rates) as determinants of bank finance.  
Psillaki and 
Daskalakis (2007)  
    - - - Risk = Squared deviation of each year‘s 
earnings before taxes from the period average.  
López-Garcia and 
Sánchez-Andújar 
(2007)  
  -    -  Effective tax rate  
 Financial distress costs  
 Operating cash flow  
 Borrowing requirement  
Zhang (2008)  -  - - - - -  Political or bureaucratic connections  
 Whether or not a native of Chengdu  
 Owner’s education 
 Native status 
 Credit rating status  
 Business experience  
 Respondent’s age category  
Abor and Biekpe 
(2009)  
     - - Risk= Standard deviation of the difference 
between the firm‘s profitability in time and the 
mean profitability 
Bell and Vos 
(2009) 
  - - - - -  Owner’s age  
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* Profitability (P), Firm Size (S), Asset Tangibility (AT), Growth Opportunities (G), Firm Age (A), Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) and Liquidity (L).  
 
 
Table 2.2 Explanatory variables used in previous studies of the determinants of capital structure in large firms 
 Reported financing access obstacles denial 
of loan 
 Education  
 Information asymmetry 
Borgia and 
Newman (2012) 
   - - - -  Managerial strategy 
 Psychology  
 Human capital 
 Managerial network ties 
 Managerial  attitudes (managerial aversion 
to external control, risk-taking propensity 
and growth intentions) 
Authors  Explanatory variables used* Other variables used  
 
 P S AT G A NDTS L  
 
Titman and 
Wessels (1988) 
    -  -  Uniqueness  
 Industry 
 Earning volatility 
Harris and Raviv 
(1991) 
    -  -  Volatility  
 Bankruptcy  
 Advertising  
 R&D expenditures 
 Free cash flow 
 Uniqueness 
Chui et al. (2002)    - - - -  Cultural dimension- conservatism / mystery  
 Agency 
Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002) 
   - - - -  Market-to-book ratio 
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Frank and Goyal 
(2003) 
   - - - -  Dividend  
 Intangibles  
 Market-to-book ratio  
 Macroeconomic  
Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) 
    -    Earning volatility 
 Share price performance 
Huang and Song 
(2006) 
    -  -  Tax  
 Volatility  
 Managerial shareholding 
 Industry 
 Region 
Shah and Khan 
(2007) 
    -  -  Earning volatility 
Fan et al. (2012)    - - - -  Market-to-book ratio 
 Economic development 
 Inflation 
 Common law  
 Corruption index 
 Tax system (dividend) 
 Life insurance penetration 
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Based on the above tables, it is clear that the factors selected in this study were among 
the factors that were mostly included in the previous studies of the capital structure. 
Firm size, profitability, and asset structure were predominantly used as variables in most 
of the previous studies. For example, size of the firm might be an important factor in 
differentiating financial practices among SMEs as most definitions of SMEs divided 
SMEs into different groups such as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Other 
factors such as firm age, growth, liquidity and non-debt tax shields were also included in 
the previous studies. Previous studies also integrate managerial characteristics and 
external factors to be one of the variables influencing the capital structure of the firm.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents a clear view of the capital structure determinants and shows that 
the literature lacks agreement regarding its determinants, and the concept is poorly 
defined. Despite the fact that capital structure theory has attempted to explain a great 
deal of the capital structure of firms, in general, there is no consensus about which 
factors have an impact on capital structure decisions. A review of the literature discovers 
a number of gaps and reveals directions for further research.  
 
Some important variables like owners’ attitudes towards debts and cultural factors are 
not widely examined in previous studies’ models. Most studies also ignored the 
importance of macroeconomic factors such as the inflation rate and interest rate, in 
affecting capital structure of SMEs. The present study stresses that refocusing on the 
owner, firm, culture and external environment is an important step towards 
understanding the capital structure determinants of the firms. Based on the foregoing 
discussions, it is anticipated that owner-related factors and firm-related factors will be 
significant determinants of capital structure of SMEs. It is also anticipated that 
management performance and environment will influence the capital structure of SMEs. 
By integrating the owner-manager characteristics, firm characteristics, management 
performance and external factor (i.e. environment), it may be possible to develop a more 
viable model of SMEs’ capital structure determinants.  
62 
 
 
None of the identified theories best explain capital structure practices. The literature 
shows that some studies support the pecking order hypothesis; others provide support to 
the trade-off theory, and some show mixed evidence. These findings would suggest 
neither of the two theories independently provides sufficient descriptions for the process 
of how firms chose their debt to equity levels. In addition, based on a significant 
influence of agency issues, the firm’s country origin and life-cycle, on the capital 
structure decisions; hence, this present study considers the other theories. Instead of two 
main theories (pecking order and trade-off theories), this study also considers agency 
cost theory, life-cycle model, signalling theory, free cash flow model, and Schwartz’s 
cultural model, as a foundation for the theoretical model.  
 
Moreover, although previous empirical studies have been conducted worldwide, the 
results are still mixed. In fact, most studies have been conducted in developed countries.  
Limited numbers of studies have been carried out in developing countries, specifically in 
the SMEs of the developing country like Malaysia. To ensure the generalisability and 
applicability of the theory in different contexts, Steenkamp (2005) suggests that 
empirical research should be expanded to cover other countries. 
 
The reviews lead to the selection of seven owner-managers’ characteristics (age, 
education and experience, ethnicity, relationship and networking, objectives and goals, 
owner’s preference, perceptions, and attitudes and culture); two firms’ characteristics 
(age, and size); three management performance characteristics (profitability, asset 
structure, and business planning); and external factors (environment) to be used in 
determining those factors influencing SMEs’ financing choices for different sources of 
finance (retained earnings, internal equity, debt, and external equity) available to SMEs 
in Malaysia. The reviews also point to further examinations on the impacts of capital 
structure on the organisational performance, and the financing pattern of three main 
ethnic groups and their similarities and differences in determining their capital structure 
decisions.  
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Consequently, based on the review of the literature, the current study addressed the 
following questions:  
1. What are the factors that influence the capital structure of SMEs in Malaysia? 
2. Do owner-managers’ characteristics, firms’ characteristics, management 
performance, and external factors influence the capital structure of SMEs? 
3. What are the impacts of capital structure and its determinants on the 
organisational performance?  
4. Does ethnicity affect the relationship between capital structure and its 
determinants? 
5. Are there any differences in the financing preferences of minority-owned and 
non-minority-owned businesses?  
 
The following chapter presents the research framework and hypotheses of the study, 
which were formulated on the basis of research questions. Each hypothesis relates each 
construct to the aforementioned theories.  
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 introduced capital structure theories which extensively discuss the factors 
determining the capital structure and the effects of capital structure and other influences 
on performance. A review of the literature reveals that the life-cycle model together with 
pecking order, trade-off, and agency theories can contribute to developing a better 
understanding of the factors that influence SMEs’ financing decisions. This chapter 
summarises all the constructs reviewed into a broad conceptual framework and develops 
hypotheses to be tested in the data analysis. The following determinants of capital 
structure have been considered in this study: owner’s age, owner’s education, owner’s 
ethnicity, relationship, networking, owner’s preference and attitude to debt, lifestyle 
goals, commercial goals, conservatism, mastery, firm age, firm size, profitability, asset 
structure, business planning, and the environment. It is followed by the development of 
hypotheses based on previous theoretical and empirical literature. The hypotheses 
development section discusses the theoretical background as a base to build up the 
research hypotheses. The final section presents a summary of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework for this study is developed based upon the gaps identified in 
the literature, specifically those related to capital structure determinants among SMEs. 
The framework also considers the view of Dodd and Patra (2002, p. 131) who assert that 
‘findings from Western context cannot be grafted onto other context without 
considerable prior empirical verification’. Specifically, this research proposes a model 
of capital structure determinants inspired by Romano et al. (2000), Nguyen and 
Ramachandran (2006), and Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2006), to predict and explain the 
determinants of capital structure and the consequences of the capital structure to the 
firm’s performance in Malaysia.  
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Hypotheses were developed in a reflection of the research problem and based on the 
developed theoretical model. This study tests the association between determinants of 
capital structure and four types of capital structure (i.e. retained earnings, funds from 
family and friends, debt, and external equity) combining all variables affecting the 
determination of capital structure. Five relationships have been tested in this study. In 
the first relationship, capital structure represents the dependent variable, and the 
determinants of capital structure are the independent variables. Although the previous 
studies had investigated the determinants of capital structure, it is worthwhile to assure 
that this relationship is still valid especially in the present study sample for the period 
selected. The second relationship examines the relationship between capital structures as 
independent variables and firm’s performance as a dependent variable. The third 
relationship examines the relationship between determinants of capital structure as 
independent variables and firm’s performance as a dependent variable. The fourth 
relationship investigates the effect of inclusion of capital structure as a mediating 
variable. The fifth relationship investigates the relationship between determinants of 
capital structure and capital structure, but it is mediated by ethnicity of the owner-
manager. For each set, there is more than one sub-set. The hypothesised model designed 
for this research is shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1 Research model 
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3.3.2 Human capital 
 
Theoretically, good human capital, which comprises of high educational achievements 
and experience of the owner-manager, should improve their accessibility to external 
financing (Storey, 1994; Bates, 1997; Scott and Irwin, 2009). Empirically, the overall 
results reveal that education of the owner is positively associated with debt (see Bates, 
1997; Cassar, 2004; Delmar and Sjoberg, 2004; Hettihewa, 2008; Robb and Robinson, 
2009; Bell and Vos, 2009). In contrast, some researchers assert that more educated 
entrepreneurs utilise less debt as they are aware of the benefits of each source of 
financing, especially for the long-term business operation. Educated entrepreneurs tend 
to have high levels of financial freedom and exercise prudence in decision-making. They 
would prefer to use retained profits (see Diener and Seligman, 2004; Vos et al., 2007) or 
other equities (Gellatly, Thornhill, and Riding, 2003; Thornhill et al., 2004).  
 
In addition, previous empirical works reveal no (Coleman and Cohn, 2000) or a negative 
(Scherr et al., 1993) relationship between the managerial experience of the owner-
manager and firm leverage. Cassar (2004) finds a negative relationship, but the result 
does not strongly indicate a significant relationship. He states that owner-managers with 
greater experience tend to be risk and control averse. 
 
Accordingly, based on the overall previous findings, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H1.2a: There is a positive association between human capital and retained earnings. 
H1.2b: There is a positive association between human capital and PF&F. 
H1.2c: There is a negative association between human capital and debt. 
H1.2d: There is a negative association between human capital and external equities. 
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3.3.3 Ethnicity of the owner 
 
Previous findings confirm that ethnic minority businesses are less likely to use business 
support agencies, for instance, business links or enterprise agencies (Fadahusi, 
Smallbone, and Supri, 2000; Ram and Smallbone, 2001). Small firms are most likely to 
doubt the relevance of what was offered. They have a lack of trust in those delivering 
support and have little ability to access such support (Jones et al., 1994; Fadahusi et al., 
2000; Ram and Smallbone, 2001).  
 
Previous studies (Smallbone et al., 2003; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Robb and Fairlie, 
2007; Ram and Jones, 2008) also highlighted that ethnic-minority owned SMEs face 
additional barriers to other SMEs, especially at start-up. They prefer to maintain their 
financing sources by using internal sources of finance (Deakin et al., 2007). This finding 
complements the findings of Hussain and Matlay (2007) who found that two-thirds of 
the ethnic-minority owner-managers rated internal sources of finance to be the most 
important sources of funding during the start-up stage. 
 
Therefore, based on the above arguments and literature, this research assumes that there 
is an association between ethnicity and capital structure. The current study also expects 
the mediating effect of ethnicity on the relationship between determinants of capital 
structure and capital structure. The above discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
H1.3a: There is a positive association between ethnic-minority owner-manager and 
retained earnings. 
H1.3b: There is a positive association between ethnic-minority owner-manager and 
PF&F. 
H1.3c: There is a negative association between ethnic-minority owner-manager and 
debt. 
H1.3d: There is a negative association between ethnic-minority owner-manager and 
external equities. 
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3.3.4 Relationship and networking 
 
Limited work has been done as to whether the factor such as ‘relationship and 
networking’ of an SME influences their financing decisions. Research studies in other 
developing economies suggest that the ‘relationship and networking’ of owner-managers 
possessed with financiers and owner-managers at other firms influences the firm’s 
capital structure (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Le and Nguyen, 2009; Newman, 
2010; Borgia and Newman, 2012).  
 
Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) assert that the accessibility to external financing of 
SMEs will increase due to their close relationships with financiers, especially for short-
term debt. Networking either with suppliers or government officers may also lead firms 
to favour utilising external finance (Le and Nguyen, 2009). Empirical work in the US 
context also demonstrates that firms can gain better access to bank financing at a more 
competitive price when their transactions with financiers are embedded in social 
relationships (Uzzi, 1999). These findings, along with the findings from the previous 
chapter, indicate that the ‘relationship and networking’ of the owner-managers are an 
important determinant of capital structure for SMEs. In Malaysia, it might be expected 
that firms with a stronger relationship and comprehensive networking have better access 
to external sources of finance leading to the following hypotheses: 
H1.4a: A good relationship between firm and lender will reduce the usage of retained 
earnings.  
H1.4b: A good relationship between firm and lender will reduce the usage of PF&F. 
H1.4c: A good relationship between firm and lender will increase the level of debt of the 
firm. 
H1.4d: A good relationship between firm and lender will increase the level of external 
equity of the firm. 
H1.5a: Comprehensive networking will reduce the usage of retained earnings. 
H1.5b: Comprehensive networking will reduce the usage of PF&F. 
H1.5c: Comprehensive networking will increase the level of debt financing of the firm.  
H1.5d: Comprehensive networking will increase the level of external equity of the firm. 
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3.3.5 Owner’s preference, perceptions and attitude to debt 
 
Limited work has been done as to whether the owners’ preference, perceptions and 
attitudes influence their financing decisions. For example, although Michaelas et al. 
(1998) pointed out the importance of the owner’s preferences, however, they merely 
mentioned it in the suggestions part. Some other studies such as Barton and Matthews 
(1989), Barton (1989), Norton (1990), Matthews et al. (1994), Cressy (1995), Berggren 
et al. (2000), Hamoudi (2007), Pukthuanthong and Walker (2007), and Newman (2010) 
highlight the influence of management preference in formulating capital structure. 
Management preference could be in terms of risk propensity, control aversion, culture 
norm, financing attitude, or managerial motivations. Based on these inconclusive 
evidences, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1.6a: There is a positive association between owner’s attitudes (risk averse) and 
retained earnings. 
H1.6b: There is a positive association between owner’s attitudes and PF&F. 
H1.6c: There is a negative association between owner’s attitudes and debt. 
H1.6d: There is a negative association between owner’s attitudes and external equities. 
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3.3.6 Objectives and goals 
 
Firms will have goals, regardless of commercial (Barton and Gordon, 1988) or lifestyle 
goals at some stage of the life-cycle (Dewhurst and Horobin, 1998). Empirically, overall 
results reveal that there is no definite relationship between commercial and lifestyle 
goals with the capital structure. Previous studies demonstrate a positive association 
between intention for business expansion and external equity. Owner-managers who are 
‘bullish’ about their businesses prefer equity over debt financing (Chaganti et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, firms that aim to maximise business values in the long-term, tend to seek 
internal funds rather than external funds. 
 
SMEs might also aim to maintain control (Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Lopez-Garcia and Sanchez-Adujar, 2007). Most SMEs will aim to maintain 
independence and rely less on debt finance (Friend and Lang, 1988; Vos et al., 2007; 
Moro et al., 2010). For example, Friend and Lang (1988) found that the debt ratio is 
inversely related to management shareholding. In contrast, those who prefer to use 
business for steady employment were found to rely on debt finance (Romano et al., 
2000).  
 
In light of these inconclusive evidences, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1.7a&b: SMEs, which focus on lifestyle and social welfare goals, are associated 
positively with retained earnings and PF&F, respectively. 
H1.7c&d: SMEs, which focus on lifestyle and social welfare goals, are associated 
negatively with debt and external equity, respectively. 
H1.8a&b: SMEs, which focus on commercial goals, are associated positively with 
retained earnings and PF&F, respectively. 
H1.8c&d: SMEs, which focus on commercial goals, are associated negatively with debt 
and external equity, respectively. 
  
72 
 
3.3.7 Culture 
 
There are relatively few studies that emphasise the influence of culture on the financial 
structure (for instance, Sekely and Collins, 1988; Stonehill and Stitzel, 1993; Chui et al., 
2002; Li et al., 2011). None of the studies employs specific cultural factors in explaining 
the firm’s financial structure. This study follows Schwartz’s (1994) measurements of 
cultural dimensions which have been used to test the theoretical influence of culture on 
capital structure decisions by Chui et al. (2002).  
 
Clugston, Howell, and Dorfman, (2000) suggest using individualised measures when 
considering culture as an independent variable, within one country. Using Schwartz’s 
(1994) two contended cultural dimensions, this study hypothesises how cultural values 
of mastery and conservatism affect firm financing decisions. This study hypothesises 
that firms (owners) with high scores on conservatism are less likely to utilise debt as in 
their capital structures. This study also hypothesises that owner-managers with high 
scores on mastery are less likely to use debt in their capital structure as they place 
greater importance on control and individual success. Hypotheses are, therefore, 
formulated as follows: 
H1.9a: There is a positive association between owner’s level of conservatism and 
retained earnings. 
H1.9b: There is a positive association between owner’s level of conservatism and PF&F. 
H1.9c: There is a negative association between owner’s level of conservatism and debt. 
H1.9d: There is a negative association between owner’s level of conservatism and 
external equities. 
H1.10a: There is a positive association between owner’s level of mastery and retained 
earnings. 
H1.10b: There is a positive association between owner’s level of mastery and PF&F. 
H1.10c: There is a negative association between owner’s level of mastery and debt. 
H1.10d: There is a negative association between owner’s level of mastery and external 
equities. 
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3.3.8 Age of the firm 
 
There are a relatively large number of studies emphasising the influence of firms’ age on 
the capital structure. Empirical studies conducted on SMEs in developed economies 
produce conflicting results. For example, Ramalho and Da Silva (2009) report an 
inverse association between firm age and leverage, and Hall et al. (2000) report negative 
and positive associations between firm age and short-term debt and long-term debt, 
respectively. Esperanca et al. (2003) find an inverse association between firm age and 
both short-term and long-term debt. Nevertheless, Romano et al. (2000) do not find any 
significant relationship between the age of the firm and total leverage. 
 
In the developing economy context, Abor and Biekpe (2009) report a positive 
relationship between firm age and access to bank financing. Their results suggest that 
older SMEs in Ghana tend to have good track records and better relationships with their 
lenders than younger enterprises, which indirectly makes them prefer to borrow. 
Similarly, Li et al. (2011) evidence a positive relationship between firm age and 
leverage. A study of Polish enterprises by Klapper et al. (2006) produces conflicting 
evidence by demonstrating an inverse relationship between firm age and both short-term 
and long-term leverage.  
 
In the Malaysia context, a number of studies have examined the relationship between 
firm age and leverage; for instance Saarani and Shahadan (2013), who also found a 
positive association between firm age and leverage. Thus, this study hypothesised that 
there will be a positive association between firm age and leverage for Malaysian SMEs 
for the following reasons. Firstly, entrepreneurs who have been running their business 
for a long period are more likely to have good connections with politicians, bank 
officials and other firms enabling them to get better access to credit. Secondly, older 
firms are more likely to have an established track record that will enable them to better 
access external sources of finance than firms without a track record. Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1.11a: There is a positive association between firm age and retained earnings. 
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H1.11b: There is a negative association between firm age and PF&F. 
H1.11c: There is a positive association between firm age and debt. 
H1.11d: There is a positive association between firm age and equity. 
 
3.3.9 Size of the firm 
 
Several studies confirm a positive significant impact of firm’s size and leverage (e.g. 
Romano et al., 2000; Cassar, 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Klapper 
et al., 2006; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Li et al., 2009). 
However, there are a number of studies finding a significantly negative relationship 
between size and short-term leverage (e.g. Michaelas et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2000; 
Chen, 2004). Although the empirical evidence on SME financing in developed 
economies points towards a positive relationship between firm size and both total and 
long-term leverage and an inverse association between firm size and short-term 
leverage, the situation was different for developing countries. In the context of 
developing economies, empirical work has confirmed a positive association between 
firm size and both short and long-term leverage. Accordingly, based on the overall 
previous findings, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1.12a: There is a positive association between size and retained earnings. 
H1.12b: There is a negative association between size and PF&F. 
H1.12c: There is a positive association between size and debt. 
H1.12d: There is a positive association between size and equity. 
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3.3.10 Profitability 
 
Theoretically and empirically, the overall results reveal that profitability has strong 
negative influence on leverage that in turn provides strong support to the pecking order 
hypothesis but contradicts trade-off theory. The results suggest that high profitability 
firms are less likely to borrow since they will utilise internally-generated funds before 
seeking debt.  
 
The majority of empirical studies in developed economies find evidence for the negative 
association (Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar, 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 
2005; Rocca et al., 2009; Degryse et al., 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). Similarly, 
studies in developing economies evidence the same pattern (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Chen, 2004; Chen and Strange, 2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; Li et 
al., 2009; Newman et al., 2011; Saarani and Shahadan, 2013). However, Ibrahim and 
Masron (2011) report contradicting results and Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) find 
no significant relationship. The inconclusive evidence leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1.13a: There is a positive association between profitability and retained earnings. 
H1.13b: There is a positive association between profitability and PF&F. 
H1.13c: There is a negative association between profitability and debts. 
H1.13d: There is a negative association between profitability and external equities. 
 
3.3.11 Asset structure (tangibility) 
 
Previous studies have evidenced the importance of assets structure in influencing capital 
structure of the firm. Empirically, the overall direction supports positive and negative 
associations of asset structure with long-term leverage and short-term leverage, 
respectively (see Chittenden et al., 1996; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Romano et al., 2000; 
Hall et al., 2004; Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Cassar and Holmes, 
2003; Chen, 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Fattouh et al., 2005; Ortqvist et al., 2006; 
Klapper et al., 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Vos et al., 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Bany-Ariffin et al., 2010). On the other hand, some studies have found a negative 
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association between leverage and tangibility (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; 
Sayilgan et al., 2006; Qian et al., 2007; Li et al., 2009; Karadeniz et al., 2009).  
 
Based on literature findings, the following hypotheses have been formulated: 
H1.14a: There is a negative association between tangibility and retained earnings. 
H1.14b: There is a negative association between tangibility and PF&F. 
H1.14c: There is a positive association between tangibility and debts. 
H1.14d: There is a negative association between tangibility and external equities. 
 
3.3.12 Business planning 
 
Business planning is highly interrelated with the issue of information asymmetry. This 
information problem is mostly related to the quality of data provided by small firms. A 
low level of business planning will indirectly increase the level of information opacity. 
A high level of information opacity will diminish the accessibility of the firm to external 
finance (Berger and Udell, 1998, Rozali et al., 2006; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). 
The opacity of information can be reduced through documenting the firm’s performance 
and preparing accurate financial reports and financial forecasts regularly (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991; Coleman and Carsky, 1999). Based on these inconclusive evidences, the 
following hypotheses are proposed. 
H1.15a: SMEs that have written business planning are associated positively with 
retained earnings. 
H1.15b: SMEs that have written business planning are associated positively with funds 
from family and friends. 
H1.15c: SMEs that have written business planning are associated positively with debt. 
H1.15d: SMEs that have written business planning are associated positively with 
external equity. 
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3.3.13 Environment 
 
Capital structure theories have very little to say about inter-country differences in 
corporate financing patterns. No existing theory explains how country-specific factors 
affect a firm’s capital structure. However, empirical studies, in particular cross-country 
studies (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Hall et al., 
2004; De Jong et al., 2008; Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2012; Venanzi et al., 2014), 
demonstrate that the inter-country variation in corporate leverage depends on 
institutional differences. Moreover, De Jong et al. (2008) report that institutional and 
legal environment and economic development affect not only the level of corporate 
leverage, but also firm-level determinants of leverage. In addition, prior studies are 
concerned slightly with the law (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La Porta et al., 2001). 
Another important issue is concerned with corruption. Prior studies show that firms 
prefer to use debt over equity when the legal system has less integrity or the corruption 
level is high (La Porta et al., 2001).  
 
Therefore, based on the above arguments and literature, this research expects to have a 
relationship between the environment and capital structure. Thus, the hypotheses for this 
factor are as follows:   
H1.16a: There is a positive association between stable environment and retained 
earnings. 
H1.16b: There is a positive association between stable environment and PF&F. 
H1.16c: There is a negative association between stable environment and debts. 
H1.16d: There is a negative association between stable environment and external equity. 
H1.17a: There is a positive association between the external environment and retained 
earnings. 
H1.17b: There is a positive association between the external environment and PF&F. 
H1.17c: There is a negative association between external environment and debts. 
H1.17d: There is a negative association between the external environment and external 
equity. 
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3.4 Capital structure and firm’s performance 
 
There are relatively few studies emphasising the influence of capital structure and 
performance of the firm. Firms that wish to maintain appropriate capital structure tend to 
minimise financing costs and maximise firm performance (Brigham and Gapenski, 
1996; Ahmad, Abdullah, and Roslan., 2012). Alternatively, firms may underestimate the 
costs of bankruptcy that indirectly increase the level of debt. Higher levels of debt may 
result in lower performance. 
 
In addition, theoretically, there is inconclusive evidence on the association between debt 
level and firm performance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) expect no association 
between the debt level and performance. Modigliani and Miller (1963) and trade-off 
theory predict positive association between the variables. In contrast, agency theory 
expects a negative association between debt level and firm’s performance. Despite 
inconclusive evidence on the issue, this current study assumes that the right capital 
structure choice may lead to good performance of the firm.  
 
Accordingly, based on these inconclusive evidences, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The debt ratio is negatively associated with the firm’s performance. 
 
3.5 Determinants of capital structure and firm’s performance 
 
The trade-off theory suggests an optimal capital structure mix for a firm to achieve the 
minimum cost of capital of financing. Theoretically, the expected minimum cost of 
capital should reflect the maximum financial performance and maximum welfare of 
shareholders. In addition to Shergill and Sarkaria (1999), there are no studies testing the 
asset structure and its relationship with performance. Trade-off theory assumes that 
firms with high tangible assets are less likely to face financial distress; this is because of 
their liquidation value. The assets are considered as productive resources, which will 
increase the production process, and improve the quality of the product, which indirectly 
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improve the financial performance. Firms that have tangible assets have an excellent 
reputation in getting funds since tangible assets are used as a guarantee for external debt. 
These funds are mostly used in profitable projects that result in higher performance.  
 
Trade-off theory also assumes that large firms are more diversified and more likely to 
use economies of scale production. They have greater access to new technology and 
cheaper sources of funds. In addition, investors believe that large firms are less risky, 
which suggests a positive relationship between size and performance. In contrast, there 
is an argument supported by many studies that a firm’s size does not reflect its 
performance and small firms are more productive than large firms. Moreover, many 
studies find no relationship to support the proposition that the competitive advantages 
among firms are their products and technology, and not the size of the firm. 
 
Accordingly, this research assumes that some determinants of capital structure influence 
the performance of the firm as represented in the following main hypothesis: 
H3: There is an association between determinants of capital structure and the firm’s 
performance. 
 
3.6 The mediating role of debt level 
 
This study assumes three significant associations in testing the mediating role of debt. 
First, the relationship between the independent variables (determinants of capital 
structure) and mediating variable (debt) should be significant. Second, the relationship 
between the mediating variable (debt) and the dependent variable (firm’s performance) 
should be significant. Third, the direct relationship between the independent variables 
(determinants of capital structure) and the dependent variable (firm’s performance) 
should also be significant. This mediating role of debt level is expressed by the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: Debt mediates the association between determinants of capital structure and a firm’s 
financial performance. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
 
A theoretical model was proposed in this chapter. The model provides insights into the 
potential associations between the selected determinants of capital structure and capital 
structure and associations between capital structure and firm’s performance.  
Accordingly, in this chapter, the hypotheses are developed in the context of the unique 
institutional characteristics of Malaysia. Table 3.1 summarises the hypotheses. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description 
H1.1 There is an association between age of the owner-manager and capital structure. 
H1.2 There is an association between human capital and capital structure. 
H1.3 There is an association between ethnicity of the owner-manager and capital 
structure. 
H1.4 There is an association between relationship between firm and lender and capital 
structure. 
H1.5 There is an association between comprehensive networking and capital structure. 
H1.6 There is an association between owner’s attitudes to debt and capital structure. 
H1.7 There is an association between lifestyle goals and capital structure. 
H1.8 There is an association between commercial goals and capital structure. 
H1.9 There is an association between owner’s level of conservatism and capital 
structure. 
H1.10 There is an association between owner’s level of mastery and capital structure. 
H1.11 There is an association between age of the firm and capital structure. 
H1.12 There is an association between size of the firm and capital structure. 
H1.13 There is an association between profitability of the firm and capital structure. 
H1.14 There is an association between firm’s asset structure and capital structure. 
H1.15 There is an association between business planning and capital structure. 
H1.16 There is an association between stable environment and capital structure. 
H1.17 There is an association between external environment and capital structure. 
H2 There is an association between debt ratio and firm’s performance. 
H3 There is an association between determinants of capital structure and the firm’s 
performance. 
H4 Debt mediates the association between determinants of capital structure and a 
firm’s financial performance. 
 
In reporting on research hypotheses, it has been found that the majority of previous 
studies have ignored the causes of the association between capital structure and 
performance. There are also inconsistency findings, particularly in relation to the 
associations between external variables (i.e. the environmental factors) and the capital 
structure. The next chapter elaborates on the research methodology and method 
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employed to test hypotheses and indirectly answer the research questions. Research 
design, data collection and analysis will be explained. The findings and the discussion of 
the analysis results will then be presented in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study seeks to enlighten the factors that influence capital structure from the SME 
owners’ point of view. The study also aims to explain the consequences of the capital 
structure decisions on the firms’ performance. This chapter describes and justifies the 
methodology used to address the overarching research question addressed by the study: 
“What are the factors that influence the capital structure of SMEs in Malaysia?”  
 
The chapter starts by discussing the research approach and the research design. It then 
moves on to describe and justify the specific research methods used. These are divided 
into those used for the preliminary study and the main study. These two sections 
incorporate information about how the data was collected and a justification of the 
statistical tests used. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
4.2 Research designs 
 
4.2.1 Approach to the research  
 
The research is designed under a broadly positivist paradigm. Collis and Hussey (2009) 
state that a positivist researcher is likely to be concerned with ensuring that any 
concept’s use can be operationalised; that is, described in such a way that they can be 
measured. A positivist study takes a deductive approach. In line with most previous 
studies on capital structure (for example, Graham and Harvey, 2001; Tucker and Lean, 
2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen, De Jong, and Koedijk, 2006; Vasioliou and 
Daskalakis, 2009; Saarani and Shahadan, 2013), this study adopts a positivist paradigm 
for the following reasons: 
 The ontological assumptions of objectivism better match the researcher’s 
assumptions about the nature of reality.  
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 The epistemological assumptions match the assumptions of the researcher 
regarding what constitutes knowledge and how knowledge can be expanded. 
 As there are a number of relevant theories and models in the literature (e.g. 
pecking order theory, trade-off theory, agency theory, and life-cycle model), 
deductive study that allows the researcher to develop hypotheses and test 
them using empirical data is appropriate, as recommended by Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2009). If the empirical data is drawn from a 
sufficiently large random sample, the statistical results of a positivist study 
can be generalised from the sample to the population under study. The results 
are likely to be high in reliability, which means that if the study is replicated 
by another researcher the same results are likely to be achieved (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
 
The study employs a mixed-method approach. Since the validity of the results from a 
positivist study may be low, some methods traditionally associated with a qualitative 
approach have been incorporated in the research design. Thus, this current study used 
the methodological triangulation as recommended by Neuman (2005), Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2008) and Collis and Hussey (2009). The main purpose of triangulation is that ‘it 
can detect potential problems with data and confirm the validity of findings’ (Baker, 
1994, p. 284-285). Validity is ‘the extent to which the research findings accurately 
reflect the phenomena under study’ (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 64). The validity of 
research can be tested under face validity, construct validity, content validity, or 
discriminant validity (Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma, 2003; Sekaran, 2009; Collis 
and Hussey, 2009).  
 
4.2.2 Main features 
 
This predictive study takes the form of a survey study. The main features are: 
 The development of a questionnaire is based on the conceptual framework (see 
Chapter 3) and a pilot study in the UK with British and Malaysian owner-
managers of SMEs to assess the face validity of the questions and test whether 
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subsequent analysis of the data would permit the research questions to be 
answered. 
 A preliminary study in Malaysia based on semi-structured interviews with 
owner-managers of SMEs to explore the issues and finalise the questionnaire. 
 An extensive questionnaire survey in Malaysia with the owner-managers of 
SMEs to collect primary research data for subsequent statistical analysis. 
 
4.3 Ethical issues 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2009), the central ethical issues are related to voluntary 
participation and anonymity and confidentiality. This study followed the Code of 
Research Ethics of Brunel University, which requires certain forms to be submitted to 
the Business School’s Research Ethics Committee for approval prior to the fieldwork. 
The main form is the research ethics form, to which the interview schedule and the final 
version of the questionnaire were attached. Since the study involves human participants, 
a participant information sheet was also presented (see Appendix A). It showed the title 
of the research, the researcher’s details, the purpose of the research, what it involved and 
the voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality. Background information helps 
respondents to understand questions and encourage them to give meaningful responses. 
All the forms were approved in advance of the data collection. 
 
4.4 Preliminary study 
 
The purpose of the preliminary study was to explore the issues and develop the 
questionnaire by obtaining relevant information regarding the new factors which were 
not included in the conceptual framework derived from the literature. It allowed new 
factors to be identified as well as ensuring that the meaning of the factors in the 
conceptual framework was perceived similarly in Malaysia’s culture.  
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4.4.1 Sample selection 
 
The sample for the preliminary study was selected from the SMEs operating in the east 
coast region of Malaysia. The study adopted non-probability sampling techniques: 
convenience sampling and snowball sampling. It implies ‘some units in the population 
are more likely to be selected than others’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 182), but this was 
not considered to be problematic as generalisation was not a fundamental objective of 
this part of the research. According to Sekaran (2009), the convenience sampling 
method is the preeminent and fastest way of obtaining essential information because the 
interviewees are known to the researcher. The researcher was able to identify 13 
interviewees using this method. 
 
The researcher also used snowball sampling techniques in obtaining information on the 
research topic. The researcher gained the list of target participants from suggestions 
given by the interviewees. According to Bryman and Bell (2007), a snowball sample is 
used to contact potential participant(s) for whom there is no sampling frame. The 
researcher was able to access a group of owner-managers who are difficult to get in 
touch with. Based on the names given by the interviewees, the researcher made an 
appointment to meet the suggested individuals. The process continued until the 
researcher obtained a sufficient sample; in this case, it was 25 interviewees. Previous 
studies that have used interviews to examine capital structure and related issues in SMEs 
have used similarly small samples; for example, Michaelas et al. (1998) interviewed 30 
owner-managers and Glansey et al. (1998) interviewed 20 entrepreneurs. 
 
4.4.2 Data collection 
 
The data collection method for the preliminary study was a combination of individual 
and group semi-structured interviews. The main reason for conducting some group 
interviews was because this is a convenient and efficient way of collecting data. It can 
also generate more ideas as interviewees may be stimulated by the views of others and 
discuss issues in more depth.   
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The draft interview guide contained an outline of topics with associated questions and 
was based on the conceptual framework developed from the literature. These questions 
are designed to help ascertain the main factors that impact on the financing of SMEs. 
The questions were tested with five owner-managers of SMEs in the UK (two British, 
one Malay, one Malaysian Chinese, and one Malaysian Indian) in July 2009. The SMEs 
were selected from the lists taken from the Brunel Career and Placement Centre, the 
Hillingdon Directory, and the Malaysian Student Department in London. The questions 
were revised following their suggestions and the final interview guide (see Appendix B) 
was tested with the sample of 25 owner-managers in Malaysia. It comprised a number of 
open-questions eliciting details on financial decision-making and sources of finance 
used, management personal characteristics, business background, firms’ financing 
preferences and attitudes towards external finance, business performance, and a number 
of direct questions regarding the determinants of capital structure.  
 
The researcher used open questions to allow respondents to express their opinions in 
their terms. Even though the researcher has a list of themes (identified from the 
literature) and questions to be covered, however, these may vary from interview to 
interview. The orders of questions may also be varied depending on the flow of the 
conversation. The interviewer might add additional questions to obtain more detailed 
information about a specific answer or to find out new, but relevant, issues that arise 
from a particular response as suggested by Collis and Hussey (2009). 
 
The interview guide and participant information form was emailed to each interviewee 
two days before the agreed date of the interview to ensure that the principles of research 
ethics were followed (see Section 4.3). The individual interviews took place at the 
business premises of the interviewees, and the group interviews were held in the office 
of one of the interviewees in the group. The individual interviews were conducted in the 
interviewee’s mother tongue (in Malay for the Malay and Indian interviewees, in 
Mandarin for some of the Chinese interviewees). The group interviews were conducted 
in English and Malay. Each interview took approximately one hour and, with the 
permission of the interviewee(s), it was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. The 
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researcher then translated the Malay and Mandarin transcripts into English, and the 
bilingual speakers verified the translations to ensure their accuracy. 
 
During the interview, the researcher summarised the main points from time to time to 
ensure the accuracy of the information taken and to encourage further explanation of 
those points. Interviewees were shown the list of variables generated from the literature, 
and they gave comments regarding the list of existing variables shown. Interviewees 
were informed that they would be contacted again if further clarification were needed 
during the process of data analysis. After the transcribing process, the transcripts of 
interviews were sent to the participants for validation (i.e. to examine the content 
validity).  
 
Interviews offer the advantage that they can provide evidence about non-financial and 
behavioural factors that a structured survey questionnaire cannot (Michaelas et al., 
1998). Unlike unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews can avoid the problem 
of time constraint and problems concerning ‘recording the questions and answers, 
controlling the range of topics and analysing the data’ (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p.144). 
Instead of closed questions, open questions were used to allow free responses and to 
explore and gather broad information.  
 
Nevertheless, interviews are time-consuming and travel to interviews may be expensive. 
Another problem was that the male interviewees tended to be friendlier and more 
cooperative than female interviewees. In addition, Chinese interviewees tended to be 
more reserved than the other ethnic groups. However, they then gave full cooperation 
once the researcher mentioned her job title at the University Malaysia Kelantan and 
spoke to them in their mother tongue, Mandarin.  
 
There were also some difficulties in getting information from Indian interviewees as 
most of them are not sufficiently fluent to communicate effectively in either Malay or 
English language. Lim (2001) also faced similar problems in recruiting non-indigenous 
participants in his investigation on work-related values among Malaysian communities.  
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The researcher had tried to solve the problem by searching for and interviewing the 
selected Indian owners (using the snowball sampling technique) who can understand 
either Malay or English. 
 
4.4.3 Data analysis  
 
This section explains how the analysis of the interview data was undertaken. According 
to Collis and Hussey (2009), there are two approaches to the analysis of qualitative data: 
quantifying methods and non-quantifying methods. For the purposes of the preliminary 
study, a non-quantifying method was adopted based on a thematic analysis of the data. 
Lemke (2012) asserts that thematic analysis focuses on the meaning, which provides a 
discursive interpretation. It may include opinions and facts that are not necessarily 
relevant to the study. Themes in thematic analysis seek to summarise the data (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). Initially, the researcher examined the data collected from various 
interviewees. The researcher identified themes and labelled them as codes as 
recommended by Ryan and Bernard (2003). The researcher then grouped the data 
together as the same themes continue to emerge. Unlike content analysis, the codes are 
not predetermined. 
 
Specifically, the coding of the interview data began during the process of data collection 
(i.e. began from the first set of interview transcripts that had been translated into 
English). The use of coding enabled quantification as to how often particular themes 
was addressed in the interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2011). In this study, the interview 
data was coded by hand. The decision was made not to code using computer programs 
as coding by hand allowed better understanding and a close examination of the interview 
data. A limited number of respondents also made the coding of the interview data by 
hand relatively easier than may have been the case with a larger amount of data. 
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4.5 Main study 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, this current study used the triangulation of methods. The 
main reason was to look at something from several angles. It is in line with the statement 
of Neuman (2003) who stated that nothing in this world has all the answers, neither 
common sense nor scientific law. For this main study, it aimed to test the hypotheses 
and to generalise the results to the population. Thus, this main study took the form of a 
questionnaire survey. According to Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 76), a survey is ‘a 
methodology designed to collect primary or secondary data from a sample, with a view 
to generalising the results to a population’. A questionnaire survey was chosen since this 
approach is widely used in previous studies of the capital structure of small firms (for 
example Norton, 1990; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Romano et al., 2000; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Beck et al., 2008; Bhaird and Lucey, 2010; Newman, 2010; Saarani and 
Shahadan, 2013). Unlike an interview, this questionnaire survey incurs low costs, and 
the questionnaires can be distributed and returned quickly (Bryman, 2008). In addition, 
according to Van der Stede, Young, and Chen (2005), if surveys are constructed and 
administered appropriately, they can be a reliable source of large-scale and high-quality 
data. 
 
4.5.1 Research location  
 
The empirical works for this research were undertaken in Malaysia. The selection 
(Malaysia as a research context) followed the suggestion of Thong (1999) who stated 
that there are many differences between developing countries like Malaysia and 
developed countries. Hence, it would be interesting to compare the findings of one part 
of the world to those of other parts. 
 
4.5.2 Sample selection 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2009) ‘the larger the sample, the better it will represent 
the population’ (p. 210). This study follows the classification of Krejcie and Morgan 
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(1970), cited by Collis and Hussey (2009), in determining the minimum sample size for 
generalisation of the results. Since the population of SMEs in the context is 
approximately 100,000, thus, this study assumes that a sample of 384 firms is 
considered adequate. The study allowed a permissible error rate of less than 5% at 95% 
confidence level as recommended by Fowler (2014).  
 
Probability sampling is most commonly associated with survey-based research strategies 
(Saunders et. al., 2009). This study adopts a stratified random. The sample comprises of 
micro, small, and medium-sized firms. The description of the SMEs is based on the 
definition of the Bank Negara Malaysia (2013) (see Table 4.1 and 4.2). The sample 
includes SMEs in all sectors: manufacturing, service, and agriculture-based businesses 
in the states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang, which are in the east coast region of 
Malaysia. Respondents were invited from all sectors to ensure broad representation in 
terms of financing patterns tapped. The study covers only those three states because they 
are included in the East Coast Economic Region (ECER), which is one of the main 
economic plans in the 9
th
 Malaysian Plan. It is important as this particular region 
becomes one of the four economic regions of Malaysia, and little study has been 
conducted in this region since most previous studies on SMEs have focused on the north 
and west regions of Malaysia. In addition, the proximity of the states within the ECER is 
convenient in terms of reducing costs and travelling time. 
 
The sampling frame was derived from several directories, namely, the Small and 
Medium-Sized Industry (SMI) Directory, directories obtained from the SME Info Portal 
(2010), directories published by SME Corporation of Malaysia, Malay Chamber of 
Commerce, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Indian Chamber of Commerce, SME 
Bank, East Coast Economic Region (ECER) office, Tourism Malaysia, and Institute 
Small and Medium Enterprise (ISME). The samples were divided equally among Malay, 
Chinese and Indian respondents. The main reason is to find out the similarities and 
differences of financing patterns among these three ethnic groups (research objective 5).  
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The following tables present the definitions of SMEs based on the number of full-time 
employees and annual sales turnover. 
 
Table 4.1 Definition of SMEs based on number of full-time employees 
 Manufacturing, Manufacturing-
Related Service and Agro-Based 
Industries 
Services Sector, Primary 
Agriculture and Information 
Communication Technology 
Micro Fewer than 5 employees Fewer than 5 employees 
Small 5-50 employees 5-19 employees 
Medium 51-150 employees 20-50 employees 
 
Table 4.2 Definition of SMEs based on the annual sales turnover 
 Manufacturing, Manufacturing-
Related Service and Agro-Based 
Industries 
Services Sector, Primary 
Agriculture and Information 
Communication Technology 
Micro Less than RM250,000 Less than RM200,000 
Small RM250,000-10 million RM200,000-1 million 
Medium RM10 million-25 million RM1 million-5 million 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2013) 
 
4.5.3  Data collection 
 
a. Questionnaire development and design  
 
At the preliminary stage of the questionnaire development, the researcher referred to the 
findings from interviews and reviewed several questionnaires that were previously used 
in the capital structure determinants’ research in large firms as well as in SMEs studies. 
Poorly designed questionnaires are usually associated with misleading conclusions 
drawn (Sreejesh et al., 2014). Alternatively, a well-designed questionnaire can reduce 
errors and make the tasks of both participants and researchers easier (Sreejesh et al., 
2014).  
 
This research follows the questionnaire design which was suggested by Sekaran (2009). 
Sekaran (2009) asserted that a good questionnaire design should focus on three 
principles. Firstly, the principle of wording which is concerned with the contents and 
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purposes of the question, wording and language (e.g. English, Malay and Chinese 
languages), type and form of questions (e.g. open questions and closed questions, short 
and precise questions), sequencing, and classification data (e.g. demographic questions). 
The second principle is a measurement in terms of categorisation, coding, scales and 
scaling, and reliability and validity. The third principle pertains to the introduction to the 
respondents, instructions for completion, general appearance and length of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The survey questionnaire for this study was prepared in the form of the booklet. The 
questionnaires were designed in three languages: Malay, Mandarin and English. For this 
study, the researcher used a back-translation technique as recommended by Brislin 
(1993). Specifically, this study applied the following translation procedures. First, the 
researcher translated the English version of the questionnaire into Malay and Chinese 
languages (one-way translation). Second, the translated Malay and Chinese 
questionnaires were then given to two professional bi-lingual translators (back 
translations) to be translated back into English. Finally, both versions of the translated 
questionnaires were compared, revised, and re-produced into English, Malay and 
Chinese versions of the questionnaires by four language lecturers from the Universiti 
Malaya (i.e. Malay-English, English-Malay, Mandarin-English and English-Mandarin). 
The objectives of the back-translation were to avoid translation-related problems and to 
make sure the meanings of each question were consistent with the English version 
questionnaire, which is the original version.  
 
The full questionnaire was only seven pages long (including covers). According to 
Saunders et al. (2009), a longer questionnaire will reduce response rates relative to a 
shorter questionnaire; thus, the general rule is to keep questionnaires as short as 
possible. The questionnaire was accompanied by background information and an 
explanatory cover letter which can assure the confidentiality of responses as suggested 
by Smith and Dainty (1991). Each questionnaire was numbered to facilitate follow-up 
procedures. A clear instruction was provided for each questionnaire and definitions of 
key terms used in the questionnaire were provided as a footnote. This complements the 
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statement of Pallant (2010) who states that the instructions of the questions are 
paramount for the respondents to answer the questionnaire accurately.  
In total, the questionnaire comprised of six parts: 
Section A Business financing  
Section B Business environment 
Section C Business cultural orientation 
Section D Information on the owner-manager 
Section E Information on the firm 
Section F Business performance  
 
b. Techniques and procedures  
 
In the next step, the questionnaire was pilot tested in January and February 2010 with 25 
owner-managers of SMEs in the east coast region of Malaysia
13
 in which the research 
was to be carried out. The purpose was to determine the appropriateness, relevance and 
clarity of the questions and to make sure that the respondents understand the 
questionnaire. It allowed any potential problems to be identified and corrected prior to 
the main distribution of the survey instrument as suggested by Saunders et al. (2009). In 
addition, the face validity and content validity tests were conducted through experts’14 
judgements as suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007) and Sekaran (2009).  
 
None of the items were omitted since most of them were taken from the preliminary 
study except for minor corrections in terms of wording especially for the Malay and 
Chinese versions. More appropriate wordings relevant to the context of Malaysia were 
identified with the assistance of professional bi-lingual translators. It was important as 
the terminology used should be familiar to the respondents and the style of asking 
questions should be suited to the way of life of the researched community (Arthur and 
Nazaroo, 2003). After considering various opinions expressed by the respondents (e.g. 
                                                          
13
They are different respondents as for preliminary study. 
14
 Research supervisors, academic experts in SME research (lecturers from the public universities in 
Malaysia), and SME experts from SME Bank of Malaysia.  
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excessive length of the survey
15
) and experts, the questionnaire was revised. The 
researcher also checked the typos and errors prior to the questionnaire distribution. The 
revised questionnaire (seven pages) had been prepared in three languages, namely 
Malay, English and Mandarin. 
 
The process of data collection for the main study began with a drop-off survey method 
(in May 2010). The researcher returned on the same day or the next day to collect the 
completed questionnaires. The objective was to gain the prospective respondents’ 
cooperation. In addition, the researcher wished to cover a large number of respondent 
groups and in diverse geographical locations in a single day with an initial drop-off and 
later collection as recommended by Elanain (2003). However, out of 100 questionnaires 
that were distributed, only 26 of them were completed by the respondents. There were 
several reasons given by the non-respondents, such as they had no time, forgot, felt too 
lazy to fill out the form, etc. 
 
The researcher then changed the data collection technique to maximise the response rate 
and to diminish the above-mentioned problems. Questionnaires were distributed in 
person to the respondents, starting on 15
th
 June until 25
th
 September 2010. There are two 
reasons for using this technique. Firstly, the postal services are not robust enough to 
send postal questionnaires to all sectors of the economy in the research context, and 
secondly, to improve the response rate. A covering letter was attached to each 
questionnaire to emphasise the importance of the survey, assured anonymity and stated 
the official sponsors of the study (Brunel University London and University Malaysia 
Kelantan). It can also indirectly improve the response rate to the questionnaire as 
suggested by Bailey (2008).  
 
Specifically, the booklet of the questionnaire was distributed on a particular appointed 
day and time. Respondents were given time to complete the questionnaire and submit it 
to the researcher on the spot. Several crucial constraints of this study, such as the 
unavailability and inaccessibility of information required in constructing a sampling 
                                                          
15
The average time taken to complete the survey was approximately 30 minutes. 
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frame such as information on profitability and financial performance of the firms could 
be overcome using the personally administered survey approach. This approach became 
the preferable approach to ensure the participants answered it and truly understood the 
questions since they could ask the researcher during the session. These efforts resulted 
in a further 330 completed questionnaires being received and brought the total of usable 
questionnaires to 356.   
 
However, the sample still did not meet the target sample of 384. In order to overcome 
the insufficient number of completed questionnaires during fieldwork studies, the 
researcher carried out surveys by telephoning and emailing the target respondents 
starting from the end of September until the end of November 2011. At this stage, 60 
questionnaires had been emailed to the target respondents and 20 phone calls had been 
made, but only 28 respondents completed the questionnaire. Altogether, out of 510 
questionnaires distributed, 384 samples had been completed by the respondents and used 
by the researcher for this study. The response rate for the surveys was 75%. It was 
higher since the researcher conducted a survey study mostly face-to-face, and she was 
present during most of the data collecting process. The following table shows the 
sampling units and the response rate for the study.  
 
Table 4.3 Main study: Sampling units and response rate 
Data collection method Sampling units Number of  
respondents 
Response 
rate 
Personally administered (wait 
and collect on the spot) 
330 330  
Drop-off 100 26  
Online survey 60 17  
Telephone survey 20 11  
Total 510 384 75% 
  
 
In February 2011, the respondents had been contacted for ‘terms’ confirmation 
purposes. The process was done after the exploratory factor analysis stage. There were 
eight respondents (different from the main survey’s respondents): five from Malaysia 
(three SME owners and two academics) and three from the UK (two SME owners and 
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one academic). After obtaining clear clarification regarding the terms used for each 
factor, the researcher then proceeded to analyse the data by using logistic and multiple 
regression analyses.  Figure 4.1 presents the timescale of data collection for the current 
study. 
 
Figure 4.1 A timescale of data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Methods of analysis  
 
The primary purpose of the data analysis is to build predictive models to answer the 
main research questions. Before deciding on suitable statistical tests (parametric or non-
parametric statistical tests), data gathered from the questionnaires was coded and 
followed by data entry using the SPSS 18.0 software package. According to Field 
(2009), parametric statistics can only be used when the population data are normally 
distributed, the level of measurement of the data reflects metric data, there is 
homogeneity of variance, or data from different cases are independent. Alternatively, a 
non-parametric test is appropriate when the distribution of population data measured on 
the metric scale is not normal. Variables are measured on a non-metric scale, or 
bivariate or multivariate analysis is being conducted that incorporates both metric and 
non-metric independent variables (Field, 2009). 
 
Nov- Dec 2009 
Preliminary study: Semi-structured interviews (15 individual 
interviews, 2 group interviews with 5participants each) 
 
Feb 2011 
Terms confirmation-were 
done after EFA 
(8 respondents) 
Jan-Feb 2010 
Pilot study in Malaysia 
(25 SMEs) 
 
Feb 2010 
Design Final Questionnaire 
 
May 2010- Nov 2010 (STUDY 2) 
Main study- Survey in Malaysia 
(384 SMEs) 
 
July 2009 
Testing the guide for interview in 
the UK (5 SMEs owners) 
 
August 2013- February 2014 
Follow-up interviews (20 
SMEs) 
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The study proceeds with non-parametric statistical tests, as none of the data met was 
normally distributed. This study performed the following non-parametric tests: 
 Descriptive statistics 
 Exploratory factor analysis  
 Reliability analysis 
 Spearman correlation and multicollinearity 
 Logistic regression analysis 
 Multiple regression analysis 
 
Specifically, after screening the data using descriptive statistical analysis, this study 
proceeds with two-stage analysis: exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis. 
The data screening provided information regarding missing values, outliers, the 
distribution of the data and invalid data. Invalid data were excluded from the analysis. 
Since the main analysis of this main study was a logistic regression, the study did not 
examine the normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance for the independent 
variables as recommended by Long (1997) and Field (2009). In addition, unlike ordinary 
regression, which assumes the dependent variable had a linear relationship with the 
independent variable, a logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between 
these two variables. The main reason is that the dependent variable is categorical, and 
this indirectly violated the assumption of linearity.  
 
The study then purifies the measurement by using principal component analysis in 
exploratory factor analysis. The exploratory factor analysis had been employed to 
validate the latent and associated manifest variables, which had been taken from extent 
models, before fitting the deduced model to the data. It was performed to identify groups 
of variables with which to evaluate construct validity.  
 
In the next stage, the study tests hypotheses 1 and 5 (the dependent variables are 
categorical variables) using logistic regression analysis, and multiple regression analyses 
were used for testing the hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 (the dependent variables are continuous 
variables). 
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4.6.1 Data screening 
 
Missing data 
 
This study assessed missing data by tabulating cases for each variable with missing data 
as recommended by Hair et al. (2010). According to Hair et al. (2010), missing data 
under 10% for an individual case can be ignored. In addition, this study assessed the 
patterns of missing data by performing a Little Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) 
test (Little, 1998). The result is considered as no systematic error in the data, and it is 
significant if the p-value is greater than 0.05. The mean substitution technique was used 
to impute missing values (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2010) since it is 
suitable for relatively lower levels of missing data (Hair et al., 2010). No variables were 
deleted at this stage as the level of missing data was less than 6%, which was considered 
too low according to the rule of thumb of Hair et al. (2010). This was followed by 
diagnosing the randomness of the missing data by performing Little’s MCAR test. The 
result showed that a dataset was missing completely at random (Chi square= 3225, 
df=3197, sig.= 0.566, p>0.05). It means that there is no systematic error in the data.  
 
Outliers 
 
This study tested both univariate and multivariate outliers. The former have been tested 
through transforming the data into standardised scores as suggested by Hair et al. 
(2010). Alternatively, the latter were tested through exploring the Mahalanobis D² and 
resulting Chi-square value (p<0.001) for the dataset. Results showed that the data 
contained a few univariate as well as multivariate outliers. It is acceptable (as suggested 
by Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) since the sample for this study comprises of firms of 
different sizes and from different sectors. At this stage, no variables were deleted. This 
is in agreement with the suggestion of Hair et al. (2010). They suggest that outliers 
should be retained unless there is proof that they truly deviate from the norm and are not 
representative of any observation of the population.  
  
99 
 
4.6.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
 
Unlike confirmatory factor analysis, exploratory factor analysis is suitable when the 
dimensionality of the variables is not known based on previous researches (Hair et al., 
2010). Exploratory factor analysis is a technique ‘used during the initial stage of scale 
development’ (Netemeyer et al., 2003, p. 156) to examine the dimensionality of 
variables. It is a data reduction method (Hair et al., 2010). The variables are grouped 
based on their theoretical concept, and a small number of factors (latent variables
16
) 
were produced from a large number of variables. The reduced factors are used for 
further analysis.  
 
Before running the factor analysis, this study considered the underlying assumptions of 
the sample size (see Section 4.5.2), the sampling adequacy (Hair et al., 2010), and the 
inter-correlation among the variables as suggested by Pallant (2010). In addition, 
according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the correlation coefficient is considered as 
reliable if the research has adequate sample size. The significance values of any variable 
were scanned to see whether the majority of values are greater than 0.05. 
 
As suggested by Field (2009, p. 645), ‘the reliability of factor analysis is also dependent 
on sample size’. This analysis began by dividing the variables into four groups. 
Variables were divided into groups to make sure that the number of observations per 
variable for each analysis was at least 5:1
17
as recommended by Cavusgil and Zou (1994) 
and Hair et al. (2010). This is in agreement with the recommendation of Menon et al. 
(1996) who suggested that in order to obtain more reliable results for many factors, it is 
better to assess fewer measurement models. It means the study should have at least five 
participants per variable. Theoretically related constructs were grouped together.  
 
The study proceeds by scanning for the inter-correlation (Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010) 
between variables in the correlation matrix (R-matrix). This study considers the 
                                                          
16
 Business goals and planning, owner-related factors, culture and external factors 
17
 Group 1: 15x5=75; Group 2: 18x5=90; Group 3: 10x5=50; Group 4: 9x5=45. 
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correlation values from 0.3 to 0.8 as recommended by Field (2009) and Hair et al. 
(2010). Any correlation above 0.9 or below 0.3 were considered as multicollinearity 
(Hair et al., 2010) and too low correlation (Field, 2009), respectively.  
 
Next, the study examined Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s test (Norusis, 1992) to test 
the factorability of the data. The former measures sampling adequacy while the latter is 
a test of sphericity (Hair et al., 2010). Kaiser (1974), cited by Vaus (2002), suggested 
that if a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures 0.90+, then sample adequacy is considered 
‘marvellous’. If 0.80-0.89, then the sample is ‘meritorious’; if 0.70-0.79, then the sample 
is ‘middling’; if 0.60-0.69, then the sample is ‘mediocre’; if 0.50-0.59, then the sample 
is ‘miserable’; and if less than 0.50, the sample is ‘unacceptable’. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin test shows whether or not each factor predicts enough variables. On the other 
hand, Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant when p 0.05 (Vaus, 2002). The 
study also considered the value of the determinant of the correlation matrix. The 
determinant value should be more than 0.00001 (Field, 2009). If it is close to zero, the 
collinearity is considered to be too high. In contrast, if it is zero, there is no solution 
possible.  
 
The study then proceeds with principle component analysis to get the minimum number 
of factors required in order to represent the original set of data (Netemeyer et al., 2003; 
Hair et al., 2010). This study follows the suggestions of Hair et al. (2010) where 
principal component analysis with an Eigenvalue
18
 greater than 1.0 is regarded as 
significant and it can be used to determine the factors to extract. In addition, according 
to Field (2009), there is no need to worry about multicollinearity if the study had 
conducted the principal component analysis.  
 
Varimax (orthogonal) factor rotation was used to ensure that each factor is independent 
of others as suggested by Hair et al. (2010). According to Field (2009), varimax rotation 
can improve the interpretation of the analysis as it maximises the tendency of each 
                                                          
18
 An Eigenvalue is a statistic that relates to a factor which indicates the amount of variance in the pool 
of initial items which that particular factor explains (Vaus, 2002). 
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variable too highly on one factor. It was applied to ‘initially-extracted factors due to 
hypothesised inherent correlations among variables’ (Long-Tolbert, 2000, p. 170). The 
rotated solution then revealed the presence of the factors with a number of strong 
loadings
19
. According to Vaus (2002), standard loading of at least 0.3 is considered 
significant for the variable to belong to a certain factor. On the other hand, Hair et al. 
(2010) suggest a cut-off point of 0.50 for loadings. This study follows the suggestion of 
Hair et al. (2010). The variables must load highly on one factor (i.e. 0.50) or must not 
split on another factor above 0.35 as suggested by Gorsuch (1974). In addition, an 
inspection of the Scree plot can also reveal a clear break of the factors (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 2007). 
 
Communality represents the relation between the variable and all other variables (Hair et 
al., 2010). It measures correlations among variables to be factor analysed. The higher the 
correlations among the variables, indicates the higher would be their communalities. If 
the sample is small, communalities of above 0.6 are recommendable; if samples are 
between 100 and 200, 0.5 are recommendable (MacCallum et al., 2001). This study 
follows the suggestion of Hair et al. (2010) where the communalities of each variable 
must not be less than 0.50 or else it will be deleted. 
 
In sum, a set of variables was subsequently reduced or deleted according to the below 
criteria:  
i. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is not significant (p 0.05); KMO less than 0.60 
ii. Multiple loadings or cross loading (more than one loading for each variable) 
iii. Low factor loadings (< 0.50) 
iv. Low communality (< 0.50) 
v. Determinant of the correlation matrix less than 0.00001 
vi. Cronbach’s alpha less than 0.50; corrected item-to-total correlation less than 
0.35. 
 
  
                                                          
19
 Factor loading is a correlation coefficient showing how much weight is assigned to that factor. 
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4.6.3 Reliability analysis 
 
Reliability is used to indicate ‘the extent to which the different items, measures, or 
assessments are consistent with one another’ and ‘the extent to which each measure is 
free from measurement error’ (Leech, Barrett, and Morgan, 2005, p. 63). The primary 
purpose of reliability analysis is to analyse the internal consistency and reliability of 
each factor. The coefficient alpha and item-to-total correlation for each dimension had 
been assessed to evaluate the internal consistency of all manifest variables (items). The 
standard estimation of alpha coefficient is 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010). Nevertheless, 
Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) suggest that alpha coefficient of 0.50 or greater is 
adequate to conclude internal consistency. This study considered the alpha coefficient of 
0.5 or greater as suggested by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and a corrected item-to-
total correlation of above 0.35 as recommended by Hair et al. (2010). 
 
4.6.4 Multicollinearity and Spearman’s correlation 
 
Multicollinearity is a potential problem which also needs to be examined in logistic 
regression analysis (Bewick, Cheek, and Ball, 2005). It exists when there is a high 
correlation of two or more independent variables in the model (Field, 2009). 
Multicollinearity can reduce the predictive power of any independent variable by the 
extent to which it is associated with other independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). The 
individual variables in the model need to be examined before applying statistical 
techniques to test the hypotheses of this study. High multicollinearity potentially leads to 
a large variance and covariance, large confidence intervals, insignificant significance 
coefficients, and it may contribute to directional inconsistencies (Hair et al., 2010).  
 
A Spearman’s bivariate correlation test was employed to diagnose the potential problem 
of collinearity and determine the relationship between the non-parametric variables. The 
coefficient of 1 (either positive or negative) represents a perfect linear association, and 0 
represents no linear association. All variables that were included in the regression 
models were included in this correlation analysis. Bivariate analysis was conducted 
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between each independent variable with each of the dependent variable to assess initial 
significant predictors. Scatter diagrams were screened to look for inter-relationships. 
The interpretation of the scatter diagrams was confirmed by constructing a correlation 
matrix of the variables. A correlation coefficient of 0.7 means that a substantial portion 
of the predictive power may be shared and a correlation coefficient of greater than 0.9 
were taken as an indication of singularity in the data (Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). 
 
The present study also examines the Tolerance and Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) for 
the independent variables in each regression, to ensure that multicollinearity was not 
present. Tolerance examines the seriousness of multiple correlations between an 
explanatory variable and the other explanatory variables. Alternatively, VIF indicates 
the value of coefficient variance that had been inflated by multicollinearity (Pryce, 
2005).  
 
4.6.5 Logistic regression analysis 
 
Logistic regressions were used to address the main research questions and test 
hypotheses 1 and 5 (see Figure 3.1). The results of the logistic regression seek to 
investigate statistically significant associations between determinants of capital structure 
(i.e. owner-managers’ characteristics, firms’ characteristics, management performance 
and external factors) and preferences for different sources of financing. H1 represents 
the relationship between determinants of capital structure and capital structure; while H5 
investigates the direct association between determinants of capital structure and a firm’s 
performance. 
 
The use of logistic regression analysis for testing the hypotheses in this study is mainly 
because of three reasons. First, logistic regression is likely to be the most appropriate 
method since the dependent variable is a dichotomous categorical variable (Field, 2009; 
Sreejesh et al., 2014). Second, instead of continuous independent variables, this study 
also contains categorical independent variables and includes non-linear association 
between dependent variables and independent variables. Hence, a logistic regression is 
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suitable as it allows the admission of both continuous and categorical variables into the 
regression model (Norusis, 1994). It does not require the normal distribution of 
independent variables (Janzen and Stern, 1998) or the assumptions like linearity or 
homoscedasticity as in a multiple regression model (Bewick et al., 2005). In addition, 
the predicted values in a multiple regression analysis cannot be interpreted as 
probabilities whereas in the logistic regression, the predicted probability can be 
estimated directly (Norusis, 1994; Field, 2009).  
 
Third, conceptually, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) can be conducted as an 
alternative analysis. However, SEM is difficult to use in dealing with the categorical 
variables (Kupek, 2005). The first reason is that the basic assumption of the maximum 
likelihood estimation method of SEM is the normality of data collected.  Even though 
SEM also provides any other estimation methods for non-normal or asymptotic-
distribution-free (ADF), they will require a very large sample size, which is not 
available for this study.  
 
Before beginning with the logistic regression analysis, the independent variables, which 
were dichotomous or nominal, were re-coded. Dummy variables were used to contrast 
the different categories. A baseline (reference) category has been chosen for each 
variable. The first group from each variable serves as the reference group. Principally, if 
the exploratory variable has three variables, then it will have two dummy variables; if 
the exploratory variable has four variables, then it will have three dummy variables, etc.  
 
This study used ‘factor score’ for each continuous independent variable. An ‘Anderson-
Rubin method’ is used instead of ‘regression 20  method’ in estimating factor score 
coefficients. The Anderson-Rubin method is a modification of the ‘Bartlett method’. It 
aims to confirm orthogonality of the estimated factors (Field, 2009). The scores will 
have a mean of 0, a standard deviation of 1, and are uncorrelated. 
 
                                                          
20
 The scores will have a mean of 0 and a variance equals to the squared multiple correlations (SMC) 
between the estimated factor scores and the true factor values. The scores are correlated even when 
factors are orthogonal. 
105 
 
This study runs two sub-categories for each dependent variable (Category 1 and 
Category 2). The first category includes two models of logistic regression (model 1 and 
model 2) that test for the main effect of the variables. The nominal predictor variables 
(ethnicity, owner’s age, education, firm’s age, and firm’s size) were entered in model 1. 
In model 2, all continuous predictor variables (perceptions and attitude to debt, business 
planning, relationship, networking, commercial goals, lifestyle goals, asset structure, 
profitability, conservatism, mastery, stable environment, and external environment) 
were added into the model together with the significant variables of model 1. Model 1 
served as the base model for Category 1.  
 
The second category covers logistic regression model 3, which was used to examine the 
moderating effect of ethnicity and independent variables. In model 3, interactions (two-
way) of ethnicity and independent variables were put into the equation. This model 3 
became the final model for the regression as it included all significant variables: both 
main effects and interaction effects. The same steps of regression were applied to all 
(four) types of dependent variables. In this category, significant variables from the first 
category were used as the base model since it included all main effects of independent 
variables on the capital structure decision for this study. A forward stepwise method had 
been used in ensuring all candidate variables were fitted to the model. 
 
This study tested the goodness of fit by looking at the -2Log likelihood (-2LL) of the 
model, as well as the value of Chi-square. The model is better in prediction as the lower 
value of -2LL shows that the model is predicting the outcome variable more accurately. 
It is important to mention that, if large value of -2LL, model fits poorly; while, the value 
is small when the model fits well. This is because the larger its value, the more variance 
that remains to be accounted for.  
 
Another indicator for goodness of fit is Chi-square
21
. The value of Chi-square should be 
equal to the value of -2LL in the current model and constant model. The model Chi-
                                                          
21  It is simply the difference between the -2LL for the model with only a constant, and that of the model currently being examined.  
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square works in the same way as the multivariate F test in linear regression. It is a test of 
the null hypothesis and seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables (in which acceptable significance levels vary). The 
most commonly used are the 10% (0.1), 5% (0.05) and 1% (0.01) levels. A model will 
be acceptable in this study if the significance is less than or equal to 10% or whether no 
relationship exists (in which case it should be accepted).  
 
The study also tested the goodness of fit by looking at the value of Hosmer and 
Lemeshow R Squared. Hosmer and Lemeshow R Squared was used instead of Pseudo R 
Squared because data in a logistic regression does not form a line as R Squared in linear 
regression (Field, 2009). 
 
In addition, this study looks into the classification table to see how well a logistic model 
performs. According to Afifi and Clark (1984), the prior probabilities indicate the 
probability of a case being correctly classified into one of the two groups before the 
model is applied to the data. The latter probabilities express the probability for each case 
of belonging to a particular group as determined by the chosen model (Afifi and Clark, 
1984). 
 
4.6.6 Multiple regression analysis 
 
A multiple regression analysis was used to test hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 (see Figure 4.2). 
H2 tests the relationship between capital structure as an independent variable and a 
firm’s performance as a dependent variable. H3 investigates the direct effect of 
determinants of capital structure (independent variables) and a firm’s performance 
(dependent variable). H4 investigates the mediating role of capital structure for the 
relationship between determinants of capital structure (independent variables) and a 
firm’s performance (dependent variable). 
 
The employment of multiple regression analysis instead of other multivariate analysis is 
because of three reasons. First, multiple regression is likely to be the most appropriate 
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method since the values of independent variables are known to predict a dependent 
variable (Hair et al., 2010). Secondly because of the basic requirement of structural 
equation modelling (SEM) disallowed the researcher to use it. Third, multiple regression 
analysis becomes the most appropriate multivariate analysis after SEM for investigating 
the association between dependent and independent variables by considering its well-
developed underlying statistical theory (Hair et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 4.2 Main study: An operational model of capital structure determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedures in testing the mediating 
effects or indirect paths. It started with the regression between independent variable and 
performance, but is mediated by capital structure (A). It is followed by the regressions 
between mediating variable and the dependent variable (B). Label C represents the 
regressions between the dependent variable and performance, without controlling the 
mediator. Finally, the dependent variable was regressed on independent variable while 
the mediator was controlled (D). 
 
According to Miles and Shevlin (2001), a variable is considered to be fully mediated if 
the independent variable first has an effect on the mediator variable, and this 
sequentially influences the dependent variable. A variable is considered to be partially 
mediated in a relationship between independent and dependent variable if independent 
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variable exerts some of its influence through a mediating variable or directly (Miles and 
Shevlin, 2001). 
 
4.6.7 Validity 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, validity is ‘the extent to which the research findings 
accurately reflect the phenomena under study’ (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 64). It is 
different from reliability, where reliability implies that similar results will be obtained 
by researchers on different occasions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008), and the concern is 
with how replicable the research study is (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
The researcher used a mixture of methods to collect and analyse the data (interviews and 
questionnaires survey) as the triangulation would increase confidence in the accuracy of 
observations (Hair et al., 2009). By using personal contacts and networks, good quality 
access to knowledge was secured. In addition, interview transcripts or survey 
questionnaires were fed back to respondents for verification. The research evidence was 
collected in an easily retrievable form and a log cataloguing research design decisions 
and justifications for these were kept so that others were able to investigate it. In 
addition, 20 follow-up interviews (ten new participants and the remaining are those who 
had responded to the survey) had been conducted to achieve the cross-validation of data 
and better explanations of potentially statistically unconfirmed hypothetical relations. 
Thus, the researcher is confident that the validity for the current study has been secured. 
The following figure presents the flow of data analysis for the main study. 
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Figure 4.3 Main study: Overview of the data collection and data analysis 
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described the study’s methodology through discussing why certain data 
was collected, who the sample are, how the samples were chosen, what data was 
collected, when, from where, and how it was collected and analysed. The research 
design incorporates methodological triangulation by using more than one method in 
collecting and analysing the data. The study adopts a survey methodology combined 
with semi-structured interviews. The main survey was preceded by a number of 
interviews and a pilot survey to explore the issues and test the questionnaire. The 
following chapter provides a description of the variables analysed in the preliminary 
study and the main study. Detailed discussions on the findings of the preliminary study 
and the results of the main study are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter describes the variables analysed in the preliminary study, 
the results of which are reported in Chapter 6. The second part describes the variables 
analysed in the main survey, the results of which are reported in Chapter 7.  
 
5.2 The preliminary study  
 
5.2.1 The sample firms 
 
A total of 25 firms took part in the preliminary study, of which the majority were sole 
proprietorships and only firms L and Q were partnerships. Approximately one-third 
were in the manufacturing sector and the remainder were in the service sector. This 
broadly reflects the SME population in Malaysia where 90% are in the service sector, 
6% are in the manufacturing sector and the remainder operate in the agriculture, 
construction, mining and quarrying sectors (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2011). 
The number of employees varied from one business sector to another, ranging from 2 to 
25 with a mode of 3 employees. The highest number of employees is in textile and 
clothes firm, followed by catering service and restaurant, and wholesale and retail. In 
specific, the number of full-time employees depends on the size and needs of the firm at 
a specific time. The age of the firms varied from 2 to 38 years, with an average of just 
over 10.5 years since start-up. Table 5.1 provides further details. 
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Table 5.1 Preliminary study: The sample firms 
ID Main activities Number of 
 employees 
Age of firm 
(years) 
A Bakery and cake   6 30 
B Bakery and cake 13 16 
C Bakery and cake   3 17 
D Hardware and painting   6 13 
E Handbag designer   8   9 
F Construction  16   7 
G Computer related services   2 15 
H Public relation consulting    4   5 
I Air conditioner service   2   2 
J Cosmetics producer   5   5 
K Hardware and painting    3   4 
L Wholesale and retail   4 33 
M Wholesale and retail 18  7 
N Textile and clothes producer  3  3 
O Business consulting  3  5 
P Ice cube producer  4  2 
Q Textile and clothes producer 32  7 
R Transportation and logistics service  3  9 
S Tailoring and dry cleaning  2          22 
T Car trading and insurance services  2          10 
U Optometry service  2          16 
V Printing service  3  9 
W Steel trading and retail  2  4 
X Printing service  3  8 
Y Catering service & restaurant 27  7 
Maximum   32 33 
Minimum    2  2 
Mode 
Median 
Mean 
SD 
  3 
 3 
 5 
4.56 
 7 
 8 
10.6 
18.73 
 
 
5.2.2 The interviewees 
 
The majority of the owner-managers interviewed (68%) were male and only 32% were 
female, which reflects the wider population of SMEs in Malaysia where 37% are owned 
by women (UNDP Malaysia, 2007). As shown in Table 5.2, 10 of the interviewees were 
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Malay, 8 were Chinese and 7 were Indian. The owners’ age at the time of the interviews 
ranged from 22 to 62, with a mode of 35 years.  
 
Table 5.2 Preliminary study: The interviewees 
Interviewee  Gender Ethnicity Age in 2009 
A Male Malay 50 
B Male Indian 43 
C Female Indian 42 
D Male Chinese 41 
E Male Malay 35 
F Male Malay 36 
G Female Indian 45 
H Male Malay 45 
I Female Chinese 40 
J Female Indian 44 
K Male Indian 33 
L Male Chinese 62 
M Female Chinese 30 
N Male Malay 33 
O Male  Chinese 47 
P Female Malay 23 
Q Female  Chinese 42 
R Male Chinese 35 
S Male Malay 41 
T Male Indian 35 
U Male Chinese  44 
V Male Indian 28 
W Female Malay 22 
X Male Malay 38 
Y Male Malay 29 
Maximum    62 
Minimum    23 
Mode 
Median 
Mean 
SD 
                        35 
                       40 
                       39 
                    8.78 
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5.3 The main study 
 
This part of the chapter describes the data relating to variables analysed in the main 
study. It is organised into subsections with themes that relates to the Chapter 7. The first 
subsection describes the variables used in the factor analysis and the second section 
describes the variables used in the subsequent analysis of the determinants of capital 
structure.  
 
5.3.1 Variables in the factor analysis  
 
This subsection provides information about the variables which were used in the factor 
analysis. The Table 5.3 presents variables that were included in the factor analysis. 
There were 52 continuous variables included in this initial stage of analysis. It is 
measured on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5. Details explanation concerning the measurement 
would be presented in the later subsection. 
 
Table 5.3 Main study: Variables included in the factor analysis 
Business goals  
 Increase business value 
 Accumulate wealth 
 Improve owner’s lifestyle 
 Like the challenge 
 Maintain control  
 Fit around family commitments 
 Develop hobbies/skills 
 Repay borrowing 
 Pass onto next generation (family tradition) 
 Expand the firm 
 Provide jobs for family and friends 
 
Business planning 
 Formal business plan 
 Formal strategic plan 
 Formal management structure 
 Business performance appraisal 
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Relationship 
 Close relationship with lender/supplier  
 Duration of relationship with lender/supplier 
 Review relationship with lender/supplier on a regular basis 
 Review procedures in getting credits 
 Send report to lender/supplier on a regular basis 
 Provide data to lender/supplier when requested 
 Consider hobbies of lender/supplier 
 Review services of lender/supplier on regular basis 
 
Networking 
 Be a regular client 
 Pay on time  
 Invite lender/supplier to visit firm 
 Visit lender/supplier regularly 
 Offer personal greetings to lender/suppliers 
 Lenders/suppliers are managed by family members or friends 
 
Perceptions and attitude to debt 
 Culture norms/social norms 
 Religious beliefs 
 Way of life (personal net worth)   
 Attitude  to debt (averse to debt) 
 
Culture 
 Regulations inform employees what is expected from them 
 Standard operating procedures are helpful to employees on job  
 Harmonious working relationships are important for the company 
 Instructions for operations are important for employees on job 
 Details of job requirements and instructions are important 
 Preserving public image is one of the main policies for the company 
 Owner's success is more important than the employee’s success 
 An aggressive financing policy is important for the firm 
 Owner's interest is more important than the employee’s interests 
 Achievement of owner's goals is more important for the company 
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External factors 
 It is very easy to keep afloat in this industry 
 There is little threat to the survival and well-being of my business 
 There are rich investments and marketing opportunities 
 My business must frequently change its marketing practices 
 One wrong decision could easily threaten the viability of my business 
 The failure rate of businesses in this industry is high 
 Social pressure could affect my business 
 Strict government rules and regulation could hinder the viability of my 
business 
 The survival of my business is highly dependent on the country’s economy 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Variables in the subsequent analysis  
 
This subsection describes the variables used in the subsequent analysis of the 
determinants of capital structure. The variables include both dependent and independent 
(categorical and continuous) variables. 
 
Dependent variables: Sources of finance  
 
Sources of finance were measured by four variables: retained earnings (RE), personal 
monies and funds from friends and families (PF&F), debt financing (DEBT), and 
external equity (EE). Table 5.4 presents the descriptions of dependent variables used in 
this study. Respondents were asked to state the choices of finance used by the firms. All 
the above variables are dichotomous variable. Each variable is coded 1 if the firm used 
the particular sources of finance and 0 otherwise. Table shows that majority of the firms 
preferred to use retained earnings as their source of financing, followed by owner’s own 
contributions or funds from friends and families and debt finance. External equity being 
the least preferred sources of financing where only 34 firms use it as their sources of 
finance.  
 
  
117 
 
Table 5.4 Main study: Sources of finance  
Variable Description  Data N Min Max 
RE Whether they use retained earnings  
 
Nominal 352 0 1 
PF&F Whether they use personal savings, 
funds from friends and family, sale 
of assets, or informal funds 
 
Nominal 334 0 1 
DEBT Whether they use short term bank 
loans, bank overdraft, trade credits, 
factoring, invoice finance, leasing, 
hire purchase, or long term debts  
 
Nominal 304 0 1 
EE Whether they use venture capital, 
business angels, private investors,  
government grants, or other external 
equity  
 
Nominal 34 0 1 
 
 
Independent variables: Categorical variables 
 
a. The sample firms 
 
A total of 384 SMEs took part in the main study, which took the form of a survey. The 
majority were sole proprietorships (67%); 13% were partnerships and 20% were limited 
liability companies. Approximately 75% were in the service sector and the remainder 
were in the manufacturing sector. Table below provides further details.  
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Table 5.5 Main study:  Demographics of the firm 
Variable  Definition  Hypothesis Expected sign 
AGEBIZ Year of incorporated minus 2010 (1 
= < 1 year,  2 = 1–3 years, 3 = 4–10 
years, 4 = > 10 years) 
 
H1.11 - 
SIZE  Size of the firm (1 = micro [< 5 
employees], 2 = small 
[manufacturing = 5-50 employees; 
Service= 5-19 employees], 3 = 
medium [manufacturing = 51-150 
employees; service = 20-50 
employees]) 
H1.12 + 
 
Table 5.6 Main study: Frequency distributions for the sample firms  
 
Variable  
Number 
coded 
1 
Number 
coded 
2 
Number 
coded 
3 
Number 
coded 
4 
AGE 14 34 85 251 
SIZE 175 140 69 - 
 
Table 5.6 presents the frequency distribution for the demographic variables for the 384 
sample firms that took part in the main survey. The table illustrates that approximately 
65% of them have operated for more than 10 years and relatively few were less than 1 
year (3.6%), between 1 to 3 years (9%) or between 4 to 10 years (22%). The table shows 
that more than one-third of the samples are small-sized firms, 45.6% of them are micro-
sized firms, and the remaining are medium-sized firms.  
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b. Respondent demographics 
 
This section provides the background information about the respondents. Table 5.7 
shows the demographic variables that relate to the respondents, for instance age, 
ethnicity, education and experience. 
 
Table 5.7 Main study: Respondent demographics  
Variable  Definition  Hypothesis Expected sign 
AGEOWN 
Age of owner (1 = 24 or under, 2 = 25-
34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45 and over) 
H1.1 - 
ETHNIC 
 
Ethnicity of owner (1 = Malay, 2 = 
Chinese, 3 = Indian) 
 
H1.2 
H5 
 
- 
+ 
EDU 
 
Educational background of the owner (1 
= No academic qualification, 2 = 
Professional qualification, 3 = 
Undergraduate degree or diploma, 4 = 
Postgraduate degree or doctorate, 5 = 
On-the-job-training) 
H1.3.1 + 
   
 
  
EXP Experience before starting the current 
business (1 = 2 years or  under, 2 = 3-5 
years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4 = More than 10 
years) 
H1.3.2 + 
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Table 5.8 Main study: Frequency distributions for the respondent demographics 
Variable  Number 
coded 1 
Number 
coded 2 
Number 
coded 3 
Number 
coded 4 
Number 
coded 5 
AGEOWN 27 87 92 178 - 
ETHNIC 128 128 128 - - 
EDU 203 24 98 47 12 
EXP 70 120 155 39 - 
N = 384 
 
Table 5.8 presents the frequency distribution for the respondent demographics. The table 
shows that nearly half (46.4%) of the respondents were aged 45 and over; while 
relatively few were 24 years old (7%). One-fifth of the respondents were from the age 
group of 25 to 34 years and approximately a quarter of them were from the age group of 
35 to 44 years. The percentage of each ethnic group is equal, where it comprised of 128 
respondents from each ethnic group. The main reason is because one of the objectives of 
this study is to highlight similarities and differences of financing patterns among these 
ethnic groups (research objective no.5).  
 
The table also shows that respondents have relatively low level of academic 
qualification where more than half of them do not have any academic qualification. A 
quarter of them possessed bachelor degrees or diplomas, 12% are postgraduate, and less 
than 10% of the respondents possessed professional qualification or had gone through 
on-the-job training. Regarding the owners’ experience (i.e. experience related to the 
current business) before starting the business, nearly three quarters of them had 
experience between 3 to 10 years; with 40.4% has experience between 6 to 10 years and 
31% had experience between 3 to 5 years. These respondents could be regarded as serial 
entrepreneurs, who are entrepreneurs with some prior start-up experiences (Westhead 
and Wright, 1998). Only 18.2% of the respondents had less than 3 years experience prior 
to the business start-up who could be called as “novice” entrepreneurs; who have no 
experience (Westhead and Wright, 1998).  
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Independent variables: Continuous Variables  
 
This section provides the information about the continuous variables which were used in 
the subsequent analysis of the determinants of capital structure. The variables include 
owner-related factors, management performance and external factors.  
 
a. Owner-related factors  
 
Owner-related factors consist of networking, relationship, perceptions and attitude to 
debt, commercial goals, lifestyle goals, conservatism, and mastery.  
 
Table 5.9 Main study: Owner-related factors  
Variable  Definition  Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
NETWORK  Importance level that networking 
influence the capital structure (5 = 
very important, 1 = not important at 
all) 
 
H1.4 + 
RELATION Importance level that relationship 
influence the capital structure (5 = 
very important, 1 = not important at 
all) 
 
H1.5 + 
ATTITUDE Importance level that owner’s 
perceptions and attitude to debt 
influence the capital structure (5 = 
very important, 1 = not important at 
all) 
 
H1.6 - 
COMGOAL Importance level that commercial 
goals influence the capital structure  
(5 = very important, 1 = not important 
at all) 
 
H1.7 - 
LIFEGOAL Importance level that lifestyle goals 
influence the capital structure (5 = 
very important, 1 = not important at 
all) 
 
H1.8 - 
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CONSERV  Extent of agreement that 
conservatism was a factor that 
influence the capital structure (5 =  
strongly agree and 1 = strongly 
disagree) 
 
H1.9 - 
MASTERY Extent of agreement that mastery was 
a factor that influence the capital 
structure  (5 =  strongly agree and 1 = 
strongly disagree) 
 
H1.10 - 
 
 
Table 5.10 Main study: Descriptive statistics for owner-related factors 
Label Description  Min Max Mean SD 
RELATION1 Close relationship with 
lenders/suppliers  
1 5 
3.86 .765 
RELATION2 Duration of relationship with 
lender/supplier 
1 5 
3.67 .780 
RELATION3 Review relationship with 
lender/supplier on regular basis 
1 5 
3.52 1.085 
RELATION5 Regular review of procedures in 
getting credits  
1 5 
3.49 .881 
NETWORK1 Be regular clients 1 5 4.04 .754 
 NETWORK2 Offer personal greetings to 
lender/suppliers 
1 5 
3.61 .842 
ATTI1 Culture norms (e.g. greedy attitude 
must be avoided according to Chinese 
culture ) 
1 5 
3.64 .693 
ATTI2 Religious beliefs (e.g. Muslims would 
not borrow money from banks because 
of riba’) 
 
1 
 
5 3.58 .825 
ATTI3 Way of life (e.g. do not borrow 
because do not want to be burdened by 
debt/ wish to  manage company in 
own way) 
 
1 
 
5 
3.64 .765 
ATTI4 Attitudes to debt (e.g. risk aversion 
attitude) 
1 5 
3.29 .941 
LIFEGOAL1 To accumulate wealth 1 5 4.10 .413 
LIFEGOAL2 To improve lifestyle 1 5 3.48 1.036 
LIFEGOAL3 To develop hobbies or skills 1 5 3.33 1.050 
COMGOAL1 To maintain control 1 5 3.54 1.091 
COMGOAL2 To expand the firms 1 5 3.88 .698 
COMGOAL3 To increase firm’s value 1 5 4.03 .241 
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COMGOAL4 To repay borrowing 1 5 3.50 .790 
MASTERY2 Owner's success is more important 
than employees’ success. 
1 5 
3.75 .837 
MASTERY3 An aggressive financing policy is 
important for the firm. 
1 5 
3.35 1.043 
MASTERY4 Owner’s interest is more important 
than employees’ interests. 
1 5 
3.78 .931 
MASTERY5 Achievement of owner’s goals is more 
important for the company. 
1 5 
4.12 .499 
CONSERV1 Rules and regulations are important to 
inform employees what the 
organisation expects from them. 
1 5 
3.43 1.332 
CONSERV2 Standard operating procedures are 
helpful to employees on job. 
1 5 
4.23 .701 
CONSERV3 Harmonious working relationship and 
social harmony are important for the 
company. 
1 5 
3.64 .693 
CONSERV4 Instructions for operations are 
important for employees on job. 
1 5 
3.58 .825 
CONSERV5 Preserving public image is one of the 
main policies for the company. 
1 5 
3.64 .765 
 
Table 5.10 presents the descriptive statistics for latent variables of owner-related factors.  
Upon inspection of the calculated mean results, it was notable to observe that all 
indicators were high in their scoring since all means are above mid-point of three.  
 
b. Management performance   
 
This section provides the information about the continuous variables which are related 
to the management performance. Table below presents the variables in the analysis of 
capital structure determinants that are related to the management performance. The 
variables are profitability, asset structure, and business planning. 
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Table 5.11 Main study: Management performance  
Variable  Definition  Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
PROFIT Extent of agreement that the 
profitability will increase/ decrease the 
debt ratio of the firm (5=Strongly 
increase, 3= No change, 1= Strongly 
decrease) 
H1.13 - 
ASSET Extent of agreement that the tangibility 
will increase/ decrease the debt ratio of 
the firm (5=Strongly increase, 3= No 
change, 1= Strongly decrease) 
H1.14 + 
PLANNING Importance level that business planning 
influence the capital structure (5 = very 
important, 1 = not important at all) 
H1.15 + 
 
Table 5.12 Main study: Descriptive statistics for management performance 
Label Description  Min Max Mean SD 
PROFIT Profitability of the firm– profit before 
interests and taxes (EBIT) 
1 5 
2.14 .971 
ASSET Asset structure– focused on tangible 
assets 
2 5 
3.84 1.048 
PLANNING1 Formal business plan  1 5 3.58 1.033 
PLANNING2 Formal strategic plan (long-term or 
short-term plan) 
1 5 
3.48 1.036 
PLANNING3 Formal management structure  1 5 3.33 1.050 
PLANNING4 Business performance appraisal 1 5 3.54 1.091 
 
Table 5.12 shows the variables relating to management performance which comprise of 
profitability, asset structure and business planning. It was remarkable to observe that 
mean score for profitability was low as the mean are below mid-point of three. In 
contrast, the mean score for asset tangibility was quite high (above mid-point of three). 
All items in the ‘business planning’ exhibited mean score more than the mid-point of 3 
with a percentage of more than 50 percent for every item.  
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c. Environment 
 
This section provides the information about the continuous variables which are related 
to the external factors. Table 5.13 presents the variables in the analysis of capital 
structure determinants that are related to the external factors. The variables are stable 
environment and external environment. 
 
Table 5.13 Main study: Environment 
Variable  Definition  Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
STABLE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Extent of agreement that stable 
environment was a factor that 
influence the capital structure (5 =  
very untrue and 1 = very true) 
 
H1.16  + 
EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Extent of agreement that external 
environment was a factor that 
influence the capital structure (5 =  
very untrue and 1 = very true) 
H1.17 - 
 
Table 5.14 Main study: Descriptive statistics for business environment 
Label Description  Mean SD 
STABLENVT1 It is very hard to keep afloat in this industry. 3.59 .959 
STABLENVT2 There is little threat to the well being of my 
business. 
3.52 .963 
STABLENVT3 There are rich investment and marketing 
opportunities. 
3.38 .900 
STABLENVT4 My business must regularly change its 
marketing practices. 
3.41 .915 
EXENVT1 High social pressure from the society could 
affect my business. 
3.98 .130 
EXENVT2 Strict government's rules and regulation could 
hinder the viability of my business. 
4.31 .463 
EXENVT3 The survival of my business is highly 
dependent on the economic situation of the 
country. 
4.18 .389 
 
Table 5.14 shows the variables relating to the external factors. The external factors 
comprise of stable (STABLENVT) and external (EXENVT) environment. All items 
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exhibited mean score more than the mid-point of 3 with a percentage of more than 50 
percent for every item.  
 
d. Performance of firm  
 
This section presents the variables measuring the performance of the firm. Table 5.15 
describes the variables in the analysis of capital structure, where firm performance (the 
dependent variable) captures whether the use of debt influence the performance of the 
firm. A firm’s performance which is indicated by NPM, ROA, ROE and CF, was 
revealed as having an upward movement in the three years (2008-2010), as more than 55 
per cent of the respondents show an increase of their firm NPM, ROA, ROE and CF.  
 
Table 5.15 Main study: Descriptive statistics for performance of the firm 
Label Description  Min Max Mean SD 
NPM Net profit margin for the year 2008-2010 (5 
= increased more than 15%, 3 = No change, 
1 = Decreased more than 15%) 
1 5 3.19 1.144 
ROA Return on asset for the year 2008-2010 (5 = 
increased more than 15%, 3 = No change, 1 
= Decreased more than 15%) 
1 5 3.33 1.132 
ROE Return on equity for the year 2008-2010 (5 
= increased more than 15%, 3 = No change, 
1 = Decreased more than 15%) 
1 5 3.36 .981 
CF Cash flow for the year 2008-2010 (5 = 
increased more than 15%, 3 = No change, 1 
= Decreased more than 15%) 
1 5 3.07 1.033 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides an understanding on the respondents, the firms and environment 
that are included in the current study’s sample. An understanding of this background set 
the stage for further analysis of the sample, particularly for exploring the determinants 
of capital structure in Malaysia’s SMEs. Overall, the characteristics of the respondents 
reflect a wide representation of business owners in terms of age, ethnicity, educational 
level experience, perception and attitudes, objectives and goals, and culture. 
Characteristics of the firm comprise of age and size of firm; while management 
performance consist of profitability, asset structure and business planning. The external 
factors focus mainly on the environment. Most measures of determinants of capital 
structure observed a wide range of response. The details analyses parts are discussed in 
the following chapters. Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the preliminary study, whilst 
Chapter 7 focuses on the results of the main study. 
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS OF THE PRELIMINARY STUDY 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
As described in Chapter 4, the preliminary study took the form of interviews with the 
owner-managers of 25 SMEs. The purpose of the study was to address the research 
question: What are the factors that influence the capital structure of SMEs in Malaysia? 
This study is conducted to validate a priori conceptual framework and identify 
additional relevant constructs that might not be identified in the literature.  
 
The chapter is structured according to the main themes identified in the literature review 
in Chapter 2. The first section analyses the characteristics of the owners and firms and 
the subsequent sections present the findings relating to management performance and 
external factors that influence the capital structure of the firm. Appendix D presents 
results of the preliminary study on the financing choices of the firms at start-up, growth, 
and maturity stages. The chapter concludes by commenting on the contribution of the 
preliminary study in developing the model that was used as the basis for the main study. 
 
6.2 Characteristics of the firm 
 
This section discusses the interview findings relating to the influence of the age and size 
of the firm on the capital structure of the business.  
 
6.2.1 Age of the firm 
 
Owner-managers A,C,E,G,J,N,O,R,T,W and X stated that when the business grows and 
the amount of capital needed becomes larger, they look for external capital such as debt 
finance or external equity. This can be explained by pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory, which suggest a link between the age of the firm and its capital structure (Myres 
and Majluf, 1984). Younger firms tend to utilise internal funds such as retained 
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earnings, personal savings, and informal investment (Timmons, 2004). As firms grow 
and mature, they may reinvest retained earnings in the current projects. 
 
Some previous studies (Romano et al., 2000; Cassar, 2002; Cole et al., 2004; Gregory et 
al., 2005) relate the firm’s age with the problem of information asymmetries. Older 
firms usually have longer financial records and are more likely to have developed close 
relationships with banks. These situations will indirectly reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry (Cole, 1998; Cole et al., 2004) and older firms are likely to have 
better access to debt finance. This is confirmed by owner-managers A,H,N,O,Q and T as 
illustrated by T’s comment: 
“At the first stage of my business, I just used internal funds because it was very 
difficult for me to apply for an external financing. However, when I was in the 
third year of my business, there were various capital structure available for me, 
such as bank loan, trade credit, venture capital and etc. I did borrow from bank 
and until today, I still finance my business using external financing.” [Owner-
manager T, Car Trading and Insurance services] 
 
As the firm grows and matures, its relationship with its suppliers may become stronger 
as trust develops (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole et al., 2004) and this helps the firm to 
buy on credit (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Newman et al., 2011). As one of the 
interviewees pointed out: 
“As time goes by, I’ve been able to buy on credit. This happened when we are 
long in business. Besides, the suppliers felt confidence with us since we always 
kept our promises and did not make any problem. For example, we make 
payments on time.” [Owner-manager Q, Textile and Clothes] 
 
In contrast, some interviewees established that mature firms are less likely to use debt 
than younger firms because the former prefer to utilise all available internal sources of 
finance, which confirm findings of previous studies (Cole and Wolken, 1995; Robb, 
2002; Hall et al., 2004; Lu, 2007; Vos et al., 2007; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2010). 
However, a new firm may not have time to retain funds and may be forced to borrow 
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(Hussain and Nivorozhkin, 1997; Hamilton and Fox, 1998). Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
and Rocca et al. (2009) also found that leverage decreases with the age of the firm. 
Interviews with owner-managers B, L and U confirm this. The following quotation 
provides an example. 
“I borrowed money from the bank when I first started this business. However, as 
time goes by, I manage to retain profits of the firm and consequently financing 
by using internal funds only.”  [Owner-manager B, Bakery and Cake] 
 
The majority of the interviewees (all except owner-managers F,R, and Y) held the view 
that the age of the firm is an important influence on its capital structure. However, others 
disagreed, as one interviewee said: 
“My capital structure did not dependent on which stage I’m in, but it depends on 
my financing needs at that time. Regardless of the age of the business, whenever 
I think I need to buy an asset (which is bus or lorry), I will then try to use 
whatever sources of finance that I have or I can apply for, at that particular 
time.” [Owner-manager R, Transportation and Logistics service] 
 
Based on the majority of opinions, it can be concluded that, the capital structure of the 
business is associated with the age of the business. These findings are consistent with 
some of the previous studies (see Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Romano et al., 2000; Gibson, 2002; Riportella and Martinez, 2003; Hutchinson, 2003; 
Hall et al., 2004; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; Lopez-Gracia 
and Sanchez-Andujar, 2007;  Bell and Vos, 2009; Ramalho and da Silva , 2009; Rocca 
et al., 2009; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2010). 
 
6.2.2 Size of the firm 
 
The findings revealed that the capital structure of the firm is also related to the size of 
the firm. Existing theory is contradictory about the effect of size on a firm’s capital 
structure. Pecking order theory predicts a negative association between the firm size and 
leverage, while the trade-off theory proposes a positive association. Although the 
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interviewees generally perceived firm’s size to have no effect on the capital structure, 
four owner-managers (B,F,M, and Y) recognise the importance of the firm’s size in 
influencing their firms’ capital structure.  
 
Some interviewees stated that as the firm grows, they use more debt, not necessarily 
because they choose to, but because they do not have sufficient retained earnings to fund 
the growth of their firms. Another argument was concerning the accessibility of external 
funds. In general, larger firms possess a better reputation, more stable cash flows, fewer 
hazards to be liquidated and their chances of bankruptcy are less as compared to small 
firms; and this stability, therefore, allows them to take advantage of leverage (Marsh, 
1982; Ang, 1992; Homaifar, Zietz, and Benkato, 1994; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Antoniou et al., 2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). On the other hand, smaller firms 
borrow less since they are riskier. This lower borrowing indirectly predisposes smaller 
firms to having less outside financing or lower debt (Cosh and Hughes, 1994). This 
point is confirmed by the following quotation. 
“As the size of the firm becomes bigger, suppliers become confident to 
give me credit terms and there is also a government grant available. 
During my sixth year of operation, I have decided to share the firm. For 
the same reason (i.e. size), the investor felt confident enough to invest 
their money into this business.” [Owner-manager Y, Catering service and 
restaurant] 
 
In contrast to the above points, some studies have found that firms may prefer to use 
internal funds as the firm grows (Mazur, 2007; Ezeoha, 2008; Chakraborty, 2010). This 
was the case for owner-manager B: 
“I used government loan during start-up stage. I then just maintain my 
financing through internal funds and retained profits.” [Owner-manager 
B, Bakery and Cakes] 
 
The overall findings demonstrated that there is no relationship between the firm’s size 
and the capital structure, which is consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis 
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(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, many of the previous studies have found 
evidence of a link between size and capital structure (Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999; Romano et al., 2000; Hutchinson, 2003; Cassar and 
Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; 
Lopez-Gracia and Sanchen-Andujar, 2007; Beck et al., 2008; Ramalho and da Silva, 
2009; Degryse et al., 2009; Rocca et al., 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). 
 
6.3  Characteristics of the owner-manager 
 
This section discusses the interview findings relating to the influence of age, perceptions 
and beliefs, relationship and networking, objectives and goals, and culture of the owner 
on the capital structure of the business.  
 
6.3.1  Owner’s age 
 
The findings revealed that the confidence level of the owner in the financing decision is 
related to the owner’s age. It has been suggested that older owners have more 
confidence and this may affect the capital structure of the business (Vos et al., 2007). 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) found that confidence level may increase through experience 
in the business. This was confirmed by some of the interviewees. 
“Previously, I was involved in more than three businesses. I was only 15 years 
old when I was first involved in the business. At that time, I just used my own 
money and some amount of my parent’s money. I took the same financing 
choices when I first started this business. At that particular time, I felt afraid to 
use a loan or any funds from others. I started using bank overdraft during fourth 
year of the business. As business grows and I myself become matured, I was 
quite clear about what I’m or will be doing. It may be because I’ve done routine 
works and expose to quite a number of business problems.” [Owner-manager M, 
Wholesale and Retail] 
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“I chose internal funds for start-up because I was not confident enough to apply 
for a loan. It may be because I was still young at that time. But now I’m quite 
open-minded and confident. That’s why I’ve used bank loan for my current 
business operation. It may be related to my age and exposure in the business.” 
[Owner-manager W, Steel Trading and Retail] 
 
In contrast to the above points, owner-managers D,J,L,S, and T stated that age makes 
them more careful in making decisions. At a young age, many people might not think 
carefully when they are making any decision. As they become older, they become more 
circumspect in their way of thinking (Van der Wijst, 1989) because they have more 
knowledge and experience. Older owner-managers are wiser and better able to recognise 
what is valuable to them in the long term (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Vos et al., 2007). 
They may prefer to focus more on financial independence and control (Van der Wijst, 
1989; Vos et al., 2007). In addition, as they become older, they gain higher utility from 
financial freedom and exercising caution in decision-making and consequently would 
make less use of debt (Gellatly et al., 2003; Diener and Seligman, 2004; Vos et al., 
2007). As one of the interviewees pointed out: 
“About 20 years ago, when I wanted to do something, I would do it no matter 
what. I ended up with overdraft facilities from more than one bank. I had almost 
all my personal assets secured against bank loans. But now, I don’t think I’m 
going to use any debt anymore. It may be because I’m getting older. What 
concerns me now is just to make sure the business performs well. As long as the 
cash is positive, I would be satisfied.” [Owner-manager S, Tailoring and Dry 
Cleaning] 
 
Based on the majority opinions, it can be concluded that, the capital structure of the 
business is associated with the age of the owner; whether negatively or positively. This 
is consistent with the theoretical findings; whereby neither pecking order nor trade-off 
theories predict any relationship between the owner’s age and leverage. However, 
empirically, there are quite a number of studies which found a correlation between these 
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two variables (see Ward, 1987; Van der Wijst, 1989; Scherr et al., 1993; Romano et al., 
2000; Vos et al., 2007; Bell and Vos, 2009).  
 
6.3.2 Owner’s perceptions and attitudes to debt 
 
Owner-managers L,P,U,V, and X prefer not to use external sources of finance because 
they do not want to be burdened by debt. They believe that using only internal funds 
allows them to manage the firm in their own way. Norton (1990), who did a comparative 
study on small and large corporation in the US found that, in line with pecking order 
hypothesis, firms (regardless of the size) believe that management is most influential in 
formulating capital structure. He found in his study that small firms use no debt at all 
due to management preference. This view is shared by some of the interviewees in 
Malaysia, as the following quotation  
“100% of my financing sources came from internal sources. It is because I don’t 
like to be burdened by debt and I really don’t like this type of commitment. I 
would rather grow slower than borrow. If I want to make a new investment, I’ll 
use internal funds. In my opinion, spending borrowed money is a risky operation 
which may lead to liquidation.” [Owner-manager I, Air Conditioner services] 
 
“I only used internal funds because I don’t want to worry about interest rates or 
loan repayments. Owing nothing meant that I’ll have more time to focus on the 
core operations of the business.” [Owner-manager U, Optometry services] 
 
In relation to religion, the findings revealed that Malays (predominantly professing the 
religion of Islam) are averse to using bank loans from conventional banks.  They favour 
seeking grants or loans from Islamic banks or government; especially for a long-term 
financing. This is in line with the argument of Hamoudi (2007) who asserted that, in 
Islam, any transaction which involves the payment of interest on debt is forbidden and 
this fact indirectly discourages Muslim entrepreneurs from borrowing from banks 
(except seeking for a short-term loan financing).  
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Some non-Muslim entrepreneurs share the same views as their Muslim counterparts. For 
example, one of the Indian interviewees commented: 
“I think, in all religion, debt must be paid. It’s similar for Hindu believer like 
me. That’s why, before making any decision on financing, I will think deeply.” 
[Owner-manager G, Computer related services] 
 
On the other hand, one of the Chinese interviewees offered a slightly different view: 
“In my religion, borrowing money is not considered as a sin or something bad. 
However, I would try my best not to borrow, and I would rather use whatever 
that I have to run the business. My principle is simple. If we earned one ringgit, 
we would save 50 cent. If we earned two ringgit, we would save 1.50. That’s the 
way we do business.”[Owner-manager U, Optometry services] 
 
Most of the interviewees (except owner-managers E,K, and R) in this preliminary study 
demonstrated behaviours that contribute to the factor of ‘perceptions and beliefs’ 
relating to capital structure of the firm. Interviewees were found to be careful in dealing 
with risks. They attempt to develop “safety nets” to minimise possible costs. This 
supports the findings of Michaeles et al. (1998) in the UK. The examples of behaviours 
reflecting owner’s attitudes to debt are summarised in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Owner’s perceptions and attitudes to debt 
 Culture norms (e.g. greedy attitude must be avoided according to Chinese 
culture ) 
 Religious beliefs (e.g. Muslims would only borrow money from the Islamic 
compliance banks; Muslims prefer to rely on their own savings or family 
funds) 
 Way of life (e.g. do not borrow because they do not want to be burdened by 
debt/ prefer internal funds because they want to manage the company in their 
own way to maintain control) 
 Attitude to debt (e.g. risk averse or risk taker) 
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6.3.3 Ethnicity 
 
As can be seen in Appendix D, personal savings and funds from friends and families are 
the most significant sources of funds at start-up for all ethnic groups. As the business 
grows, different ethnic groups begin to choose different types of finance. For example, 
Malays utilised more than two-third of the government grants and bank loans. The 
Chinese on the other hand, were found to favour using internal funds throughout the 
entire business cycle; whereby almost all of them used internal funds (i.e. retained 
earnings and other internal funds such as personal savings or funds from friends and 
families) during start-up and the mature stage of the businesses (except Entrepreneur R 
who utilised government loans during the mature stage) and 50% of it during growth 
stage. This is in line with the record from the Economic Census 2011 by the Department 
of Statistics Malaysia who found that the majority of the SMEs’ owners initially prefer 
to finance their businesses using retained earnings, internally-generated funds, or 
personal savings. They later look to grants or financing from government agencies, 
financing from cooperatives, and financing from banks, development finance institution 
- DFIs (e.g. SME Bank, Agrobank), or micro credit institutions (e.g. TEKUN, Amanah 
Ikhtiar Malaysia).  
 
Interestingly, Indians were found to utilise all types of finance at each stage of the 
business life-cycle. The only difference is that, they Indian managers used more internal 
sources of capital for initial funding as well as funding at the mature stage. They used 
more debt financing during the growing stage of the business.  
 
In addition, the findings show that Chinese and Indian managers used less government 
loans or grants compared to their Malay counterparts. The higher concentration on 
Bumiputra
22
 finance by the Malaysian government may be the result of this supply-side 
effect. Two interviewees had commented concerning this issue:  
 “My financing choice is quite limited, especially the sources from the 
government. It is because most of the financial sources are only limited for 
                                                          
22
 Bumiputra is the indigenous group in Malaysia which mostly consists of Malays. 
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Bumiputra. I mean Malays only.” [Owner-manager D, Hardware and Painting, 
Chinese] 
 
“Due to the fact that most of the external finance is only available for 
Bumiputra, it’s hard for me to find an external finance.” [Owner-manager C, 
Bakery and Cakes, Indian] 
 
Based on the majority of opinions, it can be concluded that, the ethnicity of the owner 
influences the capital structure of the business. This finding confirms previous findings 
such as the study of Smallbone et al. (2003), Deakin et al. (2007), and Robb and Fairlie 
(2007). 
 
6.3.4 Relationships and networking 
 
The findings suggest that the capital structure of the firm is also influenced by agency 
relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) with lenders and creditors, as one of the 
interviewees pointed out: 
“In a business, you have to know a lot of people. If possible, try to build a strong 
relationship with everybody especially with your supplier, lender, or funder. This 
is because, when they feel comfortable with us and trust us, then it can ease us in 
handling our business. For example, when the bank manager has trust in us, the 
approval for the loan application would be smooth as there is less bureaucratic. 
One of the ways to increase the trust of the lenders is that, you invite them to 
visit your premise. That’s what I did.” [Owner-manager N, Textile and Clothes] 
 
Previous studies confirmed that, the closer the relationship between the lender or 
supplier, the lower the difficulty in raising external finance (Scott, 2006; Saleh and 
Ndubisi, 2006; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). This preliminary study also 
discovered that bank finance becomes the most favourable external finance for the firms. 
Most of them depend totally on the support or advice of one particular bank (Howcroft 
and Beckett, 1993). They have more confidence in bank whom they have a long-
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standing relationship (Howcroft and Beckett, 1993). Owner-managers A,C,H,J,S, and T 
believe that if they build a good relationship, they will receive better service, will be 
offered a better financial package, and will indirectly ease them in obtaining loans.  
 
Owner-managers C,G,E,H,J,M,S,T, and X commented on the issues related to obtaining 
credit from suppliers. As firms grow and mature, their relationships with suppliers and 
creditors become stronger (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole et al., 2004). This situation 
may make it easier for firms to take on credit (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; 
Newman et al., 2011). According to Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006), SME’s owners 
strengthen their networks with suppliers through building a long-term relationship with 
them, paying them promptly, visiting or offering personal greetings to them and by 
being a regular client. This is confirmed in this study as well.  
“Wide networking means you know somebody in some place. In my case, it is 
between my firm and creditors. It can be built by being a regular customer, 
paying in-time, or visiting their firms (I mean suppliers) regularly. Sometimes, I 
also gave some gifts to them; for example during Chinese New Year or on 
special days such as birthday.”  [Owner-manager E, Handbag Designer] 
 
“One of my suppliers is my cousin. Here, I can see different treatments that I’ve 
received compared to other suppliers.” [Owner-manager J, Cosmetic Producer] 
 
Interviewees also mentioned that instead of building a strong relationship with banks, 
other financial institutions or suppliers, they also need to have a good relationship with 
government agencies such as MARA
23
, SME Corp. Malaysia
24
, and CGC
25
. Failure to 
establish a good personal relationship with government agencies may reduce the chances 
of the firms to obtain external finance. For example, owner-manager X (the owner of a 
                                                          
23
 The Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) was established “to aid, train, and guide Bumiputra in the areas of 
business and industry” (www.mara.gov.my) 
24
Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp. Malaysia) “is the central point of 
reference for information and advisory services for all SMEs in Malaysia” (www.smecorp.gov.my) 
25
 Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) was formed “to assist SMEs that have no track record or 
collateral, or inadequate collateral, to obtain credit facilities from financial institutions by providing 
guarantee cover for such facilities” (www.iguarantee.com.my) 
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Printing Service) specified that a lack of required support networks caused her being 
failed to obtain a grant from the government for a very profitable project which is 
related to the East Coast Economic Region (ECER)
26
.  
 
Some interviewees considered neither relationship nor networking to be important 
factors which influenced their capital structure. For example, Owner-manager L stated 
that:  
“Like I said earlier, for me, whatever you want to use depends on what you plan 
to achieve. For instance, if you plan to expand your business and need more 
capital, then you will look for an external fund. No matter how close or how 
poor your relationship with the lender, you will try to get the fund. But of course, 
your business performance must be good.” [Wholesale and Retail] 
 
However, based on majority opinions, it can be concluded that there is an association 
between building relationships and networking with capital structure decisions. The 
items that define ‘relationship’ as well as ‘networking’ factors are mostly similar as 
shown by the previous studies of Wu (2001), Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) and 
Newman (2010). Table 6.2 presents the clusters reflecting the factors of relationships 
and networking which were identified during this preliminary study. 
 
  
                                                          
26
ECER is one of the main economic regions in Malaysia (see Chapter 4). 
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Table 6.2 Relationships and networking 
Relationship Networking 
 Close relationship with 
lender/supplier  
 Duration of relationship with 
lender/supplier 
 Review relationship with 
lender/supplier on a regular basis 
 Review procedures in getting 
credits 
 Send report to lender/supplier on 
a regular basis 
 Provide data to lender/supplier 
when requested 
 Be a regular client 
 Pay on time  
 Visit supplier/friends/relatives on 
regular basis 
 Offer personal greetings to 
lender/suppliers 
 Lenders/suppliers are managed by 
family members or friends 
 
 
6.3.5 Objectives and goals 
 
The findings also revealed that the capital structure of the firm is related to the 
objectives and goals of the firm. It is significant to note that all the interviewees in this 
preliminary study are the owners of their own firms. Thus, their business objectives may 
become mixed up with their own personal aims. Owner-managers A,B,C,F,J,K,Q, and V 
pointed that, other than aiming to make money, their capital structure decisions are also 
affected by their personal ways of life. If the business can offer more profit for them or 
the firm, through debt financing, they will utilise the debt and vice versa. 
“I’m doing business to change my lifestyle to be better and to make money. 
When I want to make a decision regarding financing, I will make sure that it is in 
line with my objectives and planning. For example, during the third year of 
business, when my firm introduced a new cosmetic product, there was one 
investor who wanted to invest money into my firm. Since the offer was very 
interesting, I then accepted the offer and use the finance from a private investor 
for that particular product.” [Owner-manager J, Cosmetic Producer] 
 
Other comments (owner-managers E,G,O,S,T, and U) are concerned with the objective 
of applying knowledge and skills. It is common for owner-managers to have businesses 
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in which he/she has knowledge and experience. When he/she has experience, he/she 
would be more confident, which indirectly helps him/her in obtaining funds from 
outsiders. As one of the interviewees pointed out: 
“Previously, I was an entrepreneurship teacher. I used to assist my students in 
doing small businesses. After retirement, I started this business because I wanted 
to apply all knowledge and skills that I have. I used only internal sources of 
finance in running this business, except in the third year of this business, I 
started to borrow some money from a bank, but I’ve already paid it all for less 
than a year.” [Owner-manager O, the owner of a Business Consulting, Chinese] 
 
Nevertheless, owner-managers L,U, and V considered that, since they know what they 
are doing, they will try to avoid utilising external funds. Most of them prefer to start 
small and expand the businesses gradually, by using their own money or retained 
earnings. Some interviewees pointed out that their capital structures depend on the 
objective of a business expansion; whether to continue with internal financing or to use 
external financing.  
“I would use whatever sources available for me, regardless of internal or 
external. As long as I can expand my business, I’ll use it. If by raising funds from 
debt financing is the only way for the firm to raise profit, I’ll use it.” [Owner-
manager M, Wholesale and Retail] 
 
Another objective that reflected the financing decision which was identified in this study 
was the desire to maintain control (Dreux, 1990; Neubauer and Lank, 1998). 
Entrepreneurs, who aim to maintain control or prefer to be independent, tend to finance 
internally (Hutchinson 1995). Other than that, there were a few interviewees who relate 
this items (i.e. ‘maintain control’) with a ‘family tradition’. According to Ward (1987), 
self-defined or self-related goals are often reflected in a high degree of striving for 
autonomy in terms of financing. Generally, if the owner-managers aim to pass the 
business onto the next generation, they will try to maintain control, which will 
encourage them to use less external finance, especially external equity. This issue was 
highlighted by owner-managers Q and J: 
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“Business is something like a compulsory job for our family since my late 
grandfather. This particular business was started by my father. All my siblings 
are working together. We all have our shares in this company. We will try our 
best to maintain the share of this company. Therefore, we will avoid using any 
funds which will make us lose our control of the business.” [Owner-manager Q, 
Textile and Clothes] 
 
“This business is a family business. Every decision that I made was based on 
unanimous agreement of all family members. For your information, I started 
managing this firm when it was already at the maturity stage…from start-up 
until today; this firm only used internal funds. Only once the firm borrowed 
money from the bank and that loan has already been paid in full.” [Owner-
manager J, Cosmetic producer] 
 
The majority of the interviewees considered that their firms’ capital structure was 
determined by the objective to increase business value. This supports the findings of 
previous studies (see Read, 1998; Romano et al., 2000). Comment by owner-manager A 
illustrates this:  
“I will try to maintain my business value as high as possible. If it is necessary 
for me to borrow money in maintaining my business value, I’ll definitely borrow 
it.” [Owner-manager A, Bakery and cakes] 
 
Other interviewees stated that they favour zero debt for the firm: 
“I think it depends on where you want to go with the business. Like me, I prefer 
being cash positive and having less call from the bank. That’s why I’ll try my 
best to pay off the debts as most as possible.” [Owner-manager E, Handbag 
Designer] 
 
Based on the majority of opinions, it can be concluded that the capital structure of the 
business is associated with the objectives and goals of the owner-manager. The 
conclusions were used in the development of the quantitative survey and this study will 
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examine the objectives of owner-managers as shown in Table 6.3. The findings confirm 
prior studies that reported a link between business objectives and capital structure 
(Boyer and Roth, 1978; Barton and Gordon, 1987; Read, 1998; Romano et al., 2000). 
 
Table 6.3 Objectives and goals 
 Increase business value 
 Accumulate wealth 
 Improve owner’s lifestyle 
 Like the challenge 
 Maintain control  
 Fit around family commitments 
 Develop hobbies/skills 
 Repay borrowing 
 Pass onto next generation (family tradition) 
 Expand the firm 
 Provide jobs for family and friends 
 
 
6.3.6 Business culture 
 
Most of the interviewees (all apart from owner-managers B,I,M,T,U, and V) considered 
that the capital structure of the firm is also influenced by cultural factors. When the 
owners aim towards a harmonious relationship and preservation of public image, they 
will look for internal financial sources and try to avoid using external sources. These 
issues are highlighted in the following quotations.  
“I emphasised highly on the firm’s public image. This indirectly encourages me 
to maintain using internal finances and vice versa.” [Owner-manager R, Bakery 
and cake] 
 
“I have 32 workers from different social background, different ethnicity, and 
different religious beliefs. I should really care about their needs and maintain 
harmonious working relationship as well as social harmony. I’ll try to avoid 
using large amount of external debt and will never involve in any external equity 
financing.” [Owner-manager Q, Textile and clothes] 
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This finding is congruent with those of previous studies such as a study of Chui et al. 
(2002). Chui et al. (2002) which found that firms in a country where the national culture 
places greater importance on harmonious working relationships and social harmony, 
security, conformity, tradition, as well as preserving public image; utilised less debt in 
their capital structure. Schwartz (1994) defined these characteristic as conservatism. 
According to Schwartz (1994), conservatism is related to employees and the owners 
who aim towards harmonious relationship, preservation of public image, or uncertainty 
avoidance. This cultural factor has also been recognised as a key factor in other studies 
(see Chui et al., 2002; Licht et al., 2007; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; 
Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2011; Li et al., 2011).  
 
Some interviewees mentioned that, when owners care about their own performance, they 
would try to apply a strict policy for the firm, choose safer projects and this approach 
would automatically utilise less debts. For example, two of the interviewees explained: 
“I’m very particular about the control of the firm. Thus, I prefer to use less debt 
finance.” [Owner-manager X, Printing service]  
 
“My previous business has been less successful that drives me to come up with 
new policy. Now, the company apply more aggressive policy regarding 
financing. I just finance internally in order to play safe.”  [Owner-manager L, 
Wholesale and retail] 
 
This has been confirmed in the previous studies such as a study of Schwartz (1994). 
Schwartz (1994) defined these characteristics as mastery; which is related with 
individual success and individual actions or decisions, which aim at individual 
satisfaction. These items have been considered to represent the mastery factor in 
numerous studies as well (for example, Chui et al., 2002; Licht et al., 2007; Breuer and 
Salzmann, 2008; Shao et al., 2010; Siegel et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011).  
 
Based on the majority of opinions, it can be concluded that, the capital structure of the 
business is associated with the culture factor. Therefore, regarding the development of 
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the quantitative survey for the cultural factor, this study examines the cultural in terms 
of conservatism and mastery as defined by Schwartz (1994). Table 6.4 summarises the 
items of the cultural factor that have been revealed from the preliminary study. 
 
Table 6.4 Business culture 
Conservatism  Mastery 
 Regulations inform employees what is 
expected from them. 
 Standard operating procedures are 
helpful to employees on job.  
 Harmonious working relationships are 
important for the company 
 Instructions for operations are 
important for employees on job.  
 Preserving public image is one of the 
main policies for the company 
 Owner's success is more important 
than the group’s* success 
 An aggressive financing policy is 
important for the firm 
 Owner's interest is more important 
than the group’s* interests 
 Achievement of owner's goals is 
more important for the company 
 
 
*Note: Group means owners and employees 
 
 
6.4 Management performance  
 
This section discusses the interview findings relating to the influence of profitability, 
assets structure, and business planning on the capital structure of the business.  
 
6.4.1 Profitability 
 
All interviewees agreed that firm’s capital structure is also determined by firm’s 
profitability; regardless of the sign of the association (i.e. inverse or positive). This can 
be explained by pecking order theory, which suggests a link between the profitability 
and its capital structure (Panno, 2003; Newman et al., 2011). Some interviewees stated 
that firms with higher profits will try to utilise internal funds before looking for external 
funds and this is confirmed by the literature, for example, Psillaki and Daskalakis 
(2009), Chakraboraty (2010) and Ibrahim et al. (2011). Alternatively, firms with low 
profitability will utilise more external sources in order to cover capital shortfalls 
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(Hovakimian et al., 2004). This is consistent with the statement of one of the 
interviewees. 
“During early 1990, this business had a problem and incurred losses. The 
business was unable to be financed by using internal funds; and because of that, 
I’ve applied for a government loan and also a bank loan. Luckily, my application 
for government loan had been approved. I used it to cover the losses and used it 
as a capital. When the business is stable, I just maintained using retained 
earnings and other internal funds.” [Owner-manager S, Tailoring and Dry 
Cleaning] 
 
These preliminary findings confirm the previous findings in the literature (see Van der 
Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Wiwattanakantang, 
1999; Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Panno, 2003; Hovakimian et al., 
2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Rocca et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2011; Ibrahim et al., 
2011). In contrast, some interviewees voiced different views by stating that when firms 
are profitable, they favour using debt as they can be benefited through the tax shield. 
This is consistent with trade-off theory (Ooi, 1999). This positive association is in line 
with previous studies (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Klapper et al., 2006; Qian et al., 2009; 
Degryse et al., 2009). 
 
The owner-manager N emphasised the availability of funds required in time of need. He 
explained that some firms may prefer to borrow but lenders may only be willing to 
provide finance to stable and profitable firms. This supports the findings of Fu et al. 
(2002), Degryse and Ongena (2001), Deloof (2003), Giannetti and Ongena (2009). 
 
Some interviewees (owner-managers D,O, and V) maintained that their financing 
decisions have nothing to do with profitability and they will always avoid external 
sources of finance.  
“My business principle is simple. Use whatever you have and plan something 
that is compatible with what you have.  So, whether my firm obtains gain or 
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suffers loss, I’d only use internal sources of financing.” [Owner-manager V, 
Printing Service] 
 
These preliminary findings suggest that there is a relationship between profitability and 
capital structure of small firms in Malaysia, which supports most of the previous studies 
discussed so far. 
 
6.4.2 Asset structure 
 
Almost two-thirds of the interviewees emphasised the importance of collateral in 
increasing the chances of obtaining external funds. Interviewees mentioned that other 
than seeking to obtain sufficient information for monitoring the progress and behaviour 
of the firm, a lender also demands collateral as a condition for a loan advance. This issue 
had been highlighted in the following quotations. 
“My first-time application for a bank loan was rejected. The reason given by the 
bank was because my firm provided insufficient security. At that time, I only had 
my skills as a baker instead of tangible asset. Surely, that was not good enough 
to secure the loans.” [Owner-manager C, Bakery and Cakes] 
 
“When I started this business, I borrowed money from the bank. I secured 10% 
out of the total loan that I’ve applied for, as a security to the bank. During my 
third year of the business operation, again, I financed by using a bank loan. But 
this time, I’ve provided my house plus business fixed assets as the securities.” 
[Owner-manager T, Car Trading and Insurance Services] 
 
These preliminary findings are consistent with the previous studies (see Storey, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 1998). Interviewees also considered that firms that have a greater 
amount of tangible assets will have a greater borrowing capacity (Cassar, 2002). Thus, it 
becomes essential for firms to keep their assets, especially their tangible assets. For 
example, owner-manager L mentioned that:  
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“I found that it was difficult for me to borrow from a bank due to inadequate 
collateral value of assets and unstable cash flows of my firm. Thus, I use only 
internal sources of fund.”  [Wholesale and retail] 
 
This is in conformity with the study of Cosh and Hughes (1994) on companies in the 
UK. They report that, even though there were some firms which used the personal assets 
of directors for collateral purposes, most firms still prefer to utilise their own money 
when they have inadequate business collateral assets. This preliminary finding also 
supports some other previous studies (for example, Marsh, 1982; Van der Wijst and 
Thurik, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Michaelas, 1999; Hall et al. 2004; Sogorb-
Mira, 2005; Ortqvist et al., 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Vos et al., 
2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Bany-Ariffin et al., 2010). In addition, some interviewees 
(owner-managers B,F,L,Q, and T) mentioned the importance of tangible assets in the 
case of bankruptcy. They pointed out that the bank can seize the assets of the firm in the 
case of bankruptcy which indirectly prevents the firm from being liquidated. Thus, firms 
having fixed assets would use leverage more actively because of fewer chances of 
bankruptcy (see Shah and Khan, 2007; Chakraborty, 2010).  
 
Another benefit of tangible assets is that the higher the tangible assets, the more debt 
becomes available to small firms at a lower cost (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris 
and Raviv, 1990). This will indirectly reduce the risk borne by the lenders and increase 
the firms’ debt level since they could use their tangible assets as collateral for the debt. 
The interviewees added that the need for fixed assets depends on the type of business 
and the business life-cycle. Some businesses do not require so many assets, while others 
need more assets. Interviewees also commented that firms will secure the financing 
using fixed assets only for the long-term business activities. Alternatively, firms will use 
trade credit or bank overdraft for the short-term business activities.   
 
Thus, the preliminary findings suggest that there is a relationship between asset 
tangibility and capital structure while confirms most of the findings of previous studies 
as discussed above. 
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6.4.3 Business planning 
 
Interviewees stated that a business plan is prepared to enable entrepreneurs to view and 
evaluate the proposed business venture, to analyse and evaluate the practicability of a 
proposed business, and to allocate business resources effectively. Interviewees 
mentioned that investors or financial institutions need to fully understand the business 
before making any investment decision. The presence of a business plan will assist 
potential investors or lenders in analysing and evaluating the viability of the project and 
in deciding whether it will finance or not the proposed project. As one of the 
interviewees explained:  
“I used a business plan in obtaining a loan from a commercial bank. It was easy 
for me to get an approval as the availability of a business plan can boost the 
confidence of interested parties; i.e. in my case is a bank, to finance the cost of 
the venture.”[Owner-manager S, Tailoring and dry cleaning] 
 
It is common for small owner-managers to use a formal business plan to acquire external 
finance such as bank loans, at a start-up (Berger and Udell 1998) or post start-up stage. 
The important of a proper business plan in obtaining loan had been highlighted by 
Haron and Shanmugam (1994) in their study on a loan application in Malaysia. Haron 
and Shanmugam (1994) assert that the possible reasons leading to the rejection of a loan 
application are; lack of knowledge of capital management and overall business 
management, and lack of a proper business plan. 
 
Owner-managers F,P, and V offered different opinions regarding business plans. They 
stated that entrepreneurs need a business plan to enable him/her to fully understand the 
proposed business. This is because, by having a business plan, entrepreneurs can 
determine in advance the investment or financing decisions for their proposed business 
or product. One of the interviewees pointed out the above points.  
“Even though I only use internal funds, since start-up until today, I still prepare 
a business plan. I believe that, when you have a business plan, it can ease you in 
planning your business financially or non-financially. I prepare a plan for 
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business activities, both short-term and long-term plans. These plans include all 
future plans for the business such as target sales, target profit, production 
strategies, marketing strategies, etc.” [Owner-manager F, Construction 
Company]   
 
Another significant characteristic related to business planning was a formal management 
structure. This characteristic was highlighted by nine interviewees. They believe that a 
good management structure could facilitate the financing decisions of the firms. A 
proper structure represents a proper management of the firm; hence increasing the 
confidence level of the lender or investor forgiving financing facilities to the firm. Some 
interviewees stated that management structure can facilitate business activities. Since 
everyone in the company knows their job description, it will automatically structure the 
management of the business. Thus, it will indirectly affect the financing decision of the 
firm. For example, Entrepreneur M explained that:  
“By having a proper structure of management, it can facilitate you in obtaining 
a fund from the lender. As for my business, when I want to find a private investor 
for my company, one of the characteristics that the investor looked at was my 
firm’s management structure.” [Owner-manager M, Wholesale and Retail] 
 
Some interviewees stated that their capital structure is also influenced by the preparation 
of a strategic plan. However, the focus on strategic plans differed between ethnic groups 
in a number of ways. Malay interviewees were more concerned to have a long-term 
strategic plan. In contrast, Indians appeared to be more focused on a short-term strategic 
plan, while Chinese interviewees wanted both long-term and short-term strategic plans. 
It was found that those firms with a proper strategic plan prefer to utilise more external 
funds since they can easily access or obtain the external finances (Romano et al., 2000). 
The main reason was because lenders felt convinced and confident because of the 
information given. This relationship has been highlighted in the following quotation: 
“A business plan is required especially during a start-up stage; while a strategic 
plan is needed for every business stage. Like in my case, I can easily obtain a 
loan, as I mentioned earlier, during a growth stage. The preparation of strategic 
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plan also played a big role here. The bank felt confident and informative since 
they know my long-term and short-term strategic plans.” [Owner-manager D, 
Hardware and Painting] 
 
The above three characteristics (i.e. business plan, strategic plan, management structure) 
had been highlighted in the study of Romano et al. (2000) as well. In addition to those 
three characteristics, more than half of the interviewees mentioned that a proper 
preparation of a business performance appraisal (Townley, 1997) also influenced their 
financing decision. It was because, when the firms are able to prepare such information, 
lenders would have more confidence in them. Interviewees also mentioned that firms 
may use this type of information to evaluate the current performance of the firm and to 
identify any financial problems faced by the firm. Hence, firms would be able to choose 
the best capital structure for them.  
 
The preliminary findings suggest that there is a relationship between asset tangibility 
and capital structure while it also confirms most of the findings of previous studies as 
discussed above. A clear business plan, strategic plan, management structure and 
performance appraisal are essential for firms’ financing decisions and may increase the 
validity and reliability of the firms to outsiders. Insufficient information from the firm 
will indirectly increase the opacity of the firm; while an adequate amount of information 
from the firm may make it easier for the firm to obtain outside financing, such as in the 
approval process of the loan (Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
Table 6.5 presents the clusters of business planning and examples of behaviours for each 
cluster which were identified during the preliminary study. 
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Table 6.5 Business planning 
Cluster Examples of behaviours 
Business plan   Early or start up plan 
 Expected cash flow statement 
 Expected income 
 Expected performance 
 Financial analysis 
 Marketing plan 
Strategic plan   Long-term strategic plan 
 Short-term strategic plan 
 Clear strategic plan (informative) 
 Logic and achievable strategic plan 
Management structure   Reports of all duties 
 Task schedule 
Business performance 
appraisal 
 Actual cash flow statement 
 Actual income 
 Actual performance 
 
6.5 Business environment 
 
This section discusses the interview findings relating to the influence of the business 
environment on the capital structure of the business. The extant literature reports 
conflicting results in relation to the effect of macroeconomic factors on the capital 
structure. For instance, Hatzinikolaou et al. (2002) report a negative relationship 
between inflation rates and capital structure; Sener (1989) and Taggart (1995) report a 
positive relationship; and Mutenheri and Green (2002) found no significant relationship.  
 
Economic recession also influence the capital structure of the firms. Michaelas et al. 
(1999) report that firms rely more on short-term debt in response to liquidity problems 
during a period of economic recession in the UK. This also seems to have been a 
problem for some of the interviewees in Malaysia: 
“Last year, the performance of my firm was unstable. It may be due to the global 
economic crisis. Demand for my product decreased dramatically.  So, I couldn’t 
totally depend on my own money or internal funds. Thus, I had to finance using a 
government loan.”[Owner-manager J, Cosmetic Producer] 
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“Sales for the last year were quite low due to a widespread recession problem. 
However, I didn’t apply for a bank loan because the interest rate was too high at 
that time.” [Owner-manager D, Hardware and Painting] 
 
Some interviewees emphasised issues related to the legal system in Malaysia, especially 
concerning corruption. They stated that firms will use more short-term debt compared to 
equity, when the legal system has less integrity. La Porta et al. (1998) also found slightly 
similar findings by asserting that the laws of the country and their quality of 
enforcement appeared to be among the determinants of a firm’s capital structure.  
 
One of the interviewees pointed out the issue of tax shields. This preliminary finding 
supports previous studies who reported that macroeconomic conditions such as 
economic system, legal and tax environment (Gleason et al., 2000; Korajczyk et al., 
2003) and technological capabilities (Gleason et al., 2000) have an impact of firms’ 
capital structure. The following quotation illustrates this issue. 
“My financing decisions also depend on the rules and regulation of the 
government. For instance, when the government increased the tax rate for 
medium size firm, I’ve borrowed quite a big amount of loan. My reason was to 
be benefited through a high percentage of tax shields.” [Owner-manager Q, 
Textile and Clothes] 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the effect of social pressure
27
  on their capital structure. 
They stated that one’s opinion might be influenced by others. This confirmed the 
findings of Asch (1955) who found that social influences shape people’s beliefs, 
opinions, and practices. Interviewees also pointed out that their financing decisions may 
be influenced by the pressure from peers or competitors. Peer pressure can be a positive 
influence on the firm as it can be an effective collateral substitute (Mosele, 1996; Karlan 
et al., 2009). On the other hand, pressure from competitors can be either positively or 
negatively affect the firm. The following quotations provide the examples. 
                                                          
27
 Social pressure means a pressure from competitors, society, business partners, close friends and 
families; which may influence the financing decision of the owner.  
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“High pressure from my competitors also influenced my financing choices. In 
order to compete with them (i.e. competitors), I gave 10% of the company’s 
ownership to a private investor. I planned to produce a new facial-related 
product which required a big amount of capital.”[Owner-manager J, Cosmetic 
Producer] 
 
“As everyone knows that this type of business is mostly owned by Chinese. 
Therefore, it is quite pressure for me to keep afloat in this business. But I’m 
happy and I’ll try my best to maintain and survive in this business. [Owner-
manager K, Hardware and Painting] 
 
Based on this preliminary study, the researcher summarised environmental factors in the 
Table 6.6. The items are slightly similar to the previous literature such as Naman and 
Slevin (1993), Covin et al. (2000), and Zhengfei and Kangtao (2004).  
 
Table 6.6 Business environment 
 It is easy to keep afloat in this industry 
 There is little threat to the survival and well-being of my business 
 There are rich investments and marketing opportunities 
 My business must frequently change its marketing practices 
 One wrong decision could easily threaten the viability of my business 
 The failure rate of businesses in this industry is high 
 Social pressure could affect my business 
 Strict government rules and regulation could hinder the viability of my 
business 
 The survival of my business is highly dependent on the country’s economy 
 
 
6.6 Findings related with firm’s performance and dependent variables  
 
Based on the information gathered from the preliminary study (except owner-manager 
D), the financial information (including the financial performance) will be measured by 
the rate of change. This issue has been highlighted in the following quotation: 
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“If you want to know about the financial statements of SMEs, you will never able 
to get the exact figure. This may be because they don’t trust you, or they really 
don’t know about the information that you requested for. Therefore, it would be 
better to ask them to provide the answer in range form. For example, range 
between 15% to 20%, or less than 15%, and so on.” [Owner-manager Q, Textile 
and Clothes] 
 
Another important finding from this preliminary study was concerning the measurement 
of capital structure. A majority of the interviewees refused to disclose the exact figures 
or portions of their financial capital. They suggested that the measurement should be in 
nominal form, which should be measured in terms of ‘used’ or ‘not used’. Based on the 
literature review and preliminary findings, the researcher decided to scale capital 
structure using dichotomous measurement. 
 
6.7 Revised model 
 
The findings from this preliminary study were structured based on themes identified 
from the literature. A revised model of the determinants of capital structure and its 
consequences was developed on the basis of the preliminary study and literature 
reviews. One hypothesis concerning the moderating effect of ethnicity; on the relation 
between capital structure determinants and the capital structure was added in the model. 
In total, five main hypotheses will be used in the following analysis (in the main study) 
for hypotheses testing purposes. Below is the revised conceptual framework for the 
study.  
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Figure 6.1 Revised conceptual framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
There are a number of conclusions which can be drawn in relation to the research 
question addressed by the study. The question concerned the factors that affect the 
capital structure of firms. The results confirm the applicability of the existing model of 
Michaelas (1998), Romano et al. (2000), Chui et al. (2002), Nguyen and Ramachandran 
(2006), Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2006), Newman et al. (2011) and some others. 
However, the existing models require modification since this current preliminary study 
had revealed some new items. This preliminary study emphasises two factors, namely 
the business environment and the owner’s attitude to debt, which received relatively 
little attention from previous scholars.  
 
The findings of the preliminary study provide evidence of the universality of some of 
the Western-based theory relating to the determinants of capital structure. As 
aforementioned, this preliminary study aims to integrate the results of the preliminary 
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data into any amendment to the questionnaire intended for use in the subsequent main 
study and into the research framework that has been proposed in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 3).  
 
As described in Chapter 4, the findings of the preliminary study were used to develop 
hypotheses for the main survey. The next chapter seeks to test the psychometric 
properties of the extended model of capital structure determinants, and to test the 
reliability and validity of the dependent and independent variables as well as the 
moderator. The next chapter presents the results of the main survey that relate to the 
capital structure of the sample firms. 
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CHAPTER 7 RESULTS OF THE MAIN STUDY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The findings from the preliminary study indicate that financial theories alone might not 
fully explain how SMEs in Malaysia are financed. Therefore, the main study took the 
form of a survey with the owner-managers of 384 SMEs to investigate the other factors 
that determine the financial structure of Malaysian SMEs. This chapter starts by 
presenting the results of an exploratory factor analysis, which identifies sets of 
interrelated variables, followed by the results of the associated reliability and validity 
tests. Finally, the logistic and other multiple regression analyses are presented, followed 
by a discussion of the results. The discussion is structured according to the main themes 
identified in the literature review (see Chapter 2). The final section draws conclusions. 
 
7.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
 
Exploratory factor analysis was performed since not all latent variables were taken from 
existing models. The variables were divided into four groups and the associated results 
are discussed below.  
 
7.2.1 Group 1: Goals and planning 
 
This group contains 15 variables. Following the initial factor analysis, ‘liked challenge’ 
was deleted due to low communalities. A further three variables (‘family tradition’, ‘fit 
around family commitment’ and ‘provide job to family and friends’) were deleted due to 
cross-loading problems. The subsequent factor analysis resulted in a KMO measure of 
0.780, which indicates a satisfactory ‘middling’ sample adequacy according to Kaiser 
(1974). Moreover, the Bartlett’s test is significant (p ≤ 0.01), which supports the 
factorability of the correlation matrix, and the determinant of the correlation matrix was 
greater than 0.00001, which indicated that the multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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The principal component analysis in Table 7.1 is based on the varimax orthogonal 
method, which ensures that the factors are independent. Three factors with loadings 
above 0.5 are indicated in bold, which together explain 73% of the variance. All factors 
have eigenvalues greater than 1 and communalities above 0.50 which indicates high 
correlation between the variables.  
 
Table 7.1 Principal component analysis of goals and planning 
 
 
  
Variable Item-to-
total 
correlation 
Factor 1 
PLANNING 
 
Factor 2 
LIFEGOAL 
 
Factor 3 
COMGOAL 
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
a
lities 
  (α=0.961) 
 
(α=0.906) 
 
(α=0.634)  
Prepare a formal 
business plan  
.899 .904 .259 .026 .888 
Prepare a formal 
strategic long-term 
plan  
.922 .925 .233 .045 .912 
Prepare a formal 
management 
structure  
.910 .907 .259 -.015 .890 
Prepare a business 
performance 
appraisal 
.886 .897 .250 -.009 .869 
Accumulate 
wealth 
.840 .272 .830 .023 .835 
Improve lifestyle .822 .313 .840 -.017 .828 
Develop hobbies 
or skills 
.774 .200 .828 -.042 .782 
Maintain control .531 .224 -.226 .614 .547 
Expand the firm .591 -.083 .113 .855 .750 
Increase firm’s 
value 
.625 
-.028 .028 .782 .613 
Repay the 
borrowings 
.424 
.108 .255 .555 .614 
 
% of variance 
(73%) 
 
 
32% 
 
27.5% 
 
13.5% 
 
 
160 
 
Factor 1: Business planning (PLANNING) 
The first factor groups together four variables: ‘formal business plan’, ‘formal strategic 
plan’, ‘formal management structure’ and ‘business performance appraisal’. Such 
elements have been recognised as important financing factors in the literature (Romano 
et al., 2000). Factor 1 accounts for 32% of the variance and is named ‘Business 
planning’ (PLANNING). 
 
Factor 2: Lifestyle goals (LIFEGOAL) 
The second factor comprises three variables: ‘accumulating wealth’, ‘improving 
lifestyle’ and ‘developing hobbies or skills’. Such elements have been recognised as 
lifestyle goals in most firms in previous studies (Stanworth and Curran, 1976; Barton 
and Gordon, 1987; Petty and Bygrave, 1993; McMahon and Stanger, 1995; Dewhurst 
and Horobin, 1998; Romano et al., 2000; Burns, 2010). Factor 2 accounts for 27.5% of 
the variance and is named ‘Lifestyle goals’ (LIFEGOAL). 
 
Factor 3: Commercial goals (COMGOAL) 
The third factor groups together four variables: ‘maintaining control’, ‘expanding the 
firm’, ‘increasing business value’ and ‘repaying the borrowings’. Factor 3 accounts for 
13.5% of the total variance and is named ‘Commercial goals’ (COMGOALS). This is 
consistent with Dewhurst and Horobin (1998), who found that the owners of small firms 
may have both commercial and lifestyle goals at some stages of the firm’s life-cycle. 
The variables in this factor have also been used in previous studies (Van der Wijst, 
1989; Ang, 1992; Storey, 1994; Chaganti et al., 1995; Michaelas et al., 1999; Getz and 
Carlsen, 2000; Romano et al., 2000; Ou and Haynes, 2006; Vos et al., 2007). 
 
The results of the reliability tests for PLANNING, LIFEGOAL and COMGOAL were 
satisfactory as they were greater than 0.50 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). No variables 
were omitted from the subsequent analysis as the ‘Alpha if items are deleted’ was less 
than the overall reliability. 
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7.2.2 Group 2: Characteristics of the owner 
 
During the preliminary study, some characteristics of the owner (‘relationship’, 
‘networking’ and ‘attitude to debt’) were found to be important determinants of the 
financing decisions of the sample companies. This group contains 18 variables 
measuring the characteristics of the owner. Initial reliability tests were satisfactory for 
all variables (RELATION, NETWORK and ATTITUDE). To further examine the 
internal consistency, reliability was confirmed by the total correlation and Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item is deleted. This led to two variables being omitted from the subsequent 
analysis (‘provide data to lender/supplier when requested’ and ‘review services of 
lender/supplier on regular basis’) as the results indicated that the reliability of 
RELATION would be increased by more than 0.787 if they were omitted. The 
subsequent reliability test for RELATION gives an improved Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.894. The internal consistency of NETWORK and ATTITUDE is significant at the 1% 
level and the item-to-total correlations are above the threshold value (0.35), which is 
satisfactory. 
 
The results of the principal component analysis initially revealed three factors, but to 
enhance the factor solution, six variables were dropped. ‘Consider hobbies of 
lender/supplier’, ‘send report to lender/supplier regularly’, and ‘pay on time’ were 
deleted because of cross-loading, while ‘invite lender/supplier to visit firm’, ‘visit 
lender/supplier regularly’, and ‘lender/suppliers are family or friends’ were excluded 
because their communality values were less than 0.50. Table 7.2 presents the revised 
analysis, which reveals three factors with loadings above 0.5, indicated in bold. The 
factors were named ‘relationship’, ‘networking’ and ‘attitudes to debt’. Together, these 
factors explain 62% of the variance and all have eigenvalues greater than 1. All 
communalities are higher than 0.5 and the KMO values are above the minimum of 0.5 
(Kaiser, 1974). The result of Barlett’s test is significant at (p≤0.001), which supports the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. The determinant of the correlation matrix was 
0.00001, which indicates that the multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 7.2 Principal component analysis for owner-related factors 
Variable Item-to-
total 
correlation 
RELATI
ON 
NETWOR
K 
ATTITUD
E 
Communalities 
  (α=0.89
4) 
(α=0.85) (α=0.817
) 
 
Close relationship with 
lender/ supplier  
.602 .825 
.083 .131 .899 
Duration of 
relationship  with 
lender/supplier 
.603 .904 
.077 .065 .883 
Regular review of 
relationship with 
lender/supplier 
.730 .909 
.269 -103 .866 
Regular review of 
procedures in getting 
credits 
.790 .852 
.246 .049 .855 
Be regular clients to the 
suppliers 
.877 .127 
.963 
,049 .824 
Personal greetings to 
lender/supplier 
.877 .046 
.965 
.142 .882 
Culture norms .734 .102 .274 .805 .824 
Belief in religion .622 .010 .270 .721 .797 
Way of life   .795 .106 .208 .872 .865 
Financing attitude   .501 .175 .272 .715 .793 
 
% of variance 
(61.38%) 
 
 
25.386 
 
20.185 
 
15.812 
 
 
 
Factor 1: Relationship (RELATION) 
The first factor groups together four variables: ‘duration of relationship of the firm with 
lender or supplier’, ‘close relationship with lender or supplier’, ‘regular review of the 
firm’s relationship with the lender or supplier’, and ‘regular review of procedures in 
getting credits’. Factor 1 accounts for 26% of the total variance and is named 
‘relationship’ (RELATION). These variables have been recognised as important 
financing factors in previous studies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Donnelly et al., 1985; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006).  
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Factor 2: Networking (NETWORK) 
The second factor combines two variables: ‘be regular clients’ and ‘offer personal 
greetings to lender/supplier’. These variables have been recognised as important 
elements of networking in previous research (Yeung and Tung, 1996; Holmlund and 
Tornroos, 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). 
Factor 2 accounts for 20% of the variance and is named ‘networking’ 
(NETWORKING). 
 
Factor 3: Attitude to debt (ATTITUDE) 
The third factor groups four variables: ‘way of life’, ‘culture norms’, ‘religious beliefs’ 
and ‘financing attitudes’. Factor 3 accounts for 16% of the variance and is named 
‘attitude to debt’ (ATTITUDE). Previous research shows that these variables enhance 
the understanding of the influence of owner’s perceptions and beliefs on financing 
decisions (Michaeles et al., 1998; Chui et al., 2002). 
 
7.2.3 Group 3: Cultural dimensions 
 
This group contains ten variables. To enhance the factor solution, ‘importance of details 
of job requirements and instructions’ was omitted from the subsequent analysis as the 
communality value is less than 0.5. Table 7.3 shows the results for the remaining nine 
variables. The solution reveals two factors with loadings above 0.5 indicated in bold, 
which together explain 72% of the variance. The communality values are above 0.5 and 
eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1. Cronbach’s alpha for conservatism and mastery 
was 0.872 and 0.891 respectively and the item-to-total correlations for both constructs 
were above 0.5. The KMO measure (0.883) verifies the sampling adequacy, which is 
considered meritorious (Kaiser, 1974).  
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Table 7.3 Principal component analysis for cultural dimensions 
Variables 
 
Item-to-total 
correlation 
CONSERV MASTERY  Communa
lities 
  (α=0.872) (α=0.891)  
Regulations inform employees 
what is expected from them.  
.623 .713 .003 .543 
Standard operating procedures 
are helpful to employees on job.  
.812 .873 -.034 .791 
Harmonious working 
relationship and social harmony 
are important for the company.  
.821 .911 -.043 .821 
Instructions for operations are 
important for employees on job.  
.865 .924 -.074 .879 
Preserving public image is one 
of the main policies for the 
company.  
.688 .722 -.055 .517 
Owner’s success is more 
important than employees’ 
success.  
.810 -.013 .892 .795 
An aggressive financing policy 
is important for the firm.  
.812 .012 .902 .829 
Owner’s interest is more 
important than employees’ 
interests.  
.857 -.050 .836 .890 
Achievement of owner’s goals is 
more important for the company.  
.622 -.107 .774 .595 
 
% of variance (71.63%) 
 
 
39.34% 
 
32.29% 
 
 
Factor 1: Conservatism (CONSERV) 
The first factor combines five variables: ‘rules and regulations are important to inform 
employees what the organisation expects from them’, ‘standard operating procedures are 
helpful to employees on job’, ‘harmonious working relationship and social harmony are 
important for the company’, ‘instructions for operations are important for employees on 
job’, and ‘preserving public image is one of the main policies for the company’. 
Following Schwartz (1994), this factor has been labelled ‘conservatism’ and these 
variables have been recognised as elements of culture in previous studies (Chui et al., 
2002; Licht et al., 2007; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011;  
Siegel et al., 2011). This factor explains 39% of the variance. 
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Factor 2: Mastery (MASTERY) 
The second factor contains four variables: ‘owner’s success is more important than 
group success’, ‘an aggressive financing policy is important for the firm’, ‘owner’s 
interest is more important than group interests’ and ‘achievement of owner’s goals is 
more important for the company’. These variables are concerned with individual 
success, actions or decisions which relate to individual satisfaction. When the owners 
care about their own performance, they try to apply strict policies for the firm, choose 
safer projects and automatically utilise less debts (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989). These 
variables are considered to represent ‘mastery’ as defined by Schwartz (1994) and have 
been recognised as a key culture factor in previous studies (Chui et al., 2002; Licht et 
al., 2007; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; Siegel et al., 2011; Li et al., 
2011). This factor explains 32% of the variance. 
 
7.2.4 Group 4: Business environment 
 
Previous research suggests that the determinants of financial structure of SMEs are 
concerned with external as well as internal factors (Michaelas et al., 1998). In this study, 
the external factor has been identified as the business environment. In an effort to 
identify the important elements in the business environment that influence the owners’ 
financing decisions, a principle components analysis was conducted on nine variables. 
To enhance the factor solution, two variables were dropped:  ‘Failure rate of businesses 
in this industry is high’ because the communality values are less than 0.5 and ‘one 
wrong decision could easily threaten the viability of my business’ because it loads for 
more than 0.35 on each factor or is multi-loaded. Table 7.4 presents the results of the 
revised analysis. Together, these factors explain 67% of the variance and all have 
eigenvalues greater than 1. All communalities were higher than 0.5 which is satisfactory. 
The KMO measure shows an adequate value of 0.694 and the result of the Bartlett’s test 
is significant (p≤0.01), which indicates that the correlation between variables is 
sufficient for the analysis. The determinant of the correlation matrix was greater than 
0.00001, which indicates that the multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 7.4 Principal component analysis for environmental factors 
Variables 
 
Item-total- 
Correlation 
STABLEENVT EXENVT Communalities 
  (α=0.854) (α=0.604)  
It is easy to keep 
afloat in this 
industry.  
.858 .675 .266 .526 
There is little threat 
to the well being of 
my business.  
.704 .939 .018 .882 
There are rich 
investment and 
marketing 
opportunities.  
.738 .824 -.396 .837 
My business must 
regularly change its 
marketing practices.  
.607 .886 .012 .785 
High social pressure 
from the society 
could affect my 
business.  
.301 -.001 .535 .512 
Strict government’s 
rules and regulation 
could hinder the 
viability of my 
business.  
.551 -.205 .893 .839 
The survival of my 
business is highly 
dependent on the 
economic situation of 
the country.  
.498 .259 .848 .786 
 
% of variance 
(66.85%) 
 
 
34.72 
 
32.13 
 
 
Factor 1: Stable environment (STABLENVT) 
The first factor groups four variables: ‘It is easy to keep afloat in this industry’, ‘there is 
little threat to the survival and well being of my business’, ‘my business must frequently 
change its marketing practices’ and ‘there are rich investment and marketing 
opportunities’. This factor has been named ‘stable environment’ in accordance with 
previous studies (Porter, 1991; Zahra, 1993; Naman and Slevin, 1993; Sohi, 1996; 
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Lozada and Calantone, 1996; Covin et al., 1999; Goll and Rasheed, 2004; Lindelof and 
Lofsten, 2006). This factor accounts for 35% of the variance. 
 
Factor 2: External environment (EXENVT) 
The second factor contains three variables: ‘the survival of my business is highly 
dependent on the economic situation of the country’, ‘high social pressure from the 
society could affect my business’ and ‘strict government’s rules and regulation could 
hinder the viability of my businesses’. This factor has been labelled ‘external 
environment’. All the variables which were identified as being important in the 
preliminary study are also recognised as such in the literature (Zahra, 1993; Bull and 
Willard, 1993; Donnelly et al., 2007). This factor accounts for 32% of the variance. 
 
The reliability tests for both factors are satisfactory as they are higher than 0.50 as 
recommended by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). The total correlation for all variables 
is higher than 0.3, which is relatively good according to Field (2005). No variables were 
deleted because there was no indication in the results that this would increase the 
reliability. 
 
7.3 Logistic regression analysis 
 
There does not appear to be any empirically-based model in the literature that shows the 
relationships between the factors presented in the previous section and the financing 
decisions made by SMEs. Based on theories from divergent disciplines, this section 
presents the results of four logistic regression analyses relating to the financing 
antecedents of SMEs. The results of the preliminary tests are presented first. 
 
7.3.1 Correlation 
 
A 2-tailed Spearman correlation matrix was generated for each set of the predictor 
variables in the four regression studies and the results show no sign of multicollinearity 
among the individual variables. As a further check, the tolerance and variable inflation 
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factors (VIF) were examined. Based on the cut-off VIF≥10.0 as an indication of a 
multicollinearity problem (Neter et al., 1985; Myres, 1990), no variable was found to 
cause a problem. Therefore, it can be concluded from Table 7.5 that the determinants of 
capital structure (characteristics of the owner, characteristics of the firm, management 
performance and external factors) are correlated with no cause for concern over 
multicollinearity. 
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      Table 7.5 Correlation matrix of variables and collinearity statistics (Dependent variable: Retained earnings) 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Collineari
ty 
Statistics 
 
           Tolerance VIF 
PLANNING 1          .719 1.321 
ATTITUDE .229(**) 1         .693 1.606 
RELATION 
-.017 
.1350(
*) 
1        .744 1.098 
NETWORK -.349 -.451 -.090 1       .668 1.497 
LIFEGOAL 
.088 .065 .056 
-.111 
(*) 
1      .905 1.105 
COMGOAL 
.465(**) 
.245(*
*) 
-.001 .064 -.050 1     .604 1.655 
CONSERV 
.051 
.182(*
*) 
.458(*
*) 
-.042 .059 .048 1    .741 1.155 
MASTERY 
-.038 .051 -.080 
-.145 
(**) 
.139 
(*) 
-.127( 
*) 
-.096 1   .870 1.149 
STABLENVT 
-.080 
-
.198(*
*) 
.102 
.334(*
*) 
.066 .073 .010 
-
.197(*
*) 
1  .748 1.336 
EXENVT 
-.024 .079 .061 
-
.252(*
*) 
.103 
-
.228(*
*) 
.031 
.186(*
*) 
-.021 1 .813 1.229 
      ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
      * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.3.2 Testing of H1 and H5 
 
This section presents the results of the regression analysis used to test H1 and H5. 
Figure 7.1 summarises the variables in the analysis.  
 
Figure 7.1 Variables in the logistic regression analyses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, two sub-categories (Category 1 and Category 2) were 
run for each dependent variable. The first category includes two models (model 1 
and 2) which test for the main effect of the variables. The nominal predictor 
variables (ethnicity, owner’s age, education, firm’s age, and firm’s size) were 
entered in model 1. Next, the significant variables from model 1 were entered with 
the continuous predictor variables measured on a 5-point Likert scale (perceptions 
and attitude to debt, business planning, relationship, networking, commercial goals, 
lifestyle goals, asset structure, profitability, conservatism, mastery, stable 
environment, and external environment) in model 2. Model 1 served as the base 
model for Category 1. The second category covers logistic regression model 3. 
Model 3 put interactions (two-way) of ethnicity and independent variables into the 
equation. Model 2 became the base model for Category 2 (see Section 4.6.5 for a 
detailed explanation). 
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experience 
 Relationship  
 Networking 
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 Objectives and Goals 
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 Age 
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Management performance 
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 Business Planning 
 
External factor 
 Environment 
 
 
 
Capital Structure 
 
 Retained 
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& friends 
 Debt financing 
 External equity  
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The following sections discuss the influence of capital structure determinants on the 
selection of capital structure under study. It should be noted that the positive 
coefficients associated with some factors indicate that SME owners are more likely 
to use the modelled financial capital, and vice versa.  
 
7.3.3 Retained earnings 
 
This section presents results of logistic regression of the use of retained earnings. 
The table below indicates the outcomes for this particular regression.  
 
Table 7.6 Logistic regression of the use of retained earnings 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
sign 
B Wald P 
 
Expected 
(B) 
Characteristics of the owner 
RELATION + -.067 .095 .715 3.121 
NETWORK + -.328 .412 .523 .144 
ATTITUDE + 1.151  6.438 .011 3.162 
LIFEGOAL + 1.416  12.271 .000 4.122 
COMGOAL + -.965  7.935 .005 .381 
CONSERV - .362  12.689 .000 1.436 
MASTERY - .760  5.285 .022 2.139 
Characteristics of the firm 
AGE  +  13.528 .004  
AGE(1)  -.468  4.501 .064 .726 
AGE(2)  .921  14.204 .061 2.513 
AGE(3)  4.036  12.098 .001 56.587 
Management Performance     
PLANNING - -1.755  5.586 .018 .173 
ASSET  - -1.823  8.687 .003 .162 
PROFIT + .974  17.030 .000 2.648 
External factors     
STABLENVT 
 
- -1.354  4.718 .030 
.258 
Two-way Interaction      
CONSERV by 
ETHNIC(1)- Chinese- 
reference to Malay 
+ .936  3.922 .048 
 
22.0 
Constant value  -.443    
      
Chi-square   104.250   
-2 Log likelihood   65.450   
Hosmer & Lemeshow R
2
   0.899   
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Looking first at the owner-related factors, there is no evidence to reject the null 
hypotheses for RELATION (H1.4a) and NETWORK (H1.5a) (p≥ 0.10). The results 
for ATTITUDE (H1.6a) are significant (p≤ 0.05). This factor had a positive effect on 
the odds of utilisation of retained earnings by the firms, which support H1.6a (reject 
the null hypothesis). For a one-point increase in ATTITUDE, the firms use the 
retained earnings three times more than other sources of finance. Both factors related 
to business cultural orientation [CONSERV (H1.9a) and MASTERY (H1.10a)] 
appeared to be positively significant in the retained earnings model. Since the odds 
ratios are more than 1, this means that as these factors increase, the odds of the 
utilisation of retained earnings will also increase. A one-point increase on both 
scores will increase the odds by 1.436 times and 2.139 times respectively. The 
significance levels of both factors are significant (p≤ 0.05).  
 
Similarly, the results for LIFEGOAL are significant (p≤ 0.05), which support H1.7a 
(reject the null hypothesis). The odds of the usage of retained earnings in business 
are 4.122 times larger as the mean of LIFEGOAL increases. The correlation 
coefficient for COMGOAL (H1.8a) shows an unexpected negative sign, so there is 
no evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H1.8a.  
 
Among the characteristics of the firm, the results for AGE are significant (p ≤0.05), 
indicating that the overall variable AGE is statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0 would be rejected (H1.11a). There is no 
coefficient listed, because AGE is not variable in the model.  Rather, dummy 
variables, which code for AGE (reference category), are in the equation and those 
have coefficients. However, as can be seen in Table 7.6, only the coefficient of one 
dummy variable AGE(3) is statistically positively significant(p ≤0.05).   
 
With regard to the management performance, there is no evidence to accept the null 
hypotheses in respect of PROFIT (H1.13a), ASSET (H1.14a), and PLANNING 
(H1.15a). The results for PROFIT are highly positively significant (p≤ 0.05). The 
ASSET was negatively significantly related (p≤ 0.05) with the usage of retained 
earnings (Bi is negative), which reject the null hypothesis of H1.14a. For any 
positive change in ASSET, the odds will decrease by 0.162 times. The result for 
PLANNING shows negative effect on the odds of a business owner using the 
retained earnings, which rejects the null hypothesis of H1.15a.  
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Among the external factors, only the STABLENVT (H1.16a) is included in the final 
regression. The STABLENVT was found to produce a significant negative effect on 
the odds of utilisation of retained earnings by the firms (p 0.05). The odds ratio 
indicates that every unit increase in ‘stable environment’ is associated with a 74% 
decrease in the odds of utilising the retained earnings.  
 
The output also shows that the overall two-way interaction variable ‘CONSERV by 
ETHNIC’ is statistically significant (p≤ 0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient equals 0 would be rejected (H5.9a). There is no coefficient listed, because 
‘CONSERV by ETHNIC’ is not a variable in the model.  Rather, dummy variables, 
which code for ‘CONSERV by ETHNIC’ (reference category), are in the equation, 
and those have coefficients.  However, as shown in Table 7.6, only the coefficient of 
one dummy variable ‘CONSERV by ETHNIC (1)’ is statistically significant (p≤ 
0.05).  This shows that Chinese owner-managers are more likely to use retained 
earnings if they perceive CONSERV to be important. For one unit increase in the 
ETHNIC(1), i.e. Chinese, moderated by CONSERV, the firms will use the retained 
earnings 22 times more than other sources of finance.  It is interesting to mention 
that the variable ETHNIC does not appear to be statistically significant with the 
usage of retained earnings if it is tested by itself. Rather, when it interacts with the 
variable of CONSERV, it appears to be statistically significant. 
 
The Wald statistics in Table 7.6 indicate that the most powerful predictor of retained 
earnings in SMEs is PROFIT (H1.13a), followed by CONSERV (H1.9a), 
LIFEGOAL (H1.7a), and AGE (H1.11a). In terms of the goodness of fit for the 
model, the results show that the -2Log likelihood of the model predicts an accurate 
outcome variable as it decreased from 169.700
28
 in the previous model (where only 
the constant was included in the model). Moreover, results show that there is a 
significant association between the independent variables and retained earnings as 
the p-value of Chi-square is less than 0.001. The goodness of fit can also be found 
from the significant value of Hosmer and Lemeshow R Squared. The value of 
Hosmer and Lemeshow is not significant (0.899) which indicates an adequate 
goodness of fit for the model (i.e. it indicates a poor fit if the significance value is 
less than 0.05). This indicates that the model explains 89.9% of the variance.  
                                                          
28
 Chi-square = 169.700– 65.450 = 104.250 
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Table 7.7 Classification table for retained earnings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the classification table (Table 7.7) shows that, overall, the model 
correctly classifies 87% of the respondents. The current model correctly classifies 
76% of respondents who did not utilise retained earnings and 93.4% of those who 
used it. The above table indicates that, when only the constant was included, the 
model correctly classified 87% of the owners used retained earnings. However, with 
the inclusion of independent variables, it has risen to 91.1% (used and not used).  
This can be seen as a reasonable goodness of fit of the model.  
  
 Classification Table  
 Observed Predicted 
  RE 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used  
Step 
0 
RE not used 
0 50 .0 
  used 0 334 100.0 
 Overall Percentage   87.0 
 Classification Table (a) 
 Observed Predicted 
  RE 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used  
Step 
1 
RE not used 
38 12 76.0 
  used 22 312 93.4 
 Overall Percentage   91.1 
a  The cut value is .500 
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7.3.4 Personal savings and funds from friends and families (PF&F) 
 
This section presents results of logistic regression of the use of personal savings and 
funds from friends and families (PF&F). The table below shows the outcomes for 
this particular regression.  
 
Table 7.8 Logistic regression of the use of PF&F 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
sign 
B Wald P 
 
Expected 
(B) 
Characteristics of the 
owner 
 
    
ETHNIC- Malay +  9.756 .008  
ETHNIC(1)- Chinese 
 
.932 
(.300) 
9.625 .002 2.539 
ETHNIC(2)- Indian 
 
.553 
(.299) 
3.426 .064 1.738 
RELATION + -.224 1.871 .175 .105 
NETWORK + -.078 .042 .823 .344 
ATTITUDE + -.015  .008 .945 .162 
MASTERY 
+ 
.254 
(.112) 
5.132 .023 1.289 
Characteristics of the firm 
AGE- Less than 1 year -  9.537 .023  
AGE(1)- 1-3 
 
2.599 
(1.168) 
4.952 .026 13.450 
AGE(2)- 4-10 
 
-.086 
(1.002) 
.007 .932 .918 
AGE(3)- Over 10 
 
 
.-619 
(.974) 
.405 .525 .538 
Management performance     
PLANNING 
- 
-.696 
(.147) 
22.252 .000 
.499 
 
Constant value   23.876   
      
Chi-square   63.173   
-2 Log likelihood   371.193   
Hosmer & Lemeshow R
2
   0.670   
 
Among the owner-related factors there is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses 
(p>0.10) for RELATION (H1.4b), NETWORK (H1.5b) and ATTITUDE (H1.6b). 
The results also showed that the overall variable of ETHNIC (H1.3b) is statistically 
significant (p=0.008). There is no coefficient listed as the ETHNIC is not a variable 
in the model. Rather, dummy variables, which code for ETHNIC, are in the equation 
and those have coefficients (ETHNIC1 and ETHNIC2). However, only the 
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coefficient of one dummy variable ETHNIC1 (i.e. Chinese) is statistically significant 
(p≤ 0.05). The results show that the Chinese owner-managers prefer to use PF&F 
2.539 times more than Malay owner-managers. On the other hand, the preferences of 
Indian entrepreneurs are found to be similar to their Malay counterparts. This can be 
seen in Table 7.8 which shows that the p-value of the Indians (i.e. ETHNIC2) is not 
significant.  
 
The results for MASTERY are highly significant (p≤ 0.05). This factor had a 
positive effect on the odds of the usage of internal funds. Since the odds ratios are 
more than 1, this means that as the MASTERY increases, the odds of the utilisation 
of internal funds will also increase. This means that a one-point increase on the 
scores will increase the odds by 1.289. The more the owners perceived these factors 
to be important for their financing decisions, the more likely they will be to use 
PF&F. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0 would be rejected 
(H1.10b).  
 
An examination of the characteristics of the firm shows that AGE is highly 
significant (p ≤0.05), indicating that the overall variable AGE is statistically 
significant.  Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0 would be 
rejected (H1.11b). The output indicates that the overall variable of AGE is 
statistically significant (p≤ 0.05).  Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
equals 0 for the AGE would be rejected (H1.11b). There is no coefficient listed, 
because AGE is not a variable in the model.  Rather, dummy variables, which code 
for AGE (reference category), are in the equation and those have 
coefficients.  However, only the coefficient of one dummy variable AGE(1) is 
statistically significant, where the p-value is less than 0.05. This shows that the 
younger aged firms (age 1 to 3 years) prefer to use internal funds such as loans from 
family and friends. The results also show that PLANNING (H1.15b) is highly 
significant (p ≤0.05), and the correlation coefficients carry the expected negative 
sign, which reject the null hypothesis of H1.15b. 
 
The Wald statistics in Table 7.8 indicate that the most powerful predictor of PF&F in 
SMEs is PLANNING (H1.15b), followed by ETHNIC (H1. 3b) and AGE (H1.11b). 
In terms of the goodness of fit for the model, the results show that the -2Log 
likelihood of the model decreased from 434.366 in the previous model (where only 
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the constant was included in the model). This means that the model is better in 
prediction as the lower value of -2LL shows that the model is predicting the outcome 
variable more accurately. The model’s Chi-square significance is excellent (p< 
0.0000) where it indicates that there is a significant association between the 
independent variables and PF&F. The value of Hosmer and Lemeshow is not 
significant (0.670) which indicates an adequate goodness of fit for the model (i.e. it 
indicates a poor fit if the significance value is less than 0.05). This signifies that the 
model explains 67% of the variance.  
 
Table 7.9 Classification table for PF&F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the current model, the model correctly classifies 52.3% of the 
respondents. 181 cases that did not use PF&F are correctly predicted by the model. 
Similarly, 79 cases which used PF&F are also correctly classified. However, 104 
cases which are predicted to not use PF&F did use it. Likewise, 20 cases which are 
predicted by the model to use PF&F did in fact not use it in the observed outcome. It 
is therefore obvious that the model has higher reliability in predicting firms that do 
not use PF&F (90.1%) and not so accurate when predicting firms that use PF&F 
(56.8%). However, the overall accuracy of the model is quite high, about 67.7%. The 
above table shows that the model only correctly classified 52.3% of the owners who 
did not use PF&F when only the constant was included. However, with the inclusion 
Classification Table (a,b) 
 Observed Predicted 
  IF 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used  
Step 
0 
IF not used 
201 0 100.0 
  used 183 0 .0 
 Overall Percentage   52.3 
a  Constant is included in the model. 
b  The cut value is .500 
Classification Table (a) 
 Observed Predicted 
  IF 
Percentage 
Correct 
  
not 
used used  
Step 
3 
IF not 
used 
181 20 90.1 
  used 104 79 56.8 
 Overall Percentage   67.7 
a  The cut value is .500 
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of independent variables, this has risen to 67.7% (correctly classified).  This can be 
seen as a reasonable goodness of fit of the model.  
 
7.3.5 Debt finance 
 
This section presents the results of logistic regression of the use of debt finance. The 
following Table 7.10 indicates the outcomes for this particular regression.  
 
Table 7.10 Logistic regression of the use of debt finance 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
sign 
B Wald P 
 
Expected 
(B) 
Characteristics of the owner 
ETHNIC- Malay -  26.007 .000  
ETHNIC(1)- Chinese 
 
-2.264 
(.462) 
24.003 .000 .104 
ETHNIC(2)- Indian 
 
-.112 
(.348) 
.104 .747 .894 
RELATION 
+ 
.811 
(.385) 
4.438 .035 2.251 
NETWORK  
+ 
1.886 
(.865) 
4.751 .029 6.594 
ATTITUDE 
- 
-1.958 
(.772) 
6.439 .011 .141 
CONSERV 
- 
-.919 
(.462) 
3.952 .047 .399 
MASTERY 
- 
-.192 
(.094) 
4.148 .042 .825 
COMGOAL 
 
- 
1.666 
(.418) 
15.878 .000 5.291 
Characteristics of the firm 
AGE- Less than 1 year +  66.137 .000  
AGE(1)- 1-3 
 
-2.115 
(1.212) 
3.046 .081 .121 
AGE(2)- 4-10 
 
-2.591 
(1.140) 
5.162 .063 .075 
AGE(3)- Over 10 
 
 
-5.530 
(1.176) 
22.119 .000 .004 
Management performance     
PLANNING 
+ 
1.247 
(.208) 
35.921 .000 3.481 
ASSET  
+ 
.688 
(.224) 
9.404 .002 1.989 
PROFIT 
 
- 
-.359 
(.164) 
4.786 .029 .698 
External Factors     
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STABLENVT 
+ 
1.829 
(.592) 
9.540 .002 6.225 
EXENVT 
 
- 
-.628 
(.276) 
5.196 .023 .533 
Two-way Interaction     
MASTERY by ETHNIC 
(1)- Chinese- reference to 
Malay 
- 
-.214 
(.085) 
6.281 .012 .807 
Constant value   -19.487   
Chi-square   235.740   
-2 Log likelihood   165.264   
Hosmer & Lemeshow R
2
   0.258   
 
Starting with the owner-related factors, the output showed that the overall variable of 
ETHNIC is statistically significant (p=0.000). There is no coefficient listed as the 
ETHNIC is not a variable in the model. Rather, dummy variables, which code for 
ETHNIC, are in the equation and those have coefficients (ETHNIC1 and ETHNIC2). 
However, only the coefficient of one dummy variable of ETHNIC1 is statistically 
significant, where the p-value is less than 0.05. The results show that the Chinese 
entrepreneurs are less likely to use debts in comparison to the Malay (reference 
group), which is 0.104 times less than other sources of finance. This means that a 
one-point increase on ‘Chinese’ score will reduce the odds by 89.6%. On the other 
hand, the preferences of Indian entrepreneurs are found to be similar to their Malay 
counterparts. This can be seen in the table which shows that the p-value of the 
Indians (ETHNIC2) is not significant.  
 
The results for RELATION are highly significant (p≤ 0.05). This factor produced a 
positive effect on the odds of the usage of debt financing, which reject the null 
hypothesis of H1.4c. Since the odds ratio is more than 1, it means that as the 
RELATION increases, the odds of the utilisation of debt will also increase. This 
means that a one-point increase on RELATION score will increase the odds by 2.251 
times.  Similarly, the NETWORK (H1.5c) is also found to be highly significant (p≤ 
0.05) and the correlation coefficient carries the expected positive sign. They will 
utilise more debts when the business owners are more concerned about the 
NETWORK (i.e. be regular clients or offer personal greetings to lender/supplier). 
 
Unlike the finding for retained earnings, the ATTITUDE has a negative impact on 
the odds of utilisation of debt financing. The odds of the usage of debt in business 
are 0.141 times smaller as the mean of ATTITUDE increases. The p-value (less than 
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0.05) for this factor is statistically significant within the analysis, which supports 
H1.6c. The correlation coefficient for COMGOAL shows an unexpected positive 
sign, so there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H1.8c.  
 
With regard to business cultural orientation, both factors CONSERV (H1.9c) and 
MASTERY (H1.10c), appeared to be significant (p≤ 0.05) and had a negative effect 
on the odds of the usage of debts., for a one-point increase on both scores will reduce 
the odds by 60% and 17.5% respectively. The results reject the null hypotheses of 
H1.9c and H1.10c, respectively.  
 
An examination of the characteristics of the firm shows that AGE is highly 
significant (p≤ 0.05). The output indicates that the overall variable of AGE is 
statistically significant (p= 0.000). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
equals 0 would be rejected (H1.11c). There is no coefficient listed, because AGE is 
not a variable in the model.  Rather, dummy variables, which code for AGE 
(reference category), are in the equation and those have coefficients. However, as 
can be seen in Table 7.10, only the coefficient of one dummy variable AGE(3) is 
statistically significant, where the p-value is less than 0.05. This shows that, the older 
the age of the firm, the less likely the firms will use debts as their source of capital, 
which is 0.004 times less than other sources of finance. This means that a one-point 
increase on AGE(3) score will reduce the odds by 99.6%.  
 
With regard to the management performance, there is no evidence to accept the null 
hypotheses in respect of PROFIT (H1.13c), ASSET (H1.14c), and PLANNING 
(H1.15c). The results for PROFIT (H1.13c) are highly negatively significant (p≤ 
0.05).As the profitability of the firms increases, they will utilise less debts as their 
source of capital for the business operations or expansions. However, if they ask for 
bank finance, they can easily access it and get a greater duration than those firms 
which are less profitable.  
 
The ASSET was positively significantly related (p≤ 0.05) with the usage of debt 
financing. For any positive change in the ASSET, the odds will increase by 1.989 
times. This result shows that, if the firms possessed more fixed assets, they will use 
more debt financing as they can use their assets as security for getting debts from the 
lenders. This study also found that firms, which possessed a high level of fixed 
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assets, pledged collateral to secure long-term debt finance. On the other hand, firms 
used their personal assets as collateral to secure short-term debts.  
 
The result for PLANNING shows a significant (p≤ 0.05) positive effect on the odds 
of a business owner using the debt financing, with the odds of using debt being 3.481 
times larger as the mean of the PLANNING factor increases. This finding rejects the 
null hypothesis of H1.15c. When firms put more emphasis on business planning, it 
indirectly reduces the problem of asymmetric information, which indirectly increases 
the ability of the firm to look for external sources of finance. 
 
There is no evidence to accept the null hypotheses in respect of STABLENVT 
(H1.16c) and EXENVT (H1.17c). The STABLENVT was found to produce a 
significant positive effect (p 0.05) on the odds of utilisation of debts. The more the 
owners perceived this factor to be important when they are deciding on their 
financing decisions, the more likely they will use debt financing. On the other hand, 
the EXENVT was found to produce a significant negative effect (p 0.05) on the 
odds of utilisation of debts by the firms. The odds ratio indicates that every unit 
increase in EXENVT is associated with a 47% decrease in the odds of utilising the 
debts. This factor is concerned with the issues of the social pressure from the society, 
strict government rules and regulations, and the economic situation. The more the 
owners perceived EXENVT to be important when they are deciding on their 
financing decisions, the less likely they will use the debts.  
 
The output also shows that the overall two-way interaction variable ‘CONSERV by 
ETHNIC’ is statistically significant (p-value = 0.007).  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
(H5.9c) that the coefficient equals 0 would be rejected. There is no coefficient listed, 
because ‘CONSERV by ETHNIC’ is not variable in the model.  Rather, dummy 
variables, which code for ‘CONSERV by ETHNIC’ (reference category), are in the 
equation, and those have coefficients. However, as shown in Table 7.10, only the 
coefficient of one dummy variable ‘CONSERV by ETHNIC(1)’ is statistically 
significant, where p-value is less than 0.05.  Since the B-coefficient is negative, for 
one-unit increase in the ETHNIC(1), i.e. Chinese, moderated by CONSERV, the 
firms will use debt 67% less than other sources of finance.  
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The Wald statistics in the table indicate that the most powerful predictor of debt 
financing is PLANNING (H1.15c), followed by AGE (H1.11c), ETHNIC (H1.3c) 
and COMGOAL (H1.8c). In terms of the goodness of fit for the model, the initial –
2LL for the model was found to be 401.004 and the -2LL for the full model was 
165.264. Since the -2Log likelihood of the model decreased from the initial, this 
means that the model is better in prediction. The model’s Chi-square significance is 
excellent (p< 0.0000). Since the p-value of Chi-square is less than 0.001, it shows 
that there is a significant association between the independent variables and debt 
financing. In addition, the value of Hosmer and Lemeshow is not significant (p> 
0.05) which indicates an adequate goodness of fit for the model. 
 
This study also looks into the classification table below to see how well a logistic 
model performs.  
 
Table 7.11 Classification table for debt financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the current model, 224 cases that did not use debt financing are correctly 
predicted by the model. Similarly, 101 cases which used debt finance are also 
correctly classified. However, 20 cases which are predicted to not use debt finance 
did use it. Likewise, 39 cases which are predicted by the model to use debt finance 
did in fact not use it in the observed outcome. It is therefore obvious that the model 
has higher reliability in predicting firms that do not use debt (85.2%) and not so 
accurate when predicting firms that use debt (83.4%). However, the overall accuracy 
Classification Table (a,b) 
 Observed Predicted 
  Debt Financing 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used  
Step 
0 
Debt Financing not used 
263 0 100.0 
  used 121 0 .0 
 Overall Percentage   68.5 
a  Constant is included in the model. 
b  The cut value is .500 
 Classification Table (a) 
 Observed Predicted 
  Debt Financing 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used not used 
Step 
3 
Debt Financing not used 
224 39 85.2 
  used 20 101 83.4 
 Overall Percentage   84.6 
a  The cut value is .500 
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of the model is quite high, about 84.6%. When only the constant was included, the 
model correctly classified 68.5% of the owners who did not use debt. However, with 
the inclusion of independent variables, this has risen to 84.6% (correctly classified). 
This can be seen as a reasonable goodness of fit of the model.  
 
7.3.6 External equity 
 
This section presents the results of logistic regression of the use of external equity. 
The table below shows the outcomes for this particular regression.  
 
Table 7.12 Logistic regression of the use of external equity 
 
Variable 
 
Expected 
sign 
B Wald P 
 
Expected 
(B) 
Characteristics of the owner     
ETHNIC- Malay -  9.002 .011  
ETHNIC(1)- Chinese 
 
-6.442 
(3.322) 
3.761 .052 .002 
ETHNIC(2)- Indian 
 
 
-17.186 
(7.323) 
5.508 .019 .010 
MASTERY + .541 (.283) 3.658 .066 1.717 
COMGOAL 
 
+ 
1.037 
(.348) 
8.852 .003 2.820 
Characteristics of the firm     
SIZE- Micro +  8.190 .017  
SIZE(1)- Small  .580 (.327) 3.149 .076 1.785 
SIZE(2)- Medium 
 
 
2.344 
(1.228) 
3.645 .046 10.427 
Management performance     
PROFIT - -754 (.333) 5.117 .024 .471 
PLANNING 
+ 
1.978 
(.199) 
24.071 .000 2.659 
Two-way Interactions     
CONSERV by 
ETHNIC (1)- 
Chinese- reference to 
Malay 
- 
-3.832 
(1.804) 
4.509 .034 46.136 
Constant value    -3.268  
      
Chi-square  
  
174.47
3 
 
-2 Log likelihood  
  
186.76
2 
 
Hosmer & Lemeshow 
R
2
 
  
 0.474 
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Among the owner-related factors, the output showed that the overall variable of 
ETHNIC is statistically significant (p ≤0.05). There is no coefficient listed as the 
ETHNIC is not variable in the model. Rather, dummy variables, which code for 
ETHNIC, are in the equation and those have coefficients (ETHNIC1 and ETHNIC2). 
However, as can be seen from Table 7.12, only the coefficient of one dummy 
variable ETHNIC(2) is statistically significant (p ≤0.05). The results show that the 
Indian entrepreneurs are less likely to use external equity in comparison with the 
Malay (reference group), which is 0.011 less than other sources of finance. This 
means that a one-point increase on ‘Indian’ score will reduce the odds by 99%.  
 
The result for MASTERY is insignificant (p≥0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient equals 0 would be accepted (H1.10d). The COMGOAL produced 
a significant (p 0.05) positive effect on the odds of the usage of external equity. 
Since the odds ratio is more than 1, this means that as the COMGOAL increases, the 
odds of the utilisation of external equity will also increase, as a one-point increase on 
COMGOAL score will increase the odds by 2.82. When the firms’ goals were to 
repay borrowing or expansion, they used more external equity. This finding is quite 
similar to the findings of Fitzsimmons and Douglas (2006) who found that those 
SMEs that intend to increase the number of markets targeted or those firms that aim 
for growth or expansion sought equity financing.  
 
In addition, the results indicate that the overall variable of SIZE is statistically 
significant (p 0.05).  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H1.11d) that the coefficient 
equals 0 for the SIZE would be rejected. There is no coefficient listed, because SIZE 
is not a variable in the model.  Rather, dummy variables, which code for SIZE 
(reference category), are in the equation and those have coefficients.  However, as 
shown in Table 7.12, only the coefficient of one dummy variable SIZE(2) is 
statistically significant (p 0.05).This shows that larger firms are more likely to use 
external equity as their sources of capital, which is 10.427 times more than other 
sources of finance. This complements the findings of Romano et al. (2000) who also 
found the same association between these variables. 
 
In terms of PROFIT (H1.13d), it was found to produce a significant negative (p 
0.05) effect on the odds of the employment of external equity. The odds of the 
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utilisation of external equity in the business are 53%
29
 smaller as the mean of 
PROFIT increases. As the profitability of the firms increase, they will utilise less 
external equity as their source of capital for the business operations or expansions.  
 
The results also show that PLANNING (H1.15d) is highly significant (p 0.05), and 
the correlation coefficients carry the expected positive sign, confirming that firms 
choosing external equity do consider PLANNING as a major determinant of capital 
structure. This extends the previous research of Romano et al. (2000) who also found 
a similar pattern.The results show that, for every unit increase in the mean of the 
PLANNING, the employment of external equity increases by 2.659. This result is 
consistent with the general assumption of the utilisation of external equity, where 
mostly, the firm that used external equity as their financial sources was the one 
which paid more attention to the issue of business planning. This is mainly because, 
as the sufficiency of information increases, it will indirectly increase the confidence 
level of investors. This will then increase the chances for the firm to obtain equity 
from the outsiders. 
 
The Wald statistics in Table 7.12 indicate that the most powerful predictor of 
external equity in SMEs is PLANNING (H1.15d). In terms of the goodness of fit for 
the model, the results show that the -2Log likelihood of the model decreased to 
186.762 from the previous model (where only the constant was included in the 
model). This means that the model is better in prediction as the lower value of -2LL 
shows that the model is predicting the outcome variable more accurately. In addition, 
the model’s Chi-square is significantly (p< 0.0000).associate between the 
independent variables and external equity. The value of Hosmer and Lemeshow is 
not significant (0.474) which indicates an adequate goodness of fit for the model. 
This indicates that the model explains 47% of the variance.  
 
 
  
                                                          
29
 Odd ratio = (1- 0.47)*100 = 53% 
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Table 7.13 Classification table for external equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The current model correctly classifies 73.4% of the respondents. 255 cases that did 
not use external equity are correctly predicted by the model. Similarly, 81 cases 
which used external equity are also correctly classified. However, 21 cases which are 
predicted to not use external equity did use it. Likewise, 27 cases which are predicted 
by the model to use external equity did in fact not use it in the observed outcome. It 
is therefore obvious that the model has higher reliability in predicting firms that do 
not use external equity (90.4%) and not so accurate when predicting firms that use 
external equity (79.4%). However, the overall accuracy of the model is high, about 
87.5%. In conclusion, when only the constant was included, the model correctly 
classified 73.4% of the owners did not use external equity. However, with the 
inclusion of independent variables, this has risen to 87.5% (correctly classified). This 
can be seen as a reasonable goodness of fit of the model.  
 
  
 Classification Table (a,b) 
 Observed Predicted 
  External equity 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used not used 
Step 0 External equity not 
used 
282 0 100.0 
  used 102 0 .0 
 Overall Percentage   73.4 
Classification Table (a) 
 Observed Predicted 
  External equity 
Percentage 
Correct 
  not used used not used 
Step 3 External equity not 
used 
255 27 90.4 
  used 21 81 79.4 
 Overall Percentage   87.5 
a  The cut value is .500 
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7.4 Multiple regression analysis  
 
Table 7.14 presents results of multiple regression analyses (tests of mediating effects 
of debt). 
 
Table 7.14 Results of multiple regression analyses  
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable (PERFORMANCE)  
1 2 3 4 
DEBT -0.384* 
(0.081) 
-0.388* 
(0.092) 
- - 
GOAL - 0.721* 
(0.103) 
- 0.700* 
(0.106) 
 LIFEGOAL 0.058 
(0.082) 
- 0.341* 
(0.064) 
- 
  COMGOAL 0.054 
(0.122) 
- 0.364* 
(0.099) 
- 
PROFIT 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.102* 
(0.0003) 
SIZE 0.042 
(0.044) 
0.041 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.048) 
0.0341* 
(0.042) 
PLANNING - 0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0002) 
0.112* 
(0.0003) 
ETHNIC (Malay) 0.043 
(0.081) 
0.147 
(0.063) 
-0.322 
(0.044) 
-0.036* 
(0.031) 
CULTURE - 0.231 
(0.080) 
- 0.700* 
(0.080) 
 MASTERY 0.055 
(0.071) 
- 0.346* 
(0.103) 
- 
 CONSERV 0.057 
(0.082) 
- 0.346* 
(0.092) 
- 
Adjusted R 0.63 0.62 0.49 0.48 
F-Statistics 21.225* 32.475* 15.895* 19.204* 
VIF (minimum-
maximum) 
1.230-2.892 1.146-2.843 1.033-1.517 1.042-1.267 
 
The estimated models in Table 7.14 generally exhibit moderate fit. Adjusted R-
squares range from 0.48 to 0.63, while all F-statistics are statistically significant (p 
0.0001), suggesting that the explanatory powers of overall models are adequate 
(Myers, 1990). Table 7.14 shows the models for the performance. Models 1 and 2 
are direct effect models controlling the effect of a mediator (DEBT); while Models 3 
and 4 are total-effect models which consist of only independent variables. The latter 
models (3 and 4) account for both direct and indirect effects of determinants of 
capital structure on the performance. 
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DEBT (for Models 1 and 2) was negatively associated with PERFORMANCE 
(b=0.384 and 0.388 respectively; p<0.001). Hence, the H2 are supported when 
GOAL, PLANNING, SIZE, CULTURE and PROFIT are controlled. The fourth 
hypothesis posits that overall GOAL is positively associated with PERFORMANCE. 
As shown in Model 2, the direct effect of overall GOAL on PERFORMANCE is 
statistically significant (b=0.721, p<0.001) when controlling the effect of the 
mediator (i.e. debt). The total effect of overall GOAL on PERFORMANCE in 
Model 4 is also positive and statistically significant (b=0.700, p<0.001). A similar 
situation can be found for the tests of the relationships between LIFEGOAL (H3.7) 
and COMGOAL (H3.8) with PERFORMANCE. In Model 1, the estimated direct-
effect coefficient of COMGOAL and LIFEGOAL are not statistically significant 
(b=0.058 and 0.054 respectively), while the total effect coefficient Model 3 is 
significant (b=0.341 and 0.364 respectively, p<0.001) for LIFEGOAL and 
COMGOAL. 
 
H3.12, H3.13 and H3.15 (the relationship between SIZE, PROFIT and PLANNING 
with PERFORMANCE) are positive, while H3.2 (the relationship between ETHNIC 
and PERFORMANCE) is negative. They are supported by estimated coefficients of 
Model 4. The total effects of coefficient Model 4 are significant (b=-0.036 for 
ETHNIC, b=0.102 for PROFIT, b=0.0341 for SIZE, and b=0.112 for PLANNING). 
Moreover, the absolute effect of PLANNING on firm’s performance is diminished 
when a mediating variable (debt financing), is included (b = 0.311, p<0.001 when no 
mediator; b = 0.456, p<0.001 when a mediator is controlled). 
 
The result for H3.9 is slightly similar to the above hypothesis (i.e. GOAL) except 
that the direct effect of overall CULTURE on PERFORMANCE is not statistically 
significant (b=0.231). The total effect of overall CULTURE on firm’s performance 
in Model 4 is positive and statistically significant (b=0.700, p<0.001). In Model 1, 
the estimated direct-effect coefficient of CONSERV and MASTERY are not 
statistically significant, while the total effect coefficient Model 3 is significant 
(b=0.346 for both, p<0.001) for CONSERV and MASTERY.  
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7.5 Discussion of the hypotheses tests 
 
This section presents a discussion of the study. The discussion of results is classified 
into five main groups according to the groups of hypotheses. Existing literature and 
follow-up interviews, which were conducted with 20 SME owner-managers, will be 
used to support the discussion. 
 
7.5.1 Owner’s age and managerial human capital  
 
Surprisingly, the results do not support the proposed association between ‘age of the 
owner’ and ‘managerial human capital’ and sources of finance in hypotheses 1.1 and 
1.2, respectively. Owner-manager’s age, education level and experience were not 
found to influence the financing decisions of SMEs. The insignificant relationship 
between owner’s age and capital structure confirms the findings of Wachter and 
Green (1998), Romano et al. (2000), Cassar (2004) and Buferna (2005). 
Alternatively, the insignificant association between human capital and capital 
structure confirms the findings of Buferna (2005), Watson (2006), Roper and Scott 
(2009), Irwin and Scott (2010), Sena et al. (2012), and Borgia and Newman (2012). 
It conflicts with findings of Bates (1997) and Coleman and Cohn (2000). 
 
7.5.2 Ethnic 
 
As expected in hypothesis 1.3, the results confirm the significant positive association 
between ethnic-minority owner-manager and PF&F and negative association 
between this factor and external financing. The results show that the Chinese owner-
managers, who are ethnic-minority business owners, prefer to use internal financing 
more than Malay owner-managers; they are averse towards external financing. The 
results are consistent with prior studies, such as Smallbone et al. (2003), Deakin et 
al. (2007), and Robb and Fairlie (2007), who also found positive associations 
between ethnic-minority business owners and internal financing. The results also 
confirm the study of Curran and Blackburn (1993) who establish that black owner-
managers prefer to utilise internal sources of finance due to some obstacles. 
 
This study had also analysed the moderating effects of ethnicity with all independent 
variables. The moderating effects of ethnicity by conservatism are positively related 
190 
 
with the retained earnings and negatively related with external equity. The rest of the 
interactions were not significant in the capital structure choice of small firms. The 
results show that Chinese owner-managers who are concerned with the public image 
and employees’ working and social harmony are most likely to utilise retained 
earnings; while Indians are less likely to use external equity. This pattern had been 
confirmed by the follow-up interviews.  
“We also consider preserving public image and maintaining harmonious 
among workers when deciding on the financial sources. It indirectly 
strengthening our employees-employers’ relationship where would 
encourage us to work together and be together. To maintain these situations, 
I should have the power over my company. Hence, I prefer to utilise retained 
profits and will avoid external equity.”      
           [Chinese, Business Owner #5] 
 
The result also shows that Chinese owner-managers, who apply a strict policy and 
focus on their interests and success, are less likely to use debt. This result supports 
hypothesis 5 and has been confirmed by one of the follow-up interviewees.  
“Every single cent is matter to me. My interest will come first before anyone 
else. Since I own this company, so, anything happen to this company will 
affect my success. It is better for me to avoid debt to reduce any chance of 
bankruptcy.”  
  [Chinese, Business Owner #15] 
 
7.5.3 Relationship and networking 
 
Results reveal that only debt is significantly associated with the ‘relationship and 
networking’ which supports hypotheses 1.4c and 1.5c. The results confirm findings 
of prior studies on SMEs in developing countries (e.g. Nguyen and Ramachandran, 
2006). Results indicate that SMEs with good relationships with other economic 
factors (such as management at other firms or government officials) have better 
access to external financing since they possess more information. The information is 
concerned with government policies, business licences, market and distribution 
channels, business opportunities, and complementary policies regarding taxation 
(Fan, 2002; Tan, Yang, and Veliyath, 2009). Several interviewees from follow-up 
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interviews emphasised the imperative role played by government officers in enabling 
firms to build effective relationships with their banks. For instance: 
“The government has given us great support to communicate with the bank. 
The government officer will provide us with an introduction in the case if we 
do not know the bank officials.”                        [Malay, Business Owner #14] 
 
The results establish that SME owners who have strengthened their networks with 
suppliers through building a long-term relationship with them, paying them 
promptly, visiting or offering personal greetings to them and by being a regular 
client, face fewer difficulties in raising external finance. The findings confirm the 
previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006).  The 
current follow-up interviews also highlighted the importance of network ties in the 
financing of the firm. For instance, one of the interviewees mentioned that: 
“Keeping a good relationship with other firms, especially with suppliers or 
customers is essential. Sometimes, we use the inter-firm guarantee. We 
borrow from each other or guarantee for each other. We will use it in a case 
of lack of security for our debts.”                    [Chinese, Business Owner #11] 
  
“Sometimes, it can be difficult for supplier or lender to distinguish the 
financial position of the firm from its owner. Yes, most of the SMEs’ owners 
prefer to keep everything secret. It would be different when you know the 
supplier or lender.”                              [Indian, Business Owner #13] 
 
Additionally, the positive relationship between network ties and debt might be partly 
explained by the negative correlation between control aversion and network ties 
which can be seen from the descriptive statistics. The present findings contradict the 
argument of Newman (2010) who asserted that firms with stronger network ties tend 
not to finance using debt even though they are able to access large amounts of 
external financing due to the perceived risk of losing control over their business that 
this may entail. 
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7.5.4 Owner’s perceptions and attitudes to debt 
 
The results show negative and positive impacts on the odds of utilisation of debt 
financing and retained earnings, respectively. The results support hypothesis 1.6. 
Such results are supportive of previous findings (Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton and 
Matthews, 1989; Norton, 1990; Matthews et al., 1994; Harvey and Evans, 1995; 
Hutchinson, 1995; Michaeles et al., 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998; Hamoudi, 2007), 
which suggest that owner-managers who are risk averse, have a strict belief in 
religion, and who do not want to be burdened by debt would prefer to finance 
internally and are less likely to utilise debt. The following comment from the follow-
up interview also highlights a comment concerning owner-manager’s perception 
towards using debt. 
“Borrowing money from the bank is so difficult. I should guarantee my debts 
by assets, and the procedures are strict and inconvenient.”   
      [Malay, Business Owner #8] 
 
About the impact of the attitude of management towards risk on the financing of 
SMEs, strong evidence is found of a positive association between the risk-takers’ 
owner-managers and the utilisation of debt in the capital structure of SMEs. Previous 
studies (see Barton and Matthews, 1989; Matthews et al., 1994) also report the same 
pattern, particularly in a situation of providing security for debt using personal 
assets. Weston and Brigham (1981) assert that firm’s capital structure represents the 
financial risk that the firm could face. In other words, as stated by Barton and 
Gordon (1987), the amount of funds that could be borrowed by the companies 
depends on the amount of risk these companies can bear, and, therefore, the owner-
management’s attitudes to debt will affect the firm’s capital structure. 
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7.5.5 Objectives and goals 
 
The ‘commercial goals’ produced a positive effect on the odds of the utilisation of 
retained earnings and negative effects on the odds of the utilisation of debt and 
external equity, which supports hypothesis 1.7. Respondents who aim to maintain 
control were found to prefer to rely on retained earnings and were averse to seek 
external financing. This is complements previous empirical works (see Harvey and 
Evans, 1995; Hutchinson, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1998; Pukthuanthong and 
Walker, 2007; Newman et al., 2011). These results also confirm the findings of 
Chaganti et al. (1995) who found a negative association between aims to maintain 
control with the use of external equities.  
 
Results also indicate that if growth is the main goal of the firm, a firm might borrow 
more debt in order to finance its new project. It complements the findings of 
Romano et al. (2000) who found that firms (i.e. manufacturing sector) that aim for 
expansion were less likely to use capital and retained profits. Results suggest that 
SMEs who are aware of the need for capital for funding future development of their 
firms will focus on building strong relationships with their banks, leading to greater 
amounts of bank financing in their capital structure than firms with limited growth 
intentions. The positive relationship between growth intentions and the use of 
external sources of finance is in line with prior studies (e.g. Van der Wijst, 1989; 
Cressy, 1995; Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar, 2004). Alternatively, due to the agency 
problem, the sampled firms might reduce the debt finance. In addition, if the 
company was more concerned with increasing profitability, it might use less debt to 
avoid interest payments or use more debt to take any advantages of tax deductibility. 
 
Unexpectedly, results reveal that only retained earnings are significantly associated 
with the ‘lifestyle goals’ which supports hypothesis 1.8a and rejects hypotheses 1.8b 
1.8c and 1.8d. The sampled SMEs were found to use more retained earnings if their 
goals were related to their life satisfaction, for example to develop hobbies or skills, 
to improve lifestyle, and to accumulate wealth. This pattern was confirmed by the 
follow-up interviews.  
 
“Since the main reason of involving in this business is to improve my 
lifestyle, I’ll try avoiding any external money which may cause me to lose 
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control over my firm. Up to now, I only use retained profits to finance my 
business.”         [Indian, Business Owner #12] 
 
 “I have knowledge and high enthusiasm of doing this business. I know the 
best way to do the right thing with a little help from others. I’ll try to 
maintain financing my business internally rather than borrowing from 
outsiders.”                                                          [Malay, Business Owner #18] 
 
7.5.6 Culture 
 
Both factors of cultural orientations (i.e. ‘conservatism’ and ‘mastery’) were 
evidenced to be significant in at least one of the models tested. As expected in 
hypothesis 1.9, the results confirm the significant positive association between 
culture and internal financing and negative association between this factor and 
external financing. Those owner-managers who care about their performance, public 
image and harmony, prefer to use retained earnings and rely less on debt. The study 
confirmed the results of previous studies (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989; Schwartz, 
1994; Chui et al., 2002; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; Siegel et al., 
2011; Li et al., 2011).  
 
The results also support hypothesis 1.10. Those owner-managers who only care 
about their interest and success utilise all internal sources of finance such as retained 
earnings and F&F. They were averse to using debt. These results confirm previous 
studies (see Hirshleifer Schwartz, 1994; Chui, 2002). Such findings support the 
pecking order theory that proposes that firms will only seek external finance when 
they have exhausted all sources of internal finance. 
 
7.5.7 Age of the firm 
 
As expected, results reveal positive and negative impacts of the firm’s age on the 
odds of utilisation of retained earnings and PF&F, respectively. These results support 
hypotheses 1.11a and 1.11b. Unexpectedly, debt was found to be inversely related 
with the firm’s age, which does not support hypothesis 1.11c. The regression result 
also does not support hypothesis 1.11d, since it was not significant. The results, in 
general, suggest that SME owners prefer to use internal finance and would only raise 
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debt when additional finance is needed. The results support the predictions of 
pecking order theory and contradict the life cycle model.  
 
The results indicate that older firms are less likely to finance externally. They prefer 
to finance internally as they are able to accumulate funds internally. In contrast, new 
firms might not have time to retain funds and might be forced to borrow. This 
supports the previous studies (see Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaeles et al., 1999; 
Riportella and Martinez, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Lopez-
Gracia and Sznchez-Andujar, 2007; Vos et al., 2007; Ramalho and Da Silva, 2009; 
Rocca et al., 2009). Most of them secure loans for their businesses using the owner-
managers’ personal assets, which confirms the view of Berger and Udell (1998). 
These results contradicted empirical studies that had been done by Cole (1998), 
Upneja and Dalbor (2001), Cole et al. (2004) and Newman (2010). These prior 
studies report that lenders find the older firms are less risky since the firms have 
earned a relatively good reputation over time and most of the older firms are known 
to the lenders. This situation indirectly increases the chances of utilising external 
financing.  
 
7.5.8 Size of the firm 
 
Data analysis reveals that only external equity is significantly associated with the 
size of the firm (H1.12d). The regression results do not support the hypotheses on 
retained earnings, PF&F, and debt since all of these sources of finance are not 
significant. This result has been confirmed graphically in the descriptive statistics for 
this variable; a positive trend has been noticed for the relationship between firm’s 
size and external equity. This result confirms the findings of Romano et al. (2000) 
who found the same association.  
 
The insignificant outcome of debt confirms the findings of Upneja and Dalbor 
(2001) and Tang and Jang (2007). The present findings contradict most previous 
studies (see Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaeles et al., 1999; Hutchinson, 2003; Cassar 
and Holmes, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; 
Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Lopez-Gracia and 
Sanchez-Andujar, 2007; Beck et al., 2008; Bhabra et al., 2008; Ramalho and Da 
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Silva, 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Newman, 2010; Harrison et al., 2011; 
Jegers, 2011). 
 
7.5.9 Profitability 
 
In line with the proposed hypothesis 1.13 of the profitability variable, the results 
showed a significant positive association between profitability and retained earnings, 
and a negative association between profitability and external finance (debt and 
external equity). The positive association confirms prior studies of Myers (1984), 
Van Auken and Carter (1989) and Fu et al. (2002). The inverse relationship supports 
the results of previous studies (see Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Chen, 
2004; Chen and Strange, 2005; Sorgorb-Mira, 2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Klapper 
et al., 2006; Vos et al., 2007; Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar, 2007; Degryse et 
al., 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Rocca et al., 2009; Chikolwa, 2009; 
Chakraboraty, 2010; Harrison et al., 2011; Newman et al., 2011; Zarebski and 
Dimovski, 2012; Saarani and Shahadan, 2013).  
 
The negative effect does not support trade-off theory that firms prefer internal funds 
in financing decisions and by that strategy will have less external funds such as debt 
or external equity. There is another possible explanation that the majority of 
Malaysian SMEs may use outsiders’ funds only if they are successful at reducing the 
information asymmetries problem between firms and outsiders. As retained earnings 
are the financing sources with the least asymmetric information, SMEs would prefer 
internal financing (including retained earnings) if they cannot convey credible 
information to these outside parties. One more justification from the corporate 
governance point of view for a negative relationship is that debt might be used more 
frequently as a management discipline device in Malaysian SMEs. Therefore, more 
debt reflects more monitoring activities; these activities include expenses, which 
may reduce the firm’s profits, so debt is not favourable. 
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7.5.10 Asset structure 
 
As expected in hypothesis 1.14, the results showed a significant positive association 
between tangibility and debt, and a negative association between tangibility and 
retained earnings. The results indicate that, if the firms possessed more fixed assets, 
they would use less retained earnings. The results are similar to the findings of 
Bhaird and Lucey (2009) who found a negative association between the use of 
retained profits and collateral for small Irish firms. The results also confirm most 
prior studies (see Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Ortqvist et 
al., 2006; Huang and Song, 2006; Shah and Khan, 2007; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 
2008; Rocca et al., 2009; Degryse et al., 2009; Zekohini and Ventura, 2009; Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Bany-Ariffin et al., 2010; Newman et al., 
2011; Ayed and Zouari, 2014).  
 
These results are contrary to the findings of Riportella and Martínez (2003) and 
Cassar (2004). A positive effect of debt supports the trade-off model regarding that 
firms with more tangible assets are more likely to face financial distress due to their 
liquidation value. These firms have easier access to finance and lower costs of 
financing. It also supports the suggestion of Myers and Majluf (1984) that firms 
prefer to issue debt secured by property with known values more than issuing costly 
securities.  
 
In addition it supports the positive effect of the agency theory by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). They suggest that stockholders of levered firms have an incentive 
to invest sub optimally to expropriate wealth from bondholders. In this case, if the 
debt can be collateralised, then the borrower is restricted to use these funds in 
specific projects. The collateralised assets can also be used as a monitoring 
instrument which indirectly reduces the agency costs of debt. Results indicate that 
firms with a high level of fixed assets overcome problems of asymmetric information 
by pledging collateral to secure debt finance. When there are insufficient firm assets 
to secure business loans, the personal assets of the firm owner are an important 
source of collateral. 
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7.5.11 Business planning 
 
The result for ‘PLANNING’ shows a significant positive effect on the odds of a 
business owner using debt financing, which supports hypothesis 1.15c. When a firm 
puts more emphasis on business planning, it will indirectly reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information, which indirectly increases the ability of the firm to look for 
external sources of finance (Harvey and Evans, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Klapper et al., 2006; Bell and Vos, 2009; Rocca et al., 2009).  
 
Results also indicate that when the firm was more concerned about the business plan, 
formal strategic plan, formal management structure, and business appraisal, they 
utilised less retained earnings and PF&F. These results do not support hypotheses 
1.15a and 1.15b. The firms that used retained earnings as their financial sources did 
not pay more attention to the issue of business planning such as the issue related with 
the financial track records, credit records, proper documentation system, and the 
availability of firms’ information to outsiders. This extends the previous research of 
Romano et al. (2000) who also found a similar pattern. 
 
The negative effect and positive effect of the relationship between business planning 
with internal finance and external finance, respectively, may reduce the information 
asymmetries problem. The consideration of the ‘PLANNING’ factor may help the 
company to borrow money from outsiders (Harvey and Evans, 1995; Coleman and 
Carsky, 1999). The following are some statements from respondents of follow-up 
interviews which support the above discussion.  
“Business planning such as business plan may ease the business activities 
since we have our planning and strategies, either for long-term or short-term 
plans. A proper planning for our business may help us in borrowing money 
from outsiders. Normally, Malaysian business owners didn’t care about the 
business plan or strategic plan, or any formal documentation. However, they 
will put more attention on these issues if they decide to use external fund. 
This is because the loan application process in Malaysia is extremely tedious. 
The bank will simply reject a loan application if the applicant is lack of 
knowledge especially knowledge about the current or proposed business, or 
if the applicant unable to prepare a proper business plan.” 
    [Chinese, Business Owner #7] 
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“By having a proper business plan and structure of management, it can 
facilitate me in obtaining a fund from the outsiders. Like for my business, 
when I want to find a private investor for my company, one of the 
characteristics that the investor looked at was my firm’s management 
structure. In other words, improper planning for business may hinder the 
opportunity to obtain external funds.”           [Malay, Business Owner #3] 
 
7.5.12 Environment 
 
Unexpectedly, results do not support the proposed hypothesis 1.16. Results reveal 
that stable environment was negatively associated with retained earnings and 
positively associated with debt. Results show that companies that survive and are 
able to keep afloat in industry prefer to finance using debt rather than retained 
profits. Alternatively, in environments with greater asymmetric information, firms 
will use internal financing instead of debt (Klapper et al., 2006). 
 
The variable of external environment was negatively associated with debt, which 
supports hypothesis 1.17c. The regression results do not support the hypotheses on 
retained earnings, PF&F, and debt, since all of these sources of finance are not 
significant. Social pressure, bad economic situations, and strict government 
regulations on the business such as on taxation, will indirectly discourage the owner-
managers to use debt. This inverse relationship supports previous empirical studies 
(see Gulati, 2000; Hatzinikolaou et al., 2002) and contradicts the findings of Sener 
(1989) and Taggart (1995). In line with the research findings of SMEs in the 
previous studies (see Holmes and Kent, 1991; Pettit and Singer, 1985; Watson and 
Wilson, 2002; Klapper et al., 2006), limited evidence is found to support trade-off 
theory.  
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7.5.13 Organisational performance 
 
In line with H2, 3 and 4, results showed that there were associations between debt 
and performance, direct associations between determinants of capital structure and 
performance, and indirect associations between determinants of capital structure and 
performance (mediated by debt). The results indicated that debt was negatively 
associated with performance. These results are in line with the finding of Singh and 
Faircloth (2005) who affirm that higher debt may lead to lower funds available for 
firms in profitable investments, which indirectly will reduce the firm’s performance. 
 
Results also show positive associations between firm’s performance and size, 
profitability, planning, culture, and goals, and a negative association with ethnicity 
(Malay). Those who find a positive relationship between firm size and performance 
support the arguments of trade-off theory that size reflects economies of scale 
production, cheaper sources of funds, greater diversification and access to new 
technology. The studies include Orser et al. (2000) and Tsai and Wang (2005). Those 
studies generally found that investors are willing to invest in large firms as they 
believe that large firms are less risky. This situation may lead to better performance 
by the firms as they possess sufficient capital for business operations and 
development. The result on the association of ethnicity (Malay) with performance 
was found to be in contrast to the report of SME’s Corporation of Malaysia in SME 
Annual Report 2007. The report stated that there is a gap between minority-owned 
and non-minority-owned businesses in terms of sales, profits, employment, and 
survivability. The report stated that minority-owned businesses were found to be 
lagging behind and they faced greater challenges in getting financing which 
indirectly worsens their business performance. However, it contradicts the findings 
of the current study.  
 
In addition, results in general reveal that debt level does mediate the association 
between determinants of capital structure and the firm’s performance. This 
mediating role is confirmed to be partially related. The mediating role of debt does 
not change the association between determinants of capital structure and the 
performance in regard to its significance. However, the mediating role appeared as 
small changes in the coefficients of these determinants in the relationship with the 
performance. Even though both regressions before and after controlling debt level 
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are significant, it has been confirmed that debt level has a mediating role on the 
relationship between the determinants of capital structure and performance. As a 
result, this significant mediating role of the debt level cannot be ignored.  
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented the findings from final scales purification and hypotheses 
testing as well as discussion of the findings. The purification was conducted through 
exploratory factor analysis. The study also conducted reliability and construct 
validity tests. All measurement scales were found to possess satisfactory 
measurement properties. As for hypotheses testing, underlying assumptions such as 
outliers and multicollinearity, were evaluated. No violation was encountered. This 
chapter contributes to the capital structure literature by investigating to what extent 
the owner-related factors, firm-related factors, management performance and 
external factors influenced the financing decisions of the SMEs through the use of 
logistic regression tests. The chapter also presented results of multiple regression 
analysis which tests hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. The discussion of results was presented 
accordingly in the last part of this chapter. The next chapter presents a summary of 
the key issues that derived from this main study, contributions and limitations of the 
study as well as concluding the whole study.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter draws conclusions for the study. It reviews the results of the study and 
its contribution to the literature. It also highlights the managerial and policy 
implications for regulators in Malaysia. The final sections discuss the limitations of 
the study and offer suggestions for future research.  
 
8.2 Review of the results 
 
The purpose of the study was to fill a gap in the literature by investigating the 
determinants of capital structure in SMEs in Malaysia and their effect on a firm’s 
performance. This section discussed the results in the context of the specific aims 
and objectives. 
 
8.2.1 Influence of owner-manager characteristics, firm characteristics, 
management performance and external factors 
 
Evidence shows that all factors in the firm characteristics were found to be 
significant in at least one of four sources of finance. The factors are: business 
planning, commercial goals, lifestyle goals, relationship, networking, firm’s age, 
size, asset structure, and profitability. The findings are consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; Romano et al., 2000; 
Gibson, 2002; Swinnen et al., 2002; Fu et al., 2002; Riportella and Martinez, 2003; 
Hutchinson, 2003; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; 
Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006; Hussin et al., 2006; Mac an 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2006; Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar, 2007; Psillaki and 
Daskalakis, 2008; Beck et al., 2008; Bell and Vos, 2009; Rocca et al., 2009; 
Ramalho and da Silva, 2009; Degryse et al., 2009; Chakraboraty, 2010; Newman et 
al., 2011) which found that these factors have an influence on capital structure of the 
firms. Results reveal that retained earnings are positively associated with age of the 
firm, lifestyle goals, and profitability, and inversely related to business planning, 
commercial goals and asset structure. Age of the firm and business planning are 
negatively related to funds from family and friends. Results also reveal that debt 
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financing is positively associated with commercial goals, business planning and asset 
structure and negatively associated with the age of the firm and profitability. 
External equity is positively associated with commercial goals, firm size, and 
business planning and negatively related to profitability. 
 
SMEs’ capital structure was also found to be influenced by the owner’s ethnicity, 
networking and relationship, and attitudes to debt. Alternatively, the capital structure 
of the firm is not influenced by the owner’s age and education. Owner’s networking 
and relationship was positively associated with debt financing. Owner’s ethnicity 
(ethnic minority) was positively related to funds from family and friends and 
inversely associated with external financing. Findings concerning ethnicity were 
found to be in line with previous studies (see Smallbone et al., 2003; Deakin et al., 
2007; Robb and Fairlie, 2007). Owner’s attitude to debt (i.e. averse to use debt) was 
positively associated with retained earnings and negatively related to debt. The 
influence of owner’s attitude to debt confirms the findings of the preliminary study 
as well as the suggestion of Michaelas et al. (1999). 
 
In addition, both factors of business cultural orientations (i.e. ‘conservatism’ and 
‘mastery’) and business environment (i.e. ‘stable environment’ and ‘external 
environment’) were found to be the critical determinants in choosing sources of 
finance. Results reveal that business culture and stable environment were positively 
and negatively associated with retained earnings, respectively. Mastery is positively 
associated with funds from family and friends and external equity. Debt is positively 
associated with stable environment and inversely associated with business culture 
and external environment. The result of conservatism and mastery confirmed results 
of previous studies (Chui et al., 2002; Breuer and Salzmann, 2009; Shao et al., 2010; 
Siegel et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011). The influence of external environment confirms 
the study of Booth et al. (2001). Alternatively, the relationship between ‘stable 
environment’ and financing choice was tested for the first time in this study. This 
factor was previously used in management studies such as Barringer and Bluedorn 
(1999) in measuring the association between corporate entrepreneurship and 
strategic management. 
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8.2.2 Impact of capital structure and its determinants on organisational 
performance 
  
Results reveal a significant negative relationship between debt and the firm’s 
performance. The result shows that the Malaysian SMEs do not use debt as a control 
mechanism to maximise the performance as stated by agency theory. It is not 
possible to recommend high leverage levels to owner-managers within the study 
sample because of the negative relationship between debt and performance. It 
explains that borrowing hastens the separation between SMEs and lenders. The result 
indicates that like most of the firms in the world (Phillips and Sipahioglu, 2004), 
SMEs in Malaysia are attempting to grow through less risky paths. The study 
confirms that SMEs in Malaysia do not care about tax-shield benefit derived from 
employing debt and non-debt tax shield (Ahmed and Hisham, 2009).  
 
In addition, results indicate that only goals, profitability, size, planning, ethnicity, 
and culture have a significant association with firm’s performance. Results also 
reveal that debt mediates the relationship between determinants of capital structure 
and the firm’s performance, partially. It means the mediating role of debt does not 
change the relationship between determinants of capital structure and the 
performance in regard to its significance.  
 
8.2.3 Indirect effects of ethnicity  
 
This study has analysed the moderating effects of ethnicity with all independent 
variables. Results showed that conservatism and mastery were significant when they 
interacted with ‘ethnicity’. It indicated that the capital structure decisions of the 
Malay, Chinese, and Indian owner-managers were influenced by culture. Two-way 
interaction between conservatism and ethnicity was positively associated with 
retained earnings and negatively associated with equity financing. Alternatively, 
two-way interaction between mastery and ethnicity was negatively associated with 
debt financing.  
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8.2.4 Financing patterns of Malay, Chinese and Indian owner-managers  
 
The study found that Malays favour external sources of capital, while non-Malays 
(Chinese and Indian) prefer internal sources of finance. Malays prefer to raise capital 
through borrowing from financial institutions or using government loans. 
Alternatively, the preferred internal funds utilised by Chinese or Indians are the 
funds from friends and families. There is no evidence of the association between 
ethnicity and use of retained earnings since all ethnic groups utilised funds almost 
alike.  
 
8.3 Contribution of the study 
 
This study draws on financial management, strategic management, and 
entrepreneurship literature to develop a theoretical framework to explain the 
determinants of capital structure of SMEs in Malaysia; incorporating pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), static trade-off theory (DeAngelo 
and Masulis, 1980), life-cycle model (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954), agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and Schwartz’s (1994) culture model. The 
consideration of these theories aids in resolving inconsistent results concerning the 
influence of culture, network ties, and the environment over existing measures and 
the effect of capital structure and its determinants on firm performance. 
Consequently, this study makes a number of contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge.  
 
The thesis adds to the financial studies literature by developing an integrated model 
which combines four perspectives on the capital structure choice: firm 
characteristics, owner-manager characteristics, management performance, and 
environment. This study extends the range of theoretical firm or entrepreneur-related 
determinants of capital structure, such as attitudes to debt, relationship and 
networking, culture, and business planning. In addition, most of the previous 
literatures focused mainly on firm-related factors rather than environmental factors, 
even though in practice, managers also like to consider the environmental factor 
when deciding on financing mix (Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2002; Gianetti, 
2003; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). This factor is mostly studied in developed 
countries. Studying the influence of environmental factors on capital structure 
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decision on ASEAN countries will be more worthy especially in the wake of the 
current economic crisis as suggested by Deesomsak et al. (2004). In essence, this 
thesis attempts to bring the description of Western capital structure theory together 
with actual financing practices of firms from other economic backgrounds, thus 
bridging the gap between theory and practice. 
 
This is the first empirical study on the topic to be conducted in Malaysia from an 
SME owner’s perspective. Although the government is providing relatively large 
facilities to assist SMEs financially and non-financially, the effects of these policies 
have not been subject to systematic analysis until now. Moreover, this is the first 
study to examine the multi-dimensionality of SMEs’ capital structure in Malaysia.  
 
This is the first study to develop a theoretical framework that engages in the issue of 
capital structure choice among different ethnic groups in Malaysia. This is in 
contrast with other studies which focus on Western ethnicity issues (Smallbone et al., 
2003; Hussain and Matlay, 2007; Deakin et al., 2007; Robb and Fairlie, 2007). The 
present study focuses on one country and on three different ethnic groups. This study 
employs Schwartz’s cultural dimensions with individual-level measurement, which 
is different from previous studies that focused on country level. For instance, a study 
of Chui et al. (2002) uses Schwartz’s (1994) cultural values to investigate the 
influence of culture on financing choices across 22 countries.  
 
This study tested regression models by employing internal and external sources of 
finance as dependent variables in multivariate models. This is distinct from previous 
studies that mostly used long-term and short-term debt (e.g. Bevan and Danbolt, 
2002; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Padron et al., 2005; Abor and 
Biekpe, 2009). The main reason for also considering internal source is because the 
primary source of finance for SMEs is an internal source (Romano et al., 2000; Mac 
an Bhaird and Lucey, 2006), such as personal savings, funds from friends and 
family, or informal sources. Notwithstanding that internal funds are found to be the 
most important source of financing for SMEs, there are still few studies testing 
multivariate models by using the internal funds as a dependent variable (e.g. Fluck et 
al., 1998; Ou and Haynes, 2006; Bhaird and Lucey, 2006).  
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Although previous research has examined the determinants of capital structure, this 
is the first study to investigate the association between determinants of capital 
structure or capital structure and firm performance and the mediating role of the 
capital structure for the association between determinants of capital structure and 
performance. This research provides evidence that there is a significant (partially) 
mediating role of capital structure on the firm’s performance. 
 
This study also makes a methodological contribution to the literature by using 
methodological triangulation to investigate the capital structure determinants of 
SMEs in Malaysia. Interviews and survey questionnaire were conducted in an 
attempt to analyse financial as well as non-financial and behavioural factors that 
affect Malaysian SMEs’ capital structure. This combination of collection methods 
may mitigate the problem of access to financial data (e.g. unavailable or incomplete 
data) or panel data for Malaysian SMEs. The use of interviews or personally 
administered questionnaires instead of an online data collection method in 
identifying the dimension of capital structure is considered practical following the 
report of the Census of Establishments and Enterprises (2011) which reveals that 
73% of SMEs did not use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in 
conducting their business. The lack of access to better technology and ICT had also 
been highlighted by Salleh and Ndubisi (2006) in their study on the challenges faced 
by SMEs in Malaysia.  
 
8.4 Implications and recommendations 
 
8.4.1 Implications for owner-managers of SMEs 
 
Owner-managers should be aware of the factors that may influence their financing 
decisions. They should ensure that their firms are financed at the lowest possible 
cost. Every financial decision must be able to create value for the firms. The 
following paragraphs highlight the managerial implications of the study.  
 
SME owners should recognise that asymmetric information would restrain firms 
from accessing bank loans or other external sources of funds. Owner-managers 
should take a positive initiative in improving firms’ accessibility to external sources 
of debt and equity financing through enhancing firms’ accounting systems. This 
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would allow firms to receive larger levels of credit from networks in general, and 
from commercial banks in particular. Owner-managers may also consider merger 
and amalgamation as a means of improving access to external sources of finance. 
This may require tougher disclosure requirements on limited liability enterprises, 
resulting in improved transparency and greater trust between the firm and financial 
or non-financial institutions.  
 
SME owner-managers should focus more attention on building strong network ties. 
SME owner-managers can establish a high level of confidence and trust among 
lenders or financiers through disclosing well-prepared financial statements and 
portraying good discipline by prompt payment. In addition, maintaining strong 
business networks with customers and suppliers would make it easier for SMEs to 
obtain finance from informal networks or trade credit. SMEs also need to assess the 
consequences that their control and risk aversion might have on their ability to grow 
and prosper. SME owner-managers should be aware of how their behaviours (e.g. 
control or risk averse) may impact negatively on the competitiveness of their 
business in the long run.  
 
Finally, this study identifies the critical factors that might accelerate the performance 
of SMEs. This study will give benefit to SME owners-managers in aiding them to 
choose the right financing capital for their firms. Findings of the relevance of 
traditional capital structure theories in explaining firms’ financing behaviours 
suggest that both capital structure theories of pecking order and agency coexist in 
Malaysia, and there is a tax benefit to debt. Current findings suggest that owner-
managers should concentrate on internally generated funds in order to gain the most 
from both capital structure practices. However, sometimes owner-managers may 
overlook the opportunities to enhance the value if they do not utilise debt. Thus, 
owner-managers may acquire external funds with the condition that they should fit 
decisions around taking full advantage of the tax benefit of debt. They should set a 
low target capital structure if the bankruptcy costs are very high. 
 
8.4.2 Implications for policymakers 
 
The results of this study are not only relevant to the owner-managers of SMEs, but 
also to policymakers in Malaysia and other countries with similar ethnic mixes. This 
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study highlights a number of policy implications. The identification of influencing 
factors such as ethnicity and environment will extend current understanding of how 
effectively the policymaker assists the small firms. Such findings are necessary for 
the ultimate development of SME assistance especially in terms of financing and 
advising by the government. The government authorities should recognise the 
importance of providing SMEs with support to improve their ability to access formal 
sources of financing.  
 
The present results indicated that Malaysian SMEs are, to a large extent, control 
averse and that control aversion was negatively related to leverage. Aversion towards 
external control may prevent SMEs from seeking and obtaining adequate financing 
for their business operations (Berggren et al., 2000). Consequently, this control 
aversion may affect the firms’ chances of survival (i.e. ability to grow). Government 
authorities should be aware of how such behaviour impacts on the development of 
the SME sector when developing policies related to the SME sector.  
 
Policymakers should also be aware of the mismatch of supply and demand for 
financing in the SME sector when designing policies to support SME development 
(especially those which are unincorporated). Profitable firms, with active networks, 
are less motivated to seek external sources of financing that may subject them to 
greater scrutiny. They tend to reinvest their profits, before seeking external 
financing. In contrast, firms with fewer network ties have the greatest need for 
external financing but face greater difficulties in borrowing formally due to the 
existence of high levels of asymmetric information between them and potential 
financiers. As a result, they tend to rely on informal financing mechanisms which 
results in higher financing costs. Therefore, policymakers should concentrate on 
providing specific support for those enterprises that are in serious need of external 
financing and are actively demanding it. Policymakers must find ways of redirecting 
support away from successful firms towards firms who are in greater need of formal 
financing, but are less able to access it due to significant asymmetric information 
between them and their potential lenders. This could be done by developing effective 
mechanisms for guaranteeing the debts of firms in innovative new industries that 
have significant potential for long-term growth and new firms without the obligatory 
network ties.  
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The government might also help owner-managers improve their network ties by 
holding forums in which they might develop their network ties with other business 
owners and bank officials. Government authorities could also assist in setting up 
credit guarantee schemes or providing funds for SMEs, which may reduce the 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Although a nationwide 
network of credit guarantee schemes by Credit Guarantee Corporation has been 
established, these schemes have not worked due to a lack of ongoing financial 
support, complicated bureaucracy and red tape from the government. In addition, the 
government authorities should consider advancing low-cost non-default loans 
especially to sole traders to help them survive in the premature stages of their 
business growth. The government authorities should also provide financial aid to 
guarantee schemes. The financial aid could allow businesses with a limited track 
record to seek adequate financing to support their early stages of business 
development. 
  
Policymakers should also adopt a user-friendly accounting system that will 
encourage SMEs to be more transparent in financial dealings. It will indirectly assist 
SMEs in getting better access to external financing, since it may improve the ability 
of financial institutions to assess creditworthiness of loan applicants from the SME 
sector. Moreover, the outcome of any policy changes should be tailored towards 
having an increased liquidity in the market, and tax is one mechanism. Present 
findings of the significance of tax in firms’ financial decisions (external factors) 
suggest that policymakers should design a taxation regime that would not only 
maximise the tax benefit of debt to debt seekers, but to debt providers as well. On the 
investors’ side, Malaysia’s current tax system seeks to offset the tax incentive of 
corporate debt by giving investors a tax credit on dividends received since Malaysian 
shareholders do not pay additional taxes on dividend income.  
 
Policymakers should consider the dynamic nature of the particular industry when 
developing mechanisms to support SME development (Berggren et al., 2000). SMEs 
engaged in innovative, new industries marked by rapid technological development 
will need greater support than SMEs involved in traditional industries, with little 
potential for growth. Support should be provided towards enterprises that are most 
likely to need it rather than to all enterprises irrespective of their individual situation. 
The government should review the Industrial Coordination Act (1975), specifically 
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in terms of financial incentives, facilities and contracts. The existing requirement 
was found to favour manufacturing industries compared with service sectors or 
agriculture and ICT (MIDA, 2012). The government should also re-examine the 
requirement of ICA in terms of size of the firm as it is not in accordance to the 
definition given by the Bank Negara Malaysia (2013). Thus, the government should 
guarantee that all business sectors enjoy the same opportunity to access credit from 
the government. 
 
Another very important issue is the discrimination in financing facilities and 
accessibility among ethnic groups. Current findings show that there is unfair 
treatment for non-Malay-owned (i.e. Chinese and Indian) SMEs in accessing 
government grants and loans. Government contracts explicitly favour Malay-owned 
businesses (Tran, 2013). The government should guarantee that the rhetoric of racial 
equality to be practically implemented in the funding policy. The government could 
review the existing quota on grants and loans and increase the quota for the non-
Malay-owned businesses gradually. The government should strengthen the 
implementation of the existing New Economic Model which focuses more inclusive 
and race-blind system.  
 
8.4.3 Implications for financial institutions  
 
Implications of the study can also be drawn for financial institutions engaging in 
lending to SMEs. Many SMEs are averse to borrow from financial institutions due to 
strict lending requirements. Financial institutions should consider changing their 
credit policies accordingly to suit the individual conditions of the firm, and not solely 
assess the creditworthiness of the firm on the basis of past performance. Financial 
institutions might consider placing greater weight on other factors such as the 
viability of its future business plans or growth potential of the firm. They might also 
consider accepting more items as collateral (i.e. other than fixed assets such as 
receivables, inventory and equipment) as suggested by Fagan and Zhao (2009).  
 
8.5 Limitations of the study and generalisability 
 
Results, implications and contributions of the study should be considered with the 
following limitations. As highlighted by Pandey (2001), unavailability of 
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comprehensive financial data is a major limitation in capital structure studies in 
emerging market economies. The collected financial information may be subject to 
possible human error (i.e. not the audited financial statement), which may have 
implications for the reliability and validity of the results. The main reason is due to 
inappropriate preparation of the financial statements (e.g. lack of documentation and 
transaction records) by the owner-managers. 
 
The model developed in this thesis is a simple model, adapted from various models 
(see Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Michaelas et al., 1999; Romano et al., 2000; 
Bhaird and Lucey, 2006). Although numerous independent variables affecting 
capital structure decisions have been studied, other variables probably could have 
been used and even have been more effective. A further consideration is that, even 
after revising the underlying assumptions and including some subjective financing 
decisions’ framework to the models’ specifications, the models still need some 
improvements if they are to represent firms’ actual financing scenarios in a particular 
place, as confirmed by Palacín-Sánchez, Ramírez-Herrera, and di Pietro (2013) in 
their studies on Spanish SMEs. In addition, similar to other empirical research 
conducted in the field of financial management, the conclusions drawn in this thesis 
are based on organisational behaviours at a particular time. Thus, any development 
beyond February 2014 is ignored.  
 
The sample for the main study was drawn on the basis of the criteria described in 
Section 4.5.2. A response rate of 75% was achieved, and useable responses were 
received from 384 SMEs. This is an acceptable sample size for a population of this 
magnitude (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970, cited by Collis and Hussey, 2009). The 
satisfactory results of tests for generalisability and non-response bias allow the 
findings to be generalised only to SMEs within the definition provided in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 in this study. Hence, it would be misleading and inappropriate to make a 
claim that the findings of this research are applicable across a wide range of SMEs. 
The results are representative of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in 
Malaysia and are not necessarily generalisable to other countries. It is important to 
be aware of the cultural, legal, and institutional differences between developing 
economies and the Western economies as highlighted by Chen (2004). The findings 
of this study may be limited to the Malaysian context and may not necessarily reflect 
capital structure behaviours in other countries. However, the limitations and 
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generalisability issues do not minimise the significance of the findings. 
Alternatively, these limitations provide scope for other studies to further test and 
extend the theoretical framework developed in this study. 
 
8.6 Future research 
 
The theoretical framework developed in this study can be used as the basis for future 
research into the financing of SMEs in other regions of Malaysia and in other 
developing countries. Future research is needed to compare the financing behaviours 
of SMEs in Malaysia with those in other developing countries and to investigate 
differences in industry and sector to enhance our knowledge of SMEs’ financing 
needs. In addition, it would be useful to conduct a comparative study of company 
and non-company financing behaviours as these two structures have their own 
special characteristics arising from their legal status and the extent of limited liability 
and financial disclosure. 
 
Another consideration that should be noted is that the future research could look in 
more detail at the financing behaviours among different ethnic groups by conducting 
a survey on a large sample of each ethnic group (e.g. more than 300 samples for each 
ethnic group). Large samples of study may enable collection of detailed and 
additional information on financing behaviours. A case study (instead of survey 
questionnaire) approach may also be employed to highlight in detail the capital 
structure and financing preference of SMEs.  
 
Future studies may also integrate a measure of personal risks of SME owners into the 
model through considering the issue of collateral and owner’s equity. Finally, this 
study could be updated to take account of the effect of goods and services tax (GST) 
on the capital structure (specifically in Malaysia) as Malaysia will implement GST 
starting from the first quarter of 2015 (Zhou, Tam, and Heng-Contaxis, 2013).  
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Appendix A: The Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Brunel Business School 
Research Ethics 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
1. Title of Research  
Determinants of capital structure in small and medium enterprises in Malaysia  
 
2. Researcher   
Student on PhD programme, Brunel Business School, Brunel University London 
 
3. Contact Email   
cbpghhm@brunel.ac.uk or fizah8107@yahoo.com 
 
4. Purpose of the research   
The research project investigates the factors that influence the capital structure 
(financing choices) and effects of financing behaviours on the firm’s performance. 
 
5. What is involved?   
-   Complete a self-completion questionnaire or interview. 
- Participant has been asked about business financing preference, business 
background, general issues of SMEs in Malaysia, company’s performance (not 
included any exact figure), and comment. 
-  The targeted respondents are owner-managers of the firms (i.e. those who involve 
in making financial decisions for the firms). 
 
6. Voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality.  
Your participation is absolutely voluntary but important for the success of this study. 
This research is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and is being carried out for 
academic purposes only. Your enterprise and your name will not be identified as all 
questionnaires will be coded upon receipt; so that no links are possible between the 
data and the identity of the enterprise or yourself. The data will only be used in an 
aggregated form in the report.  
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Appendix B: Guide for individual and group interviews 
Owner’s Background 
 How old are you?  
 How long have you been in this business?  
 Is this business is your first business? If not, then how many times have you 
attempted to set up own business? 
 What is your education background? 
 What motivate you to start your own business?  
 Did you inherit this business from your family or it was your own initiative? 
 How many employees do you have so far? 
 
Company’s Background  
 What is the principal activity of your business?  
 How many years your business is operating?  
 What stage of development would you say the business is in at the present 
time? 
 
Business Financing 
 How do you finance your business in start-up, growth and matured stages?  
 What are the reasons for considering the chosen type of finance?  
 Do you prefer to fund your business by means of internal or external 
funding sources? Why? 
 Do you have any preferences for short-, medium- or long-term funding 
sources? Why? 
 Under what circumstances would you require for debt? 
 Under what circumstances would you make an equity issue? 
 What are the characteristics (e.g. enterprise or entrepreneur’s 
characteristics) required when you apply for an external finance (e.g. bank, 
financial institution, non-financial institution, or government)?  
 What do you understand about capital structure determinants? 
 Did your financing choice determined by a specific determinant? (e.g.: 
SMEs characteristics/owner’s characteristic/culture/relationship with 
financial provider) 
 What items in this page do you think are not relevant to the determinants of 
capital structure? and Why? (the researcher will show respondents the listed 
determinants of capital structure which were obtain from previous 
literature) 
 
Company’s Performance 
 How would you describe your organisation's current state? 
 Did your business performance depend on the sources of finance that you 
used?  
 If so, could you please describe the effect of each financing choice on your 
company’s performance? 
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General Issues 
 In your opinion, what are the barriers to the development of the SMEs in 
Malaysia? 
 In your opinion, what measures should be taken at governmental level to 
support the creation and development of SMEs in Malaysia?  
 Are you aware of the government’s financing packages available for SMEs? 
And, to what extent is business like yours well-supported by the 
government or financial institutions?   
 To what extent is business like yours well supported by the government or 
financial institutions? 
 What advice would you give to someone who wants to start his or her own 
business? Specifically regarding financing of business. 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire for the main survey 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Dear business owner, 
 
RE: “Determinants of Capital Structure in Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Malaysia” 
 
Recognising that the future of SMEs in Malaysia relies heavily on the efforts of the SME’s owners 
such as yourself, we are eager to learn about your own experiences. In particular, we are conducting a 
survey on the financing decisions among SMEs in Malaysia with the support of the Brunel University 
Business School, United Kingdom. The purpose of the study is to investigate the determinants of 
capital structure in SMEs and the impact of the financing decisions on the organisational 
performance. 
 
Your co-operation is critical to the success of the project; therefore, we would be very grateful if you 
could complete the questionnaire. Please note that there is no “right” or “wrong” answer to any of 
these questions. If you have any comments about the financing determinants that you would like to 
include, please do so in the space provided at the end of the survey.  
 
This research is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and is being carried out for academic purposes only. 
Your enterprise and your name will not be identified as all questionnaires will be coded upon receipt; 
so that no links are possible between the data and the identity of the enterprise or yourself. The 
findings of this research project will be reported in the thesis that will be submitted to the Brunel 
University London, as required for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.  
 
In return for your cooperation, a summary of the findings will be provided to you after the project is 
finalised (upon request). In addition, we will be delighted to discuss our findings with you if this 
could be beneficial to your organisation. 
 
We thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Hafizah Mat Nawi 
Doctoral Researcher 
Brunel Business School 
Brunel University London 
Uxbridge, Middlesex 
UB8 3PH 
United Kingdom 
Email: cbpghhm@brunel.ac.uk , fizah8107@yahoo.com, hafizah@umk.edu.my 
 
Professor Adrian Woods 
Brunel Business School 
Brunel University London 
Uxbridge, Middlesex 
UB8 3PH 
United Kingdom 
Email: Adrian.Woods@brunel.ac.uk  
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SECTION A: BUSINESS FINANCING 
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding your company’s financing. 
 
1. When you start this business, from which sources was finance raised? (Check only ONE for each 
column) 
 
 Primary sources Secondary sources 
Personal Savings/personal funds 1 1 
Funds from friends and family 2 2 
Trade Credit, Hire purchase, Leasing 3 3 
Debt financing 4 4 
External Equity Financing 5 5 
 
2. What source(s) of finance does your firm use during post start-up?  
(Please rate on a scale, 0=Not Used & 1= Used) 
 
Sources of finance (SOF) Not Use  Use 
 
Retained earnings 0 1 
Internal source of finance (i.e. Personal savings of owners, Personal 
loan,  Personal Credit cards, Funds from family and friends) 
0 1 
Debt financing (i.e. Commercial loans / mortgages from banks and 
other financial institutions, bank overdraft, leasing and hire 
purchase, factoring or sale of account receivable) 
0 1 
External equity (i.e. Venture capital, business angels/ private 
investors, government grants and loans) 
0 1 
 
 
For questions 3 to 31, please indicate the level of importance of the following statements. (For each 
question, please tick the number that reflects your perception and opinion). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not important at 
all 
Not 
Important 
Neutral Important Very Important 
 
When making a financing decision for your company, which of the following factors do you 
consider as important?  
 
3. Formal business plan  1    2    3    4    5 
4. Formal strategic plan (long-term or short-term plan) 1    2    3    4    5 
5. Formal management structure  1    2    3    4    5 
6. Business performance appraisal 1    2    3    4    5 
7. Close relationship with lender/ supplier  1    2    3    4    5 
8. Duration of relationship with lender/supplier 1    2    3    4    5 
9. Review relationship with lender/supplier on a regular basis 1    2    3    4    5 
10. Review procedures in getting credits 1    2    3    4    5 
11. Send report to lender/supplier on regular basis 1    2    3    4    5 
12. Provide data to lender/supplier when requested 1    2    3    4    5 
13. Review services of lender/supplier on regular basis 1    2    3    4    5 
14. Consider hobbies of bank’s managers  1    2    3    4    5 
15. Invite lender/supplier to visit firm 1    2    3    4    5 
16 Be regular clients 1    2    3    4    5 
17. Pay on time 1    2    3    4    5 
18. Visit lender/supplier on regular basis  1    2    3    4    5 
19. Offer personal greetings to supplier/lender 1    2    3    4    5 
20. Lenders/suppliers are managed by family members/friends 1    2    3    4    5 
21. Culture norms  1    2    3    4    5 
22. Religious beliefs 1    2    3    4    5 
23. Way of life 1    2    3    4    5 
24. Attitude to debt 1    2    3    4    5 
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For questions 25 until question 35, please indicate the level of importance of the following objectives 
in influencing the financing decision of your company.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important  Strongly 
Important 
 
25. Accumulate wealth 1    2    3    4    5 
26. Improve lifestyle 1    2    3    4    5 
27. Develop hobbies or skills 1    2    3    4    5 
28. Maintain control 1    2    3    4    5 
29. Expand the firm 1    2    3    4    5 
30. Increase firm’s value 1    2    3    4    5 
31. Repay the borrowings 1    2    3    4    5 
32. Liked challenge 1    2    3    4    5 
33. Fit around family commitment 1    2    3    4    5 
34. Family tradition (Pass onto next generation) 1    2    3    4    5 
35. Provide jobs for family and friends 1    2    3    4    5 
 
 36. Please tick the type of collateral used or not used by your company for debt financing.  
 Used  Not used 
i. Inventory or accounts receivable 1 2 
ii. Business equipment or vehicles 1 2 
iii. Business securities or deposits 1 2 
iv. Business real estate 1 2 
v. Personal real estate 1 2 
 
37.  If you have used government financing, which of the following government programs or services 
did your enterprise used or not used? 
 Used Not used 
i. Soft loans 1 2 
ii. Grants 1 2 
iii. Equity finance 1 2 
iv. Venture capital 1 2 
v. Guarantee scheme 1 2 
vi. Tax incentives 1 2 
vii. Other (please specify)___ 1 2 
 
38. In order to obtain capital to expand/grow or refinance your business, would you consider sharing 
the equity (ownership) in your firm? (Check one only) 
 I currently share 50% or more 1 
Yes, I am willing to share more than 50%. 2 
Yes, but I would rather keep more than 50%. 3 
No  4 
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Please indicate the extent to which each of the following statements is true or untrue in so far as it 
reflects the business environment that your firm is operating in (please relate each statement with the 
financing decision) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Untrue Untrue Neutral True Very True 
 
1. It is easy to keep afloat in this industry 1    2    3    4    5 
2. There is little threat to the survival and well being of my business 1    2    3    4    5 
3. There are rich investments and marketing opportunities 1    2    3    4    5 
4. My business must frequently change its marketing practices 1    2    3    4    5 
5. One wrong decision could easily threaten the viability of my business 1    2    3    4    5 
6. The failure rate of businesses in this industry is high 1    2    3    4    5 
7. Social pressure could affect my business 1    2    3    4    5 
8. Strict government rules and regulation could hinder the viability of my 
business 
1    2    3    4    5 
9. The survival of my business is highly dependent on the country’s economy 1    2    3    4    5 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements (please relate 
each statement with the financing decision). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1. Details of job requirements and instructions are important  1    2    3    4    5 
2. Regulations inform employees what is expected from them 1    2    3    4    5 
3. Standard operating procedures are helpful to employees on job 1    2    3    4    5 
4. Harmonious working relationships are important for the company 1    2    3    4    5 
5. Instructions for operations are important for employees on job 1    2    3    4    5 
6. Preserving public image is one of the main policies for the company 1    2    3    4    5 
7. Owner’s success is more important than the employees’ success 1    2    3    4    5 
8. An aggressive financing policy is important for the firm 1    2    3    4    5 
9. Owner’s interest is more important than the employees’ interests 1    2    3    4    5 
10. Achievement of owner's goals is more important for the company 1    2    3    4    5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding business environment. 
SECTION C: BUSINESS CULTURAL ORIENTATION 
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding business cultural orientation. 
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1. Please, indicate your gender: 
 
 
 
 
2. Please, indicate your racial background.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Please indicate your age?  
24 or younger 1 45-54 4 
25-34 2 55 and over 5 
35-44 3 
 
 
4. What is the highest level of academic qualification obtained by the owner? 
No academic 
qualifications 
1 Postgraduate degree/Doctorate 4 
Professional qualification 2 On-the-job-training 5 
Undergraduate degree/ 
diploma 
3 Other (please specify)___ 6 
5.  
6.  
7. 5.  For how long did you work before you started up your current business?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Please indicate the area which best represents your preparation for this business. 
Life Experience 1 
Trial and Error 2 
Relevant Work Experience 3 
Family Business Training 4 
Business Start-Up Courses 5 
Related Educational Background 6 
Other (please specify)___ 7 
 
  
SECTION D: INFORMATION ON THE BUSINESS OWNER 
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding your personal demographic 
characteristics. 
Male 1 
Female 2 
Malay 1 
Chinese 2 
Indian 3 
2 years or less 1 
3-5 years 2 
6-10 years 3 
More than 10 years 4 
Not Applicable 5 
277 
 
 
1. Please, indicate how many years your business is operating?  
 
Less than 1 year  1 
1–3 years  2 
4–10 years 3 
Over 10 years 4 
 
2. What is the principal activity of this business? (Check only one from the box below) 
      Could you briefly explain what the principal activity of your business is? 
______________________ 
 
Accommodation / Budget Hotel 1 Printing and Photocopying Services 11 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry, 
Fishing 
2 Real Estate, Renting and Housing 
Development 
12 
Arts and Entertainment 3 Restaurants and Catering Services 13 
Bakery and Cakes 4 Telecommunications, Computer and 
Related Services 
14 
Construction and Maintenance 5 Textile and Clothing 15 
Electric and electronic 6 Tourism and Travel 16 
Hardware and Painting 7 Transportation and Logistics Service 17 
Foods and beverages 8 Wholesale  and Retail 18 
Health and Beauty Services 9 Workshop (Vehicles/Bicycle) 19 
Mining and quarrying 10 Other (please specify) 20 
 
3. What is the legal status of this business? 
 
Sole Proprietors 1 
Partnership 2 
Limited Liability Partnership 3 
Limited Liability Company 4 
 
4. What is your firm’s business premise?  
 
Home-based 1 
Leased space 2 
Other 3 
 
5. Please, indicate the total number of full-time and half-time employees in your firm (including 
you)?  
 
1-4 1 
5-19 2 
20-50 3 
51-150 4 
 
  
SECTION E: INFORMATION ON THE ENTERPRISE 
In this section, please provide us with background information regarding your company. 
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4. How frequent the report is prepared? (formal or informal report) 
 
Everyday  1 
Once a week 2 
Once a month 3 
No report  4 
 
 
5. To what extent do you think each of the following items increase/ decrease your debt or equity 
ratio (external sources of finance)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
decrease 
Decrease No Change Increase Strongly 
Increase 
 
A Increase in profitability 1    2    3    4    5 
B Increase in the size of the firm 1    2    3    4    5  
C Increase in the value of fixed assets 1    2    3    4    5   
Note:  Profitability= Profit before interest and taxes/ Total assets, Size of the firm= Number of 
employees.  
 
 
6. To ensure more accuracy, please provide the following information to the best of your knowledge. 
All information that you provide will remain strictly confidential. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Decreased 
more than 15% 
Decrease not 
more than 15% 
No change Increase not more 
than 15% 
Increase more 
than 15% 
 
  Year 2010  Year 2009  Year 2008  
a Total assets 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
b Fixed assets 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
c Total liabilities 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
d Sales volume 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
e Profit before interests and taxes 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
f Gross margin 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
g Cash Flow 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 1    2    3    4    5 
 
  
SECTION F: BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we seek information on your firm’s performance 
 Yes No 
1.   Did your firm prepare the formal financial report? 1 2 
2. Did your firm prepare a financial forecast? 1 2 
3. Did your firm consistently keep the financial track record? 1 2 
279 
 
7. How well is your company’s performance compared to its close competitors in the same industry 
for the following situations? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20% Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
 
New product introduction 1    2    3    4    5 
Product quality 1    2    3    4    5 
Marketing effectiveness 1    2    3    4    5 
Manufacturing value-added 1    2    3    4    5 
Technological efficiency 1    2    3    4    5 
 
8. a) Did your business have business plan? 
Yes , written 1 
Yes, but not written 2 
No 3 
       
b) How far ahead do you plan?  
A few months 1 
1±2 years 2 
3±4 years 3 
4±5 years 4 
Not applicable 5 
 
9. How would you describe your organisation's current state?   
Rapidly Growing 1 
Healthy and growing 2 
Stable 3 
Declining 4 
 
 
If you would like to make any comments regarding any of the items included in the questionnaire, 
please write them in the space provided below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS SURVEY ENDS HERE 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY 
  
280 
 
Appendix D: Preliminary study: Capital structure 
 
Interviewees Ethnic Funding method at start-
up 
Funding method at growth Funding method at maturity 
A Malay Personal savings and F&F Bank financing (overdraft)  Retained earnings, Trade credit 
B Indian Government loan Internal funds Internal funds 
C Indian Personal savings  Bank loan, trade credit Trade credit 
D Chinese Personal savings and F&F Bank loan  Internal funds 
E Malay Bank loan, Internal funds Bank loan, Trade credit, Retained 
earnings 
Trade credit 
F Malay Personal savings and F&F Bank loan Government loan 
G Indian Personal savings  Government loan Trade credit 
H Malay Personal savings  Government loan Trade credit, Hire purchase 
I Chinese Personal savings and F&F N/A N/A 
J Indian Internal funds Internal funds, Leasing, Private 
investor 
Trade credit 
K Indian Bank loan Internal funds  Internal funds 
L Chinese Personal savings and F&F Internal funds Internal funds 
M Chinese Personal savings and F&F Bank financing/ Bank Overdraft Trade credit , Leasing & Hire 
purchase 
N Malay Personal savings  Bank loan N/A 
O Chinese Personal savings and F&F Bank loan Internal funds 
P Malay Personal savings  N/A N/A 
Q Chinese Personal savings and F&F Bank loan Leasing  
R Chinese Personal savings and F&F Bank loan Government loan 
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S Malay F&F, Bank loan Government loan, Bank loan Bank loan, Trade credit, Leasing 
T Indian Personal savings and F&F Trade credit, bank loan Trade credit, Leasing & Hire 
purchase  
U Chinese Personal savings  Internal funds Internal funds 
V Indian Personal savings and F&F Retained earnings  Retained earnings  
W Malay F&F Government grant & loan, Bank loan N/A 
X Malay Personal savings  Trade credit Trade credit 
Y Malay Personal savings and F&F Trade credit, Leasing  Private investor 
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Appendix E: Determinants of capital structure (are gathered from preliminary study and previous studies) 
 
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
Items  
 
Entrepreneurs/ Participants Related Literature  
Business Planning  Formal business plan  ALL  Romano et al. (2001), 
Berger and Udell (1998) 
Harvey and Evans (1995) 
Haron and Shanmugam (1994)  
Townley (1997)  
Chirinko and Singha (2000)  
Graham and Harvey (2001). 
  Formal strategic plan (long-term or short-term plan)  
  Formal management structure   
  Business performance appraisal  
Relationship   Close relationship with lender/ supplier  A.C,E,G,H,J,L,M,N,S,T,X Howcroft and Beckett (1993) 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
Wu (2001) 
Cole et al. (2004) 
Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) 
Scott (2006)  
Newman et al. (2011) 
  Duration of relationship with lender/supplier 
 Review relationship with lender/supplier on a 
regular basis 
 Review procedures in getting credits 
 Send report to lender/supplier on regular basis 
 Provide data to lender/supplier when requested 
 Review services of lender/supplier on regular basis 
 Consider hobbies of bank’s managers  
 Invite lender/supplier to visit firm 
 
Networking  Be regular clients  
 Pay in time  
 Visit supplier/friends/relatives on regular basis 
 Offer personal greetings to lender/suppliers 
 Lenders/suppliers are managed by family members 
or friends 
 
Owner’s attitudes, 
perceptions and beliefs 
 Culture norms 
 Religious beliefs 
 Way of life 
EXCEPT E,K,R Friend and Lang (1988) 
Norton (1990) 
Michaeles et al. (1998) 
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 Attitude to debt El-Gamal (2003) 
Hamoudi (2007) 
Objectives and goals  Increase business value 
 Accumulate wealth 
 Improve the lifestyle of the owner-manager 
 Liked challenge 
 Maintain control  
 Fit around family commitment 
 Develop hobbies/skills 
 Repay borrowing 
 Pass onto next generation (family tradition) 
 Expand the firms 
 Provide jobs for family and friends 
A,B,C,E,F,G,J,K,L,M,O,Q,S,T
,U,V 
Boyer and Roth (1978) 
Barton and Gordon (1987) 
Shrivastava and Grant (1985) 
Dreux (1990)  
Hutchinson (1995) 
Read (1997)  
Neubauer and Lank (1998) 
Romano et al. (2000) 
 
Cultural Orientations  Details of job requirements and instructions are 
important  
 Owner's success is more important than group 
success 
 An aggressive financing policy is important for the 
firm 
 Owner's interest is more important than group 
interests 
 Achievement of owner's goals is more important 
for the company 
 Rules and regulations are important to inform 
employees what the organisation expects from 
them. 
 Standard operating procedures are helpful to 
employees on job 
 Harmonious working relationship and social 
harmony are important for the company 
EXCEPT B,I,M,T,U,V Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) 
Schwartz’ (1994)  
Clugston et al. (2000)  
Chui et al. (2002) 
Castro et al.(2007) 
Licht (2007) 
Breuer and Salzmann (2008) 
Shao et al. (2010) 
Li et al. (2011) 
Siegel et al. (2011) 
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 Instructions for operations are important for 
employees on job 
 Preserving public image is one of the main policies 
for the company 
Business Environment  It is very stressful and hard to keep afloat in this 
industry. 
EXCEPT A,B,D,I,M,T,Y Sener (1989)  
Naman and Slevin (1993)  
Taggart (1995) 
Michaelas et al. (1999) 
Covin et al. (2000)  
Hatzinikolaou et al. (2002) 
Mutenheri and Green (2002)  
Zhengfei and Kangtao (2004) 
 
  There is little threat to the survival and well being 
of my business. 
 
  There are rich investments and marketing 
opportunities. 
 
  My business must frequently change its marketing 
practices. 
 
  One wrong decision could easily threaten the 
viability of my business. 
 
  The failure rate of businesses in this industry is 
high. 
 
  Social pressure could affect my business.  
  Strict government’s rules and regulation could 
hinder the viability of my business. 
 
  The survival of my business is highly dependent on 
the economic situation of the country. (e.g. 
inflation/recession) 
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Appendix F: Summary of the data collection 
 
 When? Where? Why? (purpose) How? 
(approach) 
With whom? 
(respondents) 
1
st
 Pilot 
study  
July 2009 United 
Kingdom 
- To test the level of 
understanding of the 
SMEs owners regarding 
the draft interview 
guide.  
 
- Telephone 
survey 
- Personally 
administered 
survey 
 2 British  
 1 Malay 
 1 Malaysian 
Chinese  
 1 Malaysian 
Indian 
Preliminary 
study  
Nov-Dec 2009 Malaysia - For items confirmation 
- To get a description of 
the determinants of 
capital structure in 
Malaysia’s SMEs  
 
- Semi-structured 
interviews  
- 15 individual 
interviews  
- 2 group interviews 
(consist of 5 
participants for each 
group) 
 10 Malay  
 8 Chinese 
 7 Indian 
2
nd
 Pilot 
survey 
Jan-Feb 2010 Malaysia - To determine the 
appropriateness and 
relevance of the 
questions in the 
instrument 
- To check on the 
uniformity, consistency 
and validity of variables 
used in the instruments 
- To ensure it met the 
objectives of the study 
- To refine the 
questionnaire in order to 
ensure it is understood 
by the respondents 
- To check for content 
validity and face 
validity 
- Face-to-face 
structured 
interviews 
- Telephone 
survey 
- 25 SMEs’ 
owners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 3 lecturers 
- 2 SMEs’ experts 
from SME Bank 
of Malaysia 
Main study- 
Survey 
questionnai
re 
May-Nov 
2010 
Malaysia - For generalisation 
purposes using a large 
sample 
- To gain an 
understanding of 
Malaysian owner-
managers’ preferences, 
perceptions and beliefs 
towards capital structure  
- To examine the 
determinants of capital 
structure of the SMEs. 
- Structured 
interviews (Face-
to-face) 
- Personally-
administered 
(wait and collect 
on the spot) 
- Personally-
administered 
(drop-off) 
- Online survey 
- Telephone 
survey 
384 SMEs’ owners 
 128 Malay  
 128 Chinese 
 128 Indian 
Additional  
Interviews 
After 
completing 
with the 
exploratory 
factor analysis 
UK & 
Malaysia 
- For terms confirmations 
(the name given to the 
new constructs or items) 
- To test whether the 
terms/names given to 
each constructs or items 
are relevant and 
understood by the 
business owners  
- Telephone 
interviews 
 5 SMEs’ 
owners from 
Malaysia 
 3 from the U.K 
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Appendix G: Summary of the data analysis for the main survey 
 
i. Pilot study 
Types of analysis Reason using the 
analysis 
Results 
i. Reliability test 
ii. Face validity 
iii. Content validity 
To test the reliability and 
validity of the questionnaire. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for each construct is > 0.70; the item-to-total 
correlation is > 0.50. 
 No item was deleted 
 
 
iii. Main Survey 
Types of analysis Reason using the 
analysis 
Summary of the results 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
 
- PCA with varimax 
rotation 
- KMO > 0.70 
- Eigen value > 1.0 
- Communalities > 
0.50 
- Factor Loadings > 
0.50 
 
- To reduce the number of 
items  
- To examine the 
dimensionality of 
underlying constructs 
 
 Out of 52 items, 15 items were deleted. 
 
- The internal consistency of the constructs of the study is 
relatively high as for Cronbach alpha was greater than 0.7 for all 
the constructs  
- Items assigned to each dimension consistently exhibited high 
loadings on their constructs  
- Factor loadings of all the items were fairly high indicating a 
reasonably high correlation between the hypothesized factors and 
their individual items. 
 Remaining items = 37 
 Factors = 10 
Items were divided into groups to ensure that the number of observations per item for each analysis was at least 5:1 (Cavusgil and 
Zou, 1994; Hair et al, 2010). 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
 
- Binary LR 
- Forward stepwise 
procedure 
- Check for 
multicollinearity – good, 
as all VIF < 5.0; Tolerance 
index are close to 1.0 
 
- To test the 
hypotheses 
(determinants of 
capital structure- 
DOCS) on 4 
regression models: 
i. Retained earnings 
ii. Internal funds 
iii. Debt 
iv. External equity 
 
Why did not use SEM? 
- Binary Categorical 
DV 
- Non-normality of 
data & small sample 
size-  less than 400 
as required by the 
ADF (Tanaka, 1984) 
 
DOCS & Retained earnings: 
 
Results for the first hypothesis 
reveal that, commercial goals, 
lifestyle goals, age of the firm, 
owner’s attitudes to debt, 
profitability, and two-way 
interaction between 
conservatism and ethnicity were 
positively associated with 
retained earnings; while business 
culture, stable environment, 
business planning, and asset 
structure were negatively 
associated with retained 
earnings. 
  
 
DOCS & F&F: 
 
Results reveal that mastery and 
ethnicity were positively related; 
 
DOCS & Debt finance: 
 
Results reveal that debt 
financing is positively associated 
with commercial goals, 
networking and relationship, 
business planning, asset 
structure, and stable 
environment; and negatively 
associated with the age of the 
firm, business culture, ethnicity, 
owner’s attitude to debt, 
profitability, external 
environment, and moderating 
effects of ethnicity with 
conservatism.  
 
DOCS & External equities: 
 
Results reveal that mastery, 
commercial goals, firm size, and 
business planning were 
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while age of the firm and 
business planning were 
negatively related with this 
dependent variable.  
positively related; while 
ethnicity, profitability, and the 
moderating effects of ethnicity 
with conservatism, were 
negatively related with this 
dependent variable. 
For categorical IVs, the reference group is the first item 
for each group. 
e.g.  
Ethnicity comprise of 1:Malay, 2:Chinese, 3:Indian.  
Hence, the reference group is the first item, which is 1: 
Malay. 
For continuous IVs (Likert Scale), the researcher firstly created one 
new variable for each factor in the final solution. The researcher 
chose ‘Anderson-Rubin method’ for calculating the factor scores. The 
scores that are produced have a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1, 
and are uncorrelated. (factor scores  were used in this study to 
perform additional analyses using the factors as variables) 
e.g.  
The factor of ‘Business Planning’ consists of 4 items. In doing binary 
LR, the researcher puts in ONLY the factor score of this factor, not 
every factor loading of each item. 
 
 
 
